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This is the report of a seminar assembled to develop ideas and stimulate interest in the study of the intersection between the social sciences and moral theory with respect to how formal schooling functions in the process of moral and civic education. The report consists essentially in the production of the papers produced for the seminar, in the stage they reached at the point of seminar meetings, and some summary of what emerged in the course of the discussion. The essays are reproduced, together with a brief assessment of the essential conclusions. Participants in the seminar were Thomas F. Green, Syracuse University; George Stern, Syracuse University; James E. McClellan, Temple University; Paul M. Dietl, Temple University; Roy Simeon-Bryce, Hunter College; and Edmund Pincoffs, University of Texas. (Author/CJ)

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March 1969

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

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SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIALIZATION THROUGH FORMAL SCHOOLING RELATING PRIMARILY TO CIVIC AND MORAL EDUCATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. SUMMARY 1

II. INTRODUCTION 3

- A. Purpose of the Project 3
- B. History of the Seminar 3
- C. Results 3
- D. Plan of the Report 4
- E. Conclusions and Recommendations 4

III. THE POSITION PAPERS 5

- A. The Proposal: Education for the Formation of a Technical Conscience 5
- B. The Theory of Conscience: A Note on Method 18

IV. THE SEMINAR PAPERS 27

- A. Introduction 27
  - 1. The Fundamental Question 27
  - 2. The Basic Themes 27
  - 3. The Conclusion 37
- B. Paper by Roy Simeon-Bryce 39
- C. Framework for Thinking about Education in Values by James E. McClellan 53
- D. The Failure of Ideology: An Intergenerational Disturbance by George G. Stern 67
- E. Some Prolegomena to a Theory of Moral Education by Edmund Pincoffs 93

V. PARTICIPANTS 115

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. SUMMARY 1

II. INTRODUCTION 3

- A. Purpose of the Project 3
- B. History of the Seminar 3
- C. Results 3
- D. Plan of the Report 4
- E. Conclusions and Recommendations 4

III. THE POSITION PAPERS 5

- A. The Proposal: Education for the Formation of a Technical Conscience 5
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  - 1. The Fundamental Question 27
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- D. The Failure of Ideology: An Intergenerational Disturbance by George G. Stern 67
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V. PARTICIPANTS 115

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. SUMMARY 1

II. INTRODUCTION 3
  A. Purpose of the Project 3
  B. History of the Seminar 3
  C. Results 3
  D. Plan of the Report 4
  E. Conclusions and Recommendations 4

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  A. The Proposal: Education for the Formation of a Technical Conscience 5
  B. The Theory of Conscience: A Note on Method 18

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  A. Introduction 27
    1. The Fundamental Question 27
    2. The Basic Themes 27
    3. The Conclusion 37
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  C. Framework for Thinking about Education in Values by James E. McClellan 53
  D. The Failure of Ideology: An Intergenerational Disturbance by George G. Stern 67
  E. Some Prolegomena to a Theory of Moral Education by Edmund Pincoffs 93

V. PARTICIPANTS 115

I

SUMMARY

This is the report of a seminar assembled to develop ideas and stimulate interest in the study of the intersection between the social sciences and moral theory with respect to how formal schooling functions in the process of moral and civic education. Since the purpose of the seminar was primarily to enlarge the limits of the academic public concerned with topics of educational importance, no empirical investigation was proposed. Therefore the report consists essentially in the production of the papers produced for the seminar, in the stage they reached at the point of seminar meetings, and some summary of what emerged in the course of the discussion. The results of this effort are reported in the next section of the report, and the papers are reproduced in subsequent sections together with a brief assessment of the essential conclusions.

II

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Project:

The work undertaken under this contract was originally conceived as a part of the Culture of Schools Program sponsored by the Office of Education under the leadership of Professor Stanley Diamond of the New School for Social Research. Within that program some seminars were established primarily for the purpose of exploring the potentialities for further investigation of topics relating to the culture of schools. Among those seminars was one on Some Aspects of Socialization Through Formal Schooling Relating Primarily to Civic and Moral Education. The purpose of this seminar was primarily to focus upon the relevance or irrelevance of central ideas in moral theory to the actual social structure and culture of schools from the point of view of what that social structure may be expected to develop in the way of moral character.

B. History of the Seminar:

The proposal originally submitted for funding called for a much more extensive and systematic study of these matters, including guidance for the seminar on the part of a board of advisors and follow-up to transmit the ideas generated to a wider audience. These steps were regarded as essential in order to fulfill the objectives of the Culture of Schools Program in stimulating further research and interest in the study of such topics. The contract negotiated called for a level of activity at about 20% of what was originally envisaged. Consequently, the activity was cut back to fit the resources and necessarily resulted in the formation of a seminar in the conventional sense. Papers were commissioned, an exchange of ideas took place, and some work was generated that promises to reach its completion in subsequent efforts on the part of the participants.

C. Results:

The results of this modest enterprise were approximately what was projected in the original proposal. On the basis of work undertaken in this contract, the principle investigator submitted a proposal to the Guggenheim Foundation for support. A Fellowship was awarded for the academic year 1969-70 for him to prepare a more extensive manuscript on the role of formal schooling in the transmission of moral values. This work will be undertaken during the next academic year at Harvard University. In addition, the paper herein submitted, written by George Stern, will result in a full length book on the formation of conscience. In addition, partly as a consequence of this seminar, Edmund Pincoffs and Paul Dietl have been encouraged to revive their interest in the educational relevance of moral philosophy, and are continuing to work in the area. This kind of result is precisely what was projected as an outcome from the Culture of Schools Program.

D. Plan of the Report:

In view of the somewhat unusual nature of this effort, the following report consists primarily in a submission of the papers produced in the course of the seminar together with the position papers on the basis of which the discussions were based. The position papers are included in Section III. The discussion papers developed from those initial essays are included in Section IV together with a brief discussion of the principle notions contained in them.

E. Conclusions and Recommendations:

This enterprise was not calculated to produce conclusions and recommendations in the conventional sense. It was intended to enlarge interest among specialists in the need to develop new kinds of studies and new ideas for research in the field of education. It has done this. Insofar as that is an important objective, the seminar has attained its objective, and it may be well for the Office of Education to consider continuing in small and modest ways further efforts in the humanities and philosophical subjects to enlarge the community of interest in this way.

III

A. THE PROPOSAL: EDUCATION FOR THE FORMATION OF A TECHNICAL CONSCIENCE
(Thomas F. Green)

A. Objectives

This is a proposal to establish, through Syracuse University, a working seminar to:

a. produce some intensive and theoretical studies on certain aspects of socialization through formal schooling, aspects relating primarily to moral and civic education in a technical society, and to

b. stimulate a coherent pattern of subsequent study on related topics by people in several different disciplines, and to

c. spread the discussions of the participants and the results of their work through some leaders of welfare agencies, schools and other agencies which have an institutional commitment to character education.

B. The Problem

The central problem of the seminar can be formulated in a single question: How, if at all, is it possible to educate for the formation of a technical conscience? However, the question, to gain any clarity, must be elaborated. Put in another way, the question is: how, if at all, is it possible to educate according to the view that moral behavior and civic action are to be conceived primarily as technical affairs? How can a technical conscience be formed?

The terms "technology" and "technical" relate directly to the term "technique." They connote skill, manipulation, management and efficiency and effectiveness of action. Good technique is successful and economical. It is not necessarily right or good in any moral sense. On the other hand, the terms "right," "duty," "good" and "bad," in their moral senses, have to do with the sphere of practical rather than theoretical reason. They deal with claims and counter-claims of an inter-personal or communal nature. A manipulative approach to inter-personal and communal affairs may appear to be immoral, or at best amoral. It is not true that what is good, right, or one's duty in a moral sense, will be technically effective or efficient. The idea of "conscience" seems to be extrinsic to technology and intrinsic to morality. Education in technology is primarily a matter of cultivating competence, and education in morality a matter of cultivating conscience. How, then, can it make any sense to speak of forming a technical conscience?

The distinction is too sharply drawn. It is an open question whether and to what extent the moral life is a matter of skill. Aristotle thought it was to a high degree; Kant thought it was not. It is an open question. Conscience without competence is just as dangerous as competence without conscience. That is what makes the question of the seminar possible. It is not, however, what makes the question important for American education. The importance of the question can be seen under three inter-related headings: (1) The changing function of schooling in America, (2) The instrumental demands on action in schools and urban centers, and (3) The resulting tension created in the American moral tradition.

1. The Changing Function of Schooling

Mass education in American society has come to mean mass schooling. It did not always have that meaning. It did not have that meaning for Jefferson nor for the generation of Horace Mann, nor did it have that meaning even in the initial encounter of American society with its ethnic minorities.[1] Heretofore, education, though advanced in the school, was primarily continued and sustained in the home, the polity, and through participation in the economy. It was possible to take this view because adult roles were accessible to those with common or elementary education and personal identity could be secured through some vocation without substantial prerequisites in the form of schooling. Schooling was deemed essential for the formation of an informed electorate and for security against the divisions of ethnic pluralism.

Now we have a new set of social conditions and the result is a new social function for schools and schooling. We are becoming a technological, urban, corporate and highly organized society as opposed to an earlier industrial, rural, individualistic society. The adult social roles in the economy and the polity are almost universally believed to require heavy prerequisites in the form of schooling. The requirements for increased schooling are frequently more symbolic than functional, but they are real nonetheless. For example, not long ago, Governor Rockefeller vetoed an act of the New York legislature which would require a college degree as a prerequisite for certification as a mortician in New York State. Had he allowed the act to become law, then access to the position of mortician in New York State would have been unavailable to anyone except through schooling. Again, it was at one time possible for a farmer to "read law" under an attorney and through examinations gain admission to the Bar. Abraham Lincoln did not have a law degree. He read law as a clerk. This path for entrance into the profession is now virtually closed. "Reading law" now takes the form of schooling undertaken in pursuit of a law degree. Law clerks are a virtually vanishing breed; and where they do exist, most notably in the Supreme Court offices, they must have a law degree. Not even by joining the Army can one avoid the necessity for schooling.

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[1] See Lawrence Cremin, The Genius of American Education (Random House, New York), p. 6.

The result is that as schooling becomes an increasingly necessary prerequisite for ever more positions in adult American society, the function of the schools becomes transformed. We began with a belief in mass education as essential for the formation of a democratic society and an informed electorate. We then learned to equate the need for mass education with the demand for mass schooling, and in the process we have transformed the schools into the primary agency for certifying, sorting and selecting people for positions in the economy, the polity, and the military institutions of American society.

The impact of this movement is most easily seen in higher education where the functions of certification and selection are quite properly dominant. The most fundamental functional observation that can be made about colleges and universities -- but also about the lower schools -- is not that they are institutions of teaching and research, but that they award degrees, diplomas and certificates of various sorts. Without this function, certain other institutional arrangements would be unnecessary. There would be no need for grades, examinations, registrars, records or course prerequisites. We could dispense with the programmatic aspects of organization into colleges, schools, divisions, and departments. In short, separate from the function of certification and selection, a college or university would truly resemble a teaching and research center. But certification and selection is the legal function of a college. The point is not that this is an unimportant function, but rather that whereas this social function used to be performed in other ways, it is now done primarily through schools, and certification and selection has consequently become a primary function of schools.

a. Implications: Teaching

The effects of this transformation in the purposes of schooling are felt in many subtle ways. In the first place, consider how the emphasis on the purpose of certification influences the conduct, indeed, the very conception of teaching. We would expect the activity of teaching to become focused primarily on its results. What counts is the outcome, the consequence. The tendency then is to view teaching and to assess its excellence in terms of its product. The same would be said of the school itself. It, too, is to be evaluated in relation to the excellence of its product.

The perspective, in fact, permeates the entire language with which we examine the conduct of teaching. It gets to be viewed as a practical skill in "making something" or "making something happen." Indeed, there may be an almost irresistible tendency for teachers to insist on a "process-product" appraisal of their teaching in order to escape the possibility that their efforts may lack some determinable consequences. Under the aegis of the demand for certification, teaching gets to be viewed as a productive enterprise, and the school as a productive institution. It would be important to examine the language, self-image, and self-defences of teachers to see whether this is really true and how, if it is true, it gets related to the transforming function of the school and schooling. It would be equally important to contrast these studies with what is discoverable in other societies where the social function of schooling is different and the pervasive model of teaching is different.

Consider a different view, the view that teaching and learning must be fun, must be aimed at fun and cannot be understood in relation to their outcome. Consider an analogy. There is a jungle-gym in the yard. There it stands with its ladders and bars for climbing and its cross-pieces for swinging and jumping. There it exists whether or not there are any children to play in it. But it exists for play. It has its own structure. The object is to get the child into the structure to play. Language, too, has its structure, its logical operators, its functors and modals, its peculiar metaphors. This is so of the "language of the street," of the shoe-shine boy, and the "disadvantaged." The structure is already there. What is often lacking in the school is the recognition that it can be played with, modified, and enjoyed. This enjoyment and play becomes increasingly difficult to develop in proportion as the function of the school becomes more heavily laden with the necessity for certifying achievement in a particular standard of linguistic usage. The focus must then fall on the outcome -- standard good usage -- rather than in the enjoyment of the language. That may be the remote goal, but the immediate function of teaching is to introduce the child to the structure and properties of language so that he can enter it as something to enjoy. Learning understood in this way has its own immediate motivation and cannot be understood or controlled by the necessity of attaining some standard of certification.

This was a fundamental insight of Dewey's and is the element of truth in the idea of the play-school. That idea, of course, can be cheapened. The principle of the play-school was seldom extended beyond the elementary level because play was not rightly seen as having its own intrinsic discipline and the academic disciplines were not seen as having their own intrinsic elements of play.[2] The fundamental point, however, is that when the social function of the school becomes certification and selection, then the whole language of teaching and the behavior of teachers becomes transformed from the language of and behavior of play, fun, and appreciation, to the language and behavior of working, making, and producing.

b. Implications: The role of guidance:

As certification and selection become the primary function of schooling, then certain social roles in the schools will be given weight out of proportion to what would otherwise be expected. As McClellan and Komisar have pointed out,[3] schooling has increasingly taken on the character of a contest, a contest whose rewards are substantial, visible and tangible. It becomes a deadly serious game. As a consequence, as in any contest where success is of such enormous importance, it becomes necessary to make increasingly precise discriminations between different levels of success or else give up any pretense that different rankings in any way reflect considerations of justice. In the contextof schooling, that means testing, and testing with increasing powers of discrimination. As the selecting and sorting function of schooling becomes more important, as it surely will, then the school will increasingly require technically competent professionals to carry out its main tasks. The strategic person in the school will become not the teacher but the guidance counselor.

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[2] See Dewey's discussion Education and Experience, Chapt. II.

[3] James E. McClellan and Paul Komisar, "Educational Innovations: Social Evolution or Social Revolution," Temple University Alumni Review, Fall 1965, pp. 26-29.

It is crucial to understand the power and status of the guidance counselor and the conflicts and tensions generated in the social system by his professional training as over against his changing social role. He is a man who has certain technical knowledge not shared by other members of the school staff. He knows about internal and external testing programs, about means, norms, standard deviations, and diagnostic tests. He is the keeper of records. He knows about applying to colleges, entrance exams, advanced placement and all the rest. These are not matters of primary importance in the day to day tasks of the school, but they are of extraordinary importance to the certifying and sorting tasks.

The training of the guidance counselor, however, places a greater weight on the clinical and therapeutic task of counseling than on the quite different function of guidance. The transforming social function of the school, however, makes it incumbent upon him to focus on the quite different task of guidance, selection and sorting. The logistical problem of getting the right student together with the right teacher at the right time and the right financial assistance to the right student for the right college, are technical problems which require a high level of professional competence, and a well developed program of public relations; and these functions, of such enormous importance, conflict with the therapeutic and clinical focus of the professional's training. It constitutes a role conflict of great importance to study.

As the function of the school is further transformed, other role conflicts are likely to emerge and require resolution. In the first place, as the technical competence of the guidance staff is more apparent, and it's function more clearly differentiated, then we should expect the counselor to take on a kind of "priestly function." He becomes the possessor of certain skills and technical knowledge which set him apart from the rest of the staff and establish him in a quasi-administrative position of enormous influence and increase the social distance between himself and the teaching faculty. This would produce a new, elevated, and in many ways protected status in the social organization of the school. It is the familiar process of institutional specialization or differentiation of function. In the second place, it is quite clear that this same development cannot help but make the guidance-counselor a primary spokesman for the school in its relations to parents, other schools, and the community in general.[4] He must be expected to take on some of the functions previously exercised by the principal.

In short, the role of the guidance counselor is strategic to study because of its importance in reinforcing the tendency to couch the language of teaching, schools, and schooling increasingly in terms of output and product. Moreover, the changes of role and status which I have been describing are taking place in American schools. That in itself is strong evidence that the social functions of schools and schooling are in fact being transformed and that increasing emphasis is falling on the task of sorting, selecting and certifying. Whether we like it or not, the tendency is strong and the evidence is convincing that the function of schooling in American society is not as it once was, to provide an informed electorate and a common culture. It is increasingly to shape the human resources of the nation to "fit" the economic and military requirements of the United States.

2. The Instrumental Skills for Action in School and Society

When the certification and selection functions of the school predominate, then "going to school" and graduating become deadly serious affairs. It becomes a matter of what one can get out of the teacher in the end. Then the successful student must learn to take the long view and it becomes especially important for him to view the school as a kind of con-game, the object of which is not the immediate pleasure of playing in the jungle gym, but rather to manipulate the system into granting the right stamp of approval, to get, in other words, the right out-come, to be certified as a "proper product." It would be important to study the school culture for the way it rewards the skills of the con-artist. This may have much to do with the differential response of students to the school who come from different social and cultural backgrounds. Some children come with such skills already developed. Others come from backgrounds in which such behavior is not normative. This differential adaptation may have much to do with the certification monopoly of the usual elementary and secondary "establishment" of schools as opposed to the more voluntary trade and vocational schools such as barber colleges and business schools. In the more voluntary trade schools we would expect the students to feel less strongly the "obligation" to graduate, and therefore we would expect failure to be experienced in a different way.[5]

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[4] See Parsons' notion of the "instrumental leader."

But what are the skills implicit in the con-game? In the first place, the con-artist tries to get what he wants by acting so as to reinforce the self-image of his victim. This frequently requires the adoption of a rather calculated mode of behavior. One must contrive to act the way one's victim wishes one to act.[6] It is helpful sometimes in the con-game, for the artist to appear fumbling, inept, and in need of sage advice. In the school, the same process often requires one to appear quiescent, agreeable, and well disciplined, but in both cases what one learns is to play a certain role in a calculated fashion. In the second place, the con-game stresses the capacity not to take the overtly defined situation seriously. That is, the con-artist must act inept without being so; he must be able to elicit advice, appear to take it seriously and yet not do so. His activity, in short, is an interesting miniature of what we often call alienation. It involves a kind of detachment, a presentation of the self without that presentation actually being the definition of the self. This represents a high social skill, and it may be precisely this set of social skills which are peculiarly rewarded when the school's primary function is certification and selection.[7] The development of these skills may be more important to academic success than many other factors of socio-economic status and mental ability.

The acquisition of these social skills may in fact be a highly functional thing for life in modern America for the simple reason that we are becoming an urban society. What can we say about the

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[5] This observation is contained in a report, as yet unpublished, of some research done by Professor Blanche Geer dealing with the "informal curriculum" of a business school, a barber college and the process of socialization into some professional roles in medical institutions. See John Holt, How Children Fail, especially Chapt. II "Fear and Failure."

[6] See Parsons. The Social System, p. 94, the "double contingency problem" with respect to achievement.

[7] Note: If this hypothesis can be empirically sustained, it means that the kind of social character being formed through schooling does not fit the "other-directed" -- "inner-directed" dichotomy of David Reisman.

phenomenal experience of people growing up in an urban, secular, highly organized society in which there is an attenuation of primary associations.[8] There is one proposition which is clearly beyond question because it is virtually analytic. It is that urban society is filled with strangers. The second proposition is that in such a society the secondary, casual, fairly structured encounters between people gain in significance. Most of the people that we deal with are strangers. And yet in dealing with these strangers one must be able to communicate efficiently and effectively, and that often means that one must present oneself as something that one really is not -- just a bit brighter, a bit more competent, a bit more sophisticated than one really is. Moreover, in those dealings one must be content to let strangers remain strangers. The ideals of intimacy, of primary associations, of I-Thou relations tend to be restricted to a few friends and become irrelevant for large segments of urban life. Urban man is more profoundly public in his actions, and by the same token he *can* become more profoundly personal in the smaller sphere of his privacy.[9] Under these conditions a premium is placed upon the efficiency of the actor and his capacity for a certain detachment, a healthy alienation from his activities. He must learn not to take them too seriously. In short, I wish to suggest that the high social skills of the con-artist may be indispensable in the urban setting of life. It may be precisely these skills which it is essential to develop in young people for life in modern American society. The school whose primary function is certification and selection is well adapted to serve this purpose, and for that reason such a school is in a strong position in American society.

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[8] One might argue that it is premature to speak of the attenuation of primary associations in the urban setting. There can be no doubt, however, that proportionately less of our time is spent in the presence of "primary others" in the urban setting. The more significant change, however, may be of a different sort, namely, that so vividly described in Jane Jacob's *The Life and Death of American Cities*, especially Chapters 2-4. There she describes an intricate set of interdependent "trust" relations in an urban neighborhood which are certainly not primary, but not quite secondary either. They are not relations of anonymity, at least. But they are public in nature. They are relations neither between friends nor strangers, but between mere acquaintances. They are public only in the sense that "publicity" is opposed to "privacy."

[9] See Harvey Cox, *The Secular City*. It does not follow that he *will* be more profoundly personal in his relations.

3. Technology and the Moral Tradition

It is clear, however, that this state of affairs is precisely what for years we have viewed with alarm and even condemnation. We are not accustomed to view with approval the calculated, contrived skills of the con-artist with their potential for deception. But deception is possible only when people are unequal in their skill. Consider the plays that were popular in America in the last decade of the nineteenth century. They have, almost without exception, the same theme. The hero is the clear-headed, transparent, honest and sincere country boy who came to the city from up-state New York or down-state Illinois. There he was confronted with the calculating, scheming false city boy. He was a stranger and he was taken in. But in the end, it was always the clean, forthright, plain spoken, and sincere boy from the country who won out. Not even then was virtue its own reward. Its reward was rather the success of this world which always comes to the boy of virtue and honesty if he will but persevere.

In our intellectual tradition, we have little on which to draw to celebrate the life of the city and endorse the kinds of social behavior which it seems to require.[10] What was condemned as bad and corrupting in those plays may be exactly the kind of skills, exactly the conception of the moral agent which makes sense in the city. The transformation of America from a rural and agrarian to an urban and technological, manipulative society may reach so far as to carry with it a literal transformation of the very idea of a moral agent and of what it means to be a member in society.

Throughout the history of western moral theory there have been three fundamental metaphors which have governed. There has been the idea of man the pilgrim, the searcher and creator of what is good. The idea is central in classical thought and in the utilitarians of the nineteenth century. The central question was "What is the good for man?" The second image has been the vision of man the law-giver, the legislator to himself. The central moral question from this perspective was "What is right?" "What is lawful?" This is the fundamental question in the theory of duty. The third metaphor has had to do with the image of man the artist. The central moral question becomes not what is right or what is good, but what is "fitting," what is appropriate. This is the central focus of the moral-sense school and is a strong element in the Greek conception of *hamartia* and of life as an art, a *techne*, or a skill.

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[10] For this position thoroughly treated see Morton White, The Intellectuals Versus the City. For a more benign view of this point see The Exploding Metropolis by the editors of Fortune Magazine, esp. "Introduction" and Chapts. 1, 6; see also Jane Jacobs, op. cit.

In the American experience the conception of the moral life has been powerfully shaped by the character of life in the New England town and the frontier. It has been an experience informed by religious, specifically Puritan, ideas with their focus on duty as opposed to prudence; and by a frontier experience which afforded the individual a considerable space to maneuver and permitted him a considerable panache. In short, the focus has been on the right and the good with relatively little emphasis on what is effective, prudent, practically wise and technically efficient. Yet in modern American society it is precisely these latter emphases which count. In the modern, urban, technically oriented, highly organized world, the initial moral question may not be what is right or good, but "what is happening?"[11] What is happening to me, to my neighbor, and *how*, by what *techne*, can I do something about it? The moral agent becomes much more the public agent, the political agent. He has need of some rather special skills. He becomes the man who is able in effect to "read the signs of the times," to discern the occasions for action as they present themselves, to accurately pick and choose where it is best to act, through what means, and with what expected temporary gains and losses. This is a much closer wedding of prudence, political sense, or what Aristotle called phronesis, practical wisdom, than anything we have understood as moral action before. The moral agent in this sense has need of techne, social skill, and the needed skills are largely captured in the techniques of the con-artist. He must be a moral technologist.

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[11] This point has been elaborated, to the best of my knowledge, in only one contemporary work, Richard Neibuhr, *The Responsible Self*. Yet the point is of enormous, perhaps even over-riding, importance; for connected with the problem I am considering is a transformation in the conception of the public and therefore of membership in the public. In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt argues that the modern world has seen the disappearance of the public arena. But what public did she have in mind? It was the *res publia* or *civitas* of Cicero and the *polis* of Aristotle. That public was synonymous with a political body and membership in it meant one thing. But the public that Jane Jacobs speaks of is quite another thing. It is largely a matter of surveillance by members of an inter-related network of social roles and is *not* basically political. The public of which Dewey spoke so ambiguously in *The Public and Its Problems* is sometimes the public of Cicero, sometimes that of Jane Jacobs and sometimes neither. Neibuhr's conception of the responsible self is based upon the ideas of George Herbert Mead and his is the first work in moral *theory* to take the idea of responsibility as the fundamental moral category in the sense of *ability to respond* in a public network *a la* Jane Jacobs. In short, the significance of Neibuhr's work is that he interprets moral behavior in the context of a public in the modern sense and sees the moral agent as possessing a certain kind of civic skill. In other words, he sees it as the development of a technical conscience.

The trouble with the high social skills of the con-artist is neither that they are bad nor that they are inappropriate for American society. They are essential skills to develop in the process of socialization. However, one can and must possess these skills without being a thief. Having the one does not imply being the other. The difficulty is rather that they are simply skills. The ideas of effectiveness and efficiency of action are not moral concepts at all. They are technical concepts. The danger is that we shall develop technical competence without developing a technical conscience. The skills of the con-artist are indispensable for urban America. The schools, partly because of their overwhelming function of selection and sorting are successful in producing these skills. Yet it is precisely this technical social skill which the school develops in practice and repudiates in theory. This places a hopeless burden on teachers and young people, and it is fraught with danger for American life. No society, to the best of my knowledge, has long survived with a technical ethic. The best example is Homeric society in which it could be said, "The qualities of a man are best displayed in ambush." This is the ultimate in the ethics of success. It is a view as Arthur Adkins has observed, most suitable to a society which cherishes the arts of war.[12]

This then is the more profound sense in which there is a revolution in American education. It is a revolution in the very conception of the moral agent and of membership in society. The problem is not simply the universal contrast between the real and the ideal. That contrast must always exist in every society. The problem is not to overcome that distinction, but rather to make it intelligible. The problem is the formation of a technical conscience.[13]

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[12] The most outstanding work to deal with this matter is Arthur Adkins' study of the transformation of Greek values from a feudal through an agrarian to a civic society. It is Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1962).

[13] Parsons has developed a cogent hypothesis as to how this conscience is formed. See The Social System, pp. 207-217, especially p. 213. See also, Parsons and Shills, Toward a General Theory of Action, pp. 60, 73-75, and The Social System, pp. 51-54 and 69-75 on the instrumental action-orientation.

It is to interpret the human values of the American and Western tradition so that they can be formulated in technical terms. How, to be specific, do we educate to an understanding of service as a matter of technical competence? If we fail to do this, we shall have failed to communicate what it means to render service in the concrete life of the professions and the family, and in the political affairs of the community. How, in short, can we utilize the social skills developed in the school to interpret the values of service, respect, and dignity which are so important a part of the American experience? Is it possible for moral education to be conducted as a matter of developing technical competence in the expression of certain values? This then is the problem.

Some of the questions raised here are appropriately studied from the perspective of anthropology, others need philosophical, sociological, historical, or even psychiatric examination. But they all relate to the problem of educating a technical conscience, formulating the traditional values of American society so that they can be learned, recognized and lived as technical problems.

B. THE THEORY OF CONSCIENCE: A NOTE ON METHOD

The proposal submitted to the Office of Education was built around the concept of a "technical conscience," the idea of a conscience which combines "competence" with "conscience." In this position paper, I attempt to specify more carefully how this idea might be studied in order that we can begin to identify the theoretical problems more precisely and delimit the boundaries of some questions on which studies need to be conducted.

In order to get at our problem as directly as possible, I shall simply formulate a kind of target about the subject and then consider how it might be possible to hit that target. Our aim ultimately is to find and formulate a heuristically and pedagogically useful way of _describing_ conscience and to do so in such a way that specific, useful and new empirical approaches might be formulated for the study of moral education. The aim, moreover, is to describe conscience, initially at least, in such a way that our description does not describe any particular kind of moral life. That is, the formulation of conscience is not something limited to people of a particular tradition, culture, "moral outlook," or set of values. Conscience can be framed in a variety of ways involving different valuations and different factual beliefs about the world. On the other hand, it is quite necessary to recognize that conscience may be expressed more adequately in one time or place than in another. That is to say, there is no reason to suppose _a priori_ that moral conscience does not grow, even for mankind at large. It certainly is true that it changes in some sense. Consequently, a description of what conscience _is_ cannot be a description of any _particular_ kind of conscience. Still conscience is the sort of thing which grows, changes and develops, certainly in the life of a given individual, and perhaps even in the history of any particular society. The limits of conscience; that is, the _scope_ of the questions to which it relates, will undoubtedly be different in different societies. Moreover, the specific _way_ in which conscience is expressed may, as I have suggested, be quite different as between a technological and an agrarian society.

I wish, therefore, to consider as a matter of method four concerns under which the nature of conscience might be studied. They are:

1. The _Form_ of Conscience
2. The _Formation_ of Conscience
3. The _Scope_ of Conscience
4. The _Context_ of Conscience

It can be seen, I think, that most of the observations I have made so far, and most of the questions we shall want to consider can be made to fall under one or another of these four points. But let us examine each one individually to see exactly how that happens.

1. The Form of Conscience

Most of the questions of contemporary ethical theory fall under this heading. They have to do primarily with understanding the nature of morality as a structure. In that respect, most of modern ethical theory is Kantian. It is concerned with delineating the logical form of moral judgments, the logical canons of moral reason, or with mapping the structural relations that exist between concepts that enter into moral thinking. I say that it is Kantian because as Singer has argued (Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics) and Hare also (R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason), the principle of generalization is really a principle which underlies all cases of reason-giving behavior and is, in fact, a particular formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative. There can be no doubt, moreover, that contemporary ethical philosophy has been preoccupied with the view of morality as rule guided; and what has been of interest is the structure or form of such rules rather than their particular content. In these respects, modern ethical theory has been Kantian in its focus and has been concerned primarily with the form of conscience.

If we grant the possibility--and in view of the developments in philosophical ethics over the past sixty years there seems no reason not to--that it is possible to investigate the form or structure of morality as such, then the problem, when we focus on moral education, is not to reject this approach as irrelevant, but rather to describe its limits and to consider how far it will take us in the study of other questions which may be pedagogically and heuristically of equal importance. This might be done if we were to take an attack somewhat as follows. If there is such a thing as the structure or form of morality wherever and whenever it is found (see Wm. Frankena, Ethics, Prentice-Hall foundations of philosophy series), then, adopting a useful metaphor, we might view morality as an institution. The idea is not new. Butler spoke frequently of the "moral institution of life." But the advantage of this view is that it allows us to focus on morality as a structure and to view moral education as the process of inducting the young into that institution.

Institutions, after all, are structurally related roles. Thus, the institution of agriculture includes, among others, the roles of farmer and implement manufacturer. The institution of government includes, among other things, the structural relation between the roles of citizen and representative. The institutions of agriculture and government include much more than this, of course, but these examples may serve to illustrate what I have in mind by speaking of an institution as a structure. By viewing morality as an institution, it is then possible to place appropriate weight on the contemporary interest in the formal properties of the moral life and, at the same time, begin to set the appropriate limits to that interest. Morality is an institution, and moral education is the process of induction into that institution. The form of conscience and the formation of conscience are thus joined.

Let us explore this idea a bit more. Consider the following passage.

> "If it makes anyone happy, as it apparently does, to reflect that everything, everywhere and everywhen, is organized in some fashion, so be it. That leaves us just where we were before, profoundly interested in discovering the objective differences between organization and disorganization, between order and chaos, and this difference is to be looked for, I think, in the fact that it takes a certain kind of structure and organization to house and embody certain kinds of significant contents....A chaotic society is one with a type of

> organization which bars it from incorporating significant ideas and values, such as justice and freedom. The questions whether you are confronted by order or disorder, civilization or barbarism, have nothing to do with subjective preference. It is the question of the adequacy of a container to its contents, of a body to its soul. In short, institutional organization of any society is not the totality of its civilization....It is not enough to say that social structure performs certain functions in the sense in which the nerve ganglia of mollusks perform a function. No doubt they do; but that is not their distinctive trait. The new, utterly unique and momentous thing about the functions performed by social structures is that the individuals belonging to these institutions can become aware both of the social machinery and of the ends which it may serve, the significant contents and meanings for which the social machinery is but the vehicle."
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> W. R. Dennes, Civilization, "The Idea of Civilization," George P. Adams, (U. of Calif. Press) pg. 57-58.

Professor Adams marks a distinction between the structure of a civilization or society and its content, and presumably he would mark the same contrast in the case of a specific institution within a society or civilization. He suggests, moreover, that certain kinds of social structures are ill-suited to contain certain kinds of contents. In this way he hopes to point to the possibility of delineating a difference between civilization as a generic concept and specific civilizations. He wishes to distinguish civilization from this or that particular civilization and to point to the possibility that there may be some contents which, if they were to pass out of existence in every civilization, would mean the passing of civilization itself. The argument is strictly analogous to one that might be offered in an attempt to distinguish between morality as contrasted with this or that particular morality, or certain features of morality which, if they passed out of existence, would mean the passage of morality itself.

But now if one were to extend Professor Adams' metaphor, one might suggest that the reason certain structures (i.e. certain civilizations structurally conceived) are able to contain certain contents and others are not able to is because of the structure of the content itself. Sometimes it can be made to fit, and sometimes it cannot. Thus he says, "A chaotic society is one with a type of organization which bars it from incorporating significant ideas and values, such as justice and freedom." But this may be true, because justice and freedom themselves possess a kind of structure which requires a certain kind of container. That is to say, "a chaotic society" is one whose social roles are dysfunctional with respect to the social roles required by the institutions of justice and freedom. In short, to speak of the values of justice and freedom as content of a social structure is to speak of the creation of certain social roles and structural arrangements because they are the social roles of justice and freedom.

What Professor Adams refers to as the content of institutions may, therefore, be viewed as possessing a certain shape, organization or structure itself, and because such a content possesses such a shape or structure, it can be expressed; i.e. can exist only in certain kinds of institutions as its containers. When I speak of morality as an institution, or the moral institution of life, or the form of conscience, I mean to refer to just such a structure, and this is what gives it its character as an institution. Moral philosophy, insofar as it consists of ethical theory, is the attempt to describe or "give an account of" the structure of this institution, and moral education is the attempt to give conscience the form of morality by induction into that institution.

In viewing morality in this light we are speaking of morality as opposed to amorality and not morality as opposed to immorality. It is only from within the moral institution of life that we can judge someone as immoral, some acts as morally wrong, or some things as morally bad or evil. But at the same time it must be recognized that in so viewing the institution of morality we are not implying that the structure of the institution is sufficient to specify, _in every case_, _which_ things are to be judged morally bad, which morally wrong or which persons immoral. In short, when we speak of the moral institution, we are speaking again of a structure, and just for that reason alone, we must admit that the moral institution is compatible with a great many different beliefs about nature, history, religion, death and dozens of other matters all of which are well known for their influence upon the particular expressions of morality found in different societies or in the same society at different times.

It should be clear, in short, that by viewing morality in this way we are speaking of the _form_ of conscience and not its content. On the other hand, suppose we consider what apparently seems to be the case; namely, that there are some "moral practices" which seem to be indispensable to the idea of morality itself. Such practices as promise-making and promise-keeping, if in fact they are logically necessary to morality as such, tell us, then, that there are certain commands and performances which are a part of the _form_ of conscience. And so, a consideration of the form of conscience by itself is perhaps not fruitless in telling us something about the _content_ of conscience and the _way_ in which it is formed.

Notice, for example, that learning _how_ to run the bases in baseball is not a simple thing. It involves learning _that_ a great many other things--_that_ one runs counter-clockwise, _that_ one must touch the bases, _that_ one may run safely only on certain occasions, and yet _that_ one may run anytime, etc. Learning _how_ to run bases may be regarded as a skill. But, like any other skill, learning how to do it requires also learning a lot of rules. Similarly, learning _how_ to make promises involves learning _that_ a great many other things--_that_ some kinds of behavior count as saying "I promise" and that certain other kinds of behavior do not, _that_ one can be released from his promises in various ways, _that_ one can be excused from keeping his promises in various ways, _that_ one should not make promises he can't keep, etc. Learning _how_ to make promises may be regarded as a skill or an accomplishment. We should be able to describe what the constituent parts of this skill are. That would turn out, then, to be a description of the structure of the practice of promise-keeping, just as an account of the constituent parts of the skill of base-running would turn out to be a description of the rules of baseball, or some of the rules of baseball. Suppose now that after careful analysis it turns out that learning how to run bases involves learning a great many matters of fact: What is a base? What counts as touching it? etc. Analogously, suppose that learning how to make promises (not keep them) involves learning a great many matters of fact, like "What things can I control in the future?" What kinds of desires (propensities, dispositions, etc.) do other people have?" "How are they likely to behave?" and so forth. Then it might turn out that learning how to make promises may not be anything in addition to learning some matters of fact. If that were to turn out to be the case, then by looking at the form of conscience I would also discover a great many things about the process by which conscience is formed.

Note: (1) Learning how to make a promise is distinguishable from learning how to utter the words "I promise." But it is not distinguishable from learning how those words function in a practice of promise making and promise keeping. (2) Learning how those words function in a certain moral practice is inseparable from learning a great many facts about the world I live in, how it works and how to make predictions. (3) Does it not follow that learning some moral duties is inextricably tied up with simply learning how things work?

Still, the point I want to stress is that a study of the form of conscience should yield a description of conscience wherever and whenever it occurs, and that pursuit is not entirely unrelated to many practical pedagogical concerns we have. Still, it is not enough.

2. The Formation of Conscience

When we ask about the formation of conscience rather than about its form, it seems, on the surface at least, that we are asking a question about a process. That is, the question here seems to be "By what procedure or process does a person learn to (learn how to) take a role in the moral institution?" It seems, in short, that the question, having to do with the nature of a process, must therefore require a genetic answer. It seems to require an answer of the form "These are the steps by which it comes about that..." And yet, initially at least, I do not mean to be asking a question that can receive a genetic answer when I ask about the formation of conscience. A genetic discussion of the formation of conscience would, I think, necessarily have to be framed in sociological and psychological terms. Yet, I want to frame it, initially at least, in logical terms instead.

It may be useful here to return to a distinction which was popular in medieval philosophy--a distinction between the order of being and the order of learning. The distinction has its roots in Aristotle. He says,

> "....For learning proceeds...through that which is less knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself. Now what is knowable and primary for particular sets of people is often knowable to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely knowable but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is knowable without qualification, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one does know." 1029b

Put in another way, we can say that the simplest things may be the last to be learned. The order in which we learn things is not necessarily the logical order in which they must be understood. What is logically first (logically most fundamental) may be last in the order of learning. First principles of knowledge may be the last in the order in which we learn things, yet they remain first nonetheless.

The point I wish to make, however, is that there is a connection between the order of learning and the order of being, a link between the sequence in which we learn something and the sequence in which they are logically related. For example, to learn the principle of generalization (that in giving reasons, like cases are to be treated alike) may be the last thing we come to learn in the actual process of learning about reason giving. Yet it may be first in logical order, or at any rate, among the logically most basic principles of reason-giving. We are tempted to say, then, that the principle of generalization is a "higher" principle, more abstract, more difficult, or more remote. And that is likely to incline us to suppose that it must be learned later as something in addition to learning how to give reasons in specific cases. But what I want to suggest is that it is not something that is learned in addition to learning to give reasons in specific cases. It is something which is learned at the same time as learning to give reasons in specific cases. To learn to give reasons in specific cases just does involve learning that like cases are to be treated alike. In a sense it is presupposed, implicit, or already latent in learning to give reasons in specific cases. So learning the principle of generalization is different from learning to formulate it. It is simply already involved in learning to give reasons in any number of specific cases.

A further example or two may help to clarify how a concern with the formation of conscience can be framed as a question of logic and how, therefore, the formation of conscience is related to a study of the form of conscience. It would be useful to consider whether it is true that a child must learn how to tell lies in a sense in which he does not have to learn how to tell the truth. Truth-telling, it can be argued, is logically prior to lying, and logically prior, moreover, in a peculiar sense of "prior" which would also make it temporally antecedent in the sequence of learning. The point is that learning to tell lies presupposes a capacity to use the language, and it is not logically possible to learn to use the language except in a context of truth-telling. I shall not develop the point, but it is an interesting illustration of how a study of the logical order of learning may have considerable bearing on the process of the formation of conscience. This point, sufficiently expanded (which is to say probably "illigitimately expanded") would yield a view of moral education strikingly like that found in Rousseau's Emile.

Again, William Frankena has argued that the principle of utility as a basic moral principle (act so as to maximize the greatest amount of happiness--well being--for the greatest number of people) really conceals or presupposes two principles: a principle of distributive justice and what he calls the principle of benevolence, viz, maximize good and not evil. It seems to me that his argument is sound (see Frankena, op. cit.). But the interesting point to reflect on is the possibility that the principle of benevolence is simply part of what is learned in the process of learning any form of distinction between good and evil or between good and bad. That is to say, one would not be said to have learned a distinction between good and evil unless part of what he had learned was that one should do one and not the other. Hence, what Frankena takes to be logically prior in the structure of the moral institution may not be temporally prior in the process of forming conscience.

These observations are, in some respects, rather startling for a curious historical reason. In the history of Western thought, philosophers have concerned themselves with a variety of epistemological questions. But the central preoccupation has been with the nature of knowledge and belief. They have paid relatively little attention to the concept of "learning." In moral philosophy, they have concerned themselves with the analysis of moral knowledge and much less with the question as to what is involved in learning moral concepts. But this latter question is amenable to the same kind of logical analysis as the former, and when that sort of analysis is undertaken what results is some attention to identifying what kinds of moral knowledge are logically antecedent to other kinds of moral knowledge. And that is a question which has to do directly with the formation of conscience. And so, when I ask how conscience is formed, I must be understood to be asking "In what kinds of activities is the form of conscience to be found latent and in what kinds of activities is it not to be found?" That is not, obviously, a question which can be answered genetically; yet it is one which carries us far in investigating the formation of conscience.

So far I have been concerned with the study of the formation of conscience as a philosophical problem in the study of learning. There are, of course, any number of other ways in which the same problem can be examined. I shall only indicate what some of these might be. To begin with, the societal equivalent to the formation of conscience might be dealt with sociologically under the category of the process of normation. That is to say, how does it happen that the laws or mores or accustomed ways of behaving in a society receive their authority to command? This is both a theoretical and an empirical question. It is, in fact, the question with which Durkheim was primarily concerned in his lectures on moral education, his work on method, and his famous investigation of suicide. Indeed, Durkheim's lectures on moral education may be viewed in many respects as his most mature statement in which the first part is concerned with the form of conscience and the second part with the formation of conscience. In view of our concern with the concept of a "technical conscience," it is of more than passing interest, moreover, that Durkheim's thinking leads him inevitably to a view in which morality is internally related to social role, technique in that role, and to professional and civic ethics.

The formation of conscience can also be approached from the point of view of the theory of self-definition. The process of differentiating between self and other in the life-cycle of an individual and the way in which the social structure affords or inhibits this development is obviously of enormous sociological importance and of direct relevance to the formation of conscience.

In dealing with the formation of conscience it would also be useful to consider such pre-empirical questions as the following. Are there some generalized stages in the formation of conscience extending on the one hand from the capacity for self-consciousness to the capacity to "take the role of the other" in an attitude of mutual trust allowing one to see the morally compelling demand to defend the rights of others? If so, what are the social conditions and the social "pay-offs" which must accompany the various stages in this process? In this connection, it might be useful to consider the "prisoners' dilemma" not as a theoretical problem in gaming, but as a psychological problem in the various stages of trust and social prediction.

3. The Scope of Conscience

The interesting feature of this aspect of our problem is that it begins to make concrete the relation between the formation of character and other kinds of development with which the schools are particularly concerned. The problem can best be formulated in a series of tightly related questions. What would it be like to encounter a conscience which sees everything in the world as within its jurisdiction? That is to say, problems of politics, engineering, economics and home decoration would, among others, all become framed in moral categories. Or conversely, what would it be like to encounter a conscience, the limits of which are so impoverished that virtually nothing is viewed as a matter for moral estimation? The theoretical question is a traditional one. Views on it extend from Durkheim's idea that the moral and the social are virtually coextensive to Aristotle's rather ambivalent view to Plato's tendency, with the Puritans, to make the moral aspects of life the most dominant. The question is important for two reasons. In the first place, no theory of moral education can be adequate if it does not distinguish between social and technical competence and moral conscience. Yet, in the second place, it is a central contention of this project that no theory of moral education can be adequate which does not connect the two. How to properly understand the scope of conscience is one of those great undecided questions in the moral tradition. To distinguish different possible answers is perhaps, in fact, to distinguish important character types. It is perhaps not possible to resolve the question, but it is possible, and enormously important to the theory of moral education, to clarify it and to consider carefully the ramifications of different answers for the formation of conscience. It is especially important to examine this problem if we are to clarify, in any measure, what it means to speak of a technical conscience.

4. The Context of Conscience

Let us suppose, for the moment, that conscience, wherever it occurs, has the same form. That may be granted. Yet it surely is not true that it is always and everywhere expressed in the same way or that it is mediated through the same symbolic manifestations. Conscience may be connected with magic, with rite and ritual, with science. The concept of the public, in relation to which conscience must be expressed, has gone through many permutations even within the limited resources of Western thought. Neither the res publica of Cicero nor the polis of Aristotle is the context within which conscience must be expressed in modern American cities. Nor do the national mythologies or theologies, in relation to which the moral conscience has expressed itself in the past, have obvious application in the modern world. All of these factors must have substantial impact on the ways in which conscience will be expressed in modern America and how it can be formed through the transmission of some appropriate body of mythology. In short, to study the context of conscience is to ask two essential questions about the specific content of conscience: (1) What are the peculiar conditions which the social order places on the way in which conscience is concretely expressed? and (2) What is the appropriate body of symbols through which conscience can be shaped and in relation to which expressions of conscience and be defended? Answers to these questions will surely be very different as between an agrarian society and an industrial one, between a work society and a leisure one, between a Western rational view of life and an Eastern aesthetic one. It is precisely at this point that one must ask, "What are the appropriate symbols and the evidences in action of a technical conscience?" And so we come full circle--from the form of conscience to its formation to its context and again to its formation--and that is the essential problem of moral education.

IV

THE SEMINAR PAPERS

A. INTRODUCTION

The actual papers employed as the basis for discussion are reproduced here. It should be stressed that they are included here in the form in which they were produced for the seminar. None of the participants regarded these efforts as the final formulation of what they are struggling to say. Each is undergoing continual revision and expansion as a result of the discussions held. In this brief introduction, we shall attempt simply to identify certain salient themes which emerged from the seminar and to indicate what would seem to be interesting points of contact between the social sciences represented among the participants and the philosophers who attacked the problem from the perspective of moral theory.

1. The fundamental question asked in the initial essay of the seminar may be framed in various ways. It might be asked whether it is possible to understand moral education in a technological society as a special kind of technical education. Alternatively it might be asked to what extent our understanding of the formation of character can be construed as a task in developing a kind of technical skill or to what extent we can understand morality to be essentially a matter of prudence, to what extent a matter of knowledge and to what extent a matter of character formation, habit, or understanding. Depending on how these questions are answered we shall arrive at different assessments as to what function the schools can serve in the transmission of moral ideas, moral ideals, or moral character. Moreover, depending on how these issues are met we shall get different understandings of the utility of the traditional moral theory of philosophical ethics to the kind of moral understanding that is so fundamental in the field of education. Moral education will become more cognitive, more emotional, more oriented toward training or understanding depending upon how these issues are defined.

2. The basic themes in the discussion of the seminar, therefore, understandably took the form of attacking or defending the view that moral education might be adequately understood as a form of technical education. But in the process, some other central issues were approached. The best way to identify these issues will be to consider the dominant

features of each of the papers ad seriatum.

a) Roy Bryce in his discussion made the most explicit attack upon the basic position papers. He focused on the pervasive dilemma of moral education as over against that education which structurally and institutionally is calculated to preserve the status-quo.

Society, he argues, should "fit" man, even if this requires revolution--not necessarily an overthrow of the government, but "a significant reorientation of outlook and values and a radical reorganization of institutional and personal relationships to harmonize with such a reorientation"; rather than socializing man to "fit" society. It is not possible for everyone to attain success in American society and, thus, a radical look should be taken at the society, not only to see why success is a desirable aim. The revolutionary looks from a moral, not a technical point of view and from outside of the system and asks for a change of rather than a change within the system.

According to Bryce, the aim of moral education should not be an adjustment to the status quo unless the status quo is a desirable state of affairs. It should not merely attempt to explain or explain away the discrepancy between the real and the ideal. Rather, moral education should contribute to the honorable realization of the ideal if it is realizable or, if not, moral education should work towards a more attainable ideal.

Bryce applies these considerations to the question, "Is it possible for moral education to be conducted as a matter of developing technical competence in the expression of certain values?" He suggests that a prior question is "Is a technical competence of conways morally good?" Con ways involve adjusting, manipulating and taking advantage of the status quo rather than controlling and changing it. Even though con ways might make success more possible in the present society and even though they might become legitimate, they are still immoral and inimical to man; for they involve fitting man to society, not society to man. Bryce, then, sees a close link between moral education and revolution.

Although Bryce does not develop the argument, his paper implicitly contains a rather decisive attack on the moral theory implicit in the original proposal paper. That argument would employ what among philosophers is known as the "open question" argument. In general the view might be taken that if it is possible to ask, assuming whatever set of con-ways happens to underlie the social life of the school, whether a competence in "con-ways" is morally good, then the mere possibility of asking that question would show that competence in the "con-ways" of the school cannot in itself constitute the objective of moral education. Some argument along these lines, fully explored, would begin to reveal in detail the limits to which moral conduct or moral character can be understood in technical terms. This in a real sense was the fundamental question of the seminar.

b) McClellan attacks the issue from a different direction altogether. In his fable he sought the point of contact in education between the aim of development to produce a moral character on the one hand, and the basic demands of aesthetic education on the other. There is no doubt that McClellan's emphasis remains on the formation of character as the fundamental focus for a theory of moral education as opposed to the inculcation of rules and habits. But his attack is especially revealing as to how the apparent cognitive emphases in moral teaching must be associated with the equally clear focus on educating the feelings in the case of aesthetic education.

The Moral Life as Art, he says, is concerned not with just doing the right action, but with doing it well, with style, with a sense of timing, with a sense of balance. Wholeness of art as art object is important. One cannot take away or add to a "beautiful" act. Excess or defect destroys the goodness, beauty of the act as art. Thus, there is a stress on the Mean.

McClellan suggests that when talking about persons the distinction between truth, beauty, and right breaks down. When we describe a person as truthful, we mean to praise him for having a certain moral virtue. The righteousness of a person has to do with his "fine sensitivity for the appropriateness of actions, thus overlapping a predicate the P use of which is in the category of beauty"* (P use -- the term is used evaluatively and and literally).

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* McClellan, James. "Framework for Thinking About Education in Values," p. 8.

As technological advances affect the nature of society, they bring about the need for a different style of morality. Just as certain types of paintings go "out of style" (are no longer considered beautiful), certain types (styles) of moral behavior are no longer considered appropriate in societies altered by technological changes. Perhaps even certain kinds or styles of behavior are no longer moral.

Aesthetic tastes and practical reason as different ways of morally justifying behavior. McClellan points out that beauty predicates (and S predicates used for distinctively aesthetic purposes) appear in judgments prefaced by "I believe...," "I feel...," etc. He adds that "aesthetic judgments require personal defense in a way that scientific judgments clearly do not and moral judgments do not so obviously"[*]. He also distinguishes between an initial expression of preference (pre-critical judgment) and a more fundamental expression of preference (post-critical judgment). Both judgments are expressions of aesthetic taste, but the latter comes after statements having to do with aesthetic criticism have been considered as justification for the "like it." Nevertheless, both judgments are expressions of feeling. The latter is not justified in a more fundamental sense than the former.

Is there a sense of moral reason giving which is compatible with aesthetic taste? Can one be considered a moral man if he does things because he feels, or intuits that they are good, beautiful things to do and refuses to consider any "other" moral reasons which might justify the act? He might be willing to defend his acts in a very personal way, but always does so in terms of "I just think that it was a beautiful thing to do." Is this principled behavior?

Will one's view of moral theory be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the social setting? What is the relationship between ethics and politics? The relationship between morality and politics -- between moral reasoning and policy will have a bearing on [illegible] of moral education.

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[*] McClellan. p. 61.

c) Stern's paper, the next in the series, constitutes in some ways the most intimate connection between Bryce's interest in the effects of social structure in moral education and McClellan's interest in joining moral education to aesthetic training through the discipline of the feelings. Stern is intimately concerned on the one hand with the way that the structure of society influences the mode of character developed. But he is equally focusing upon the processes of self-definition which emerge in connection with the social structure. He discusses his particular formulation of the famous "Prisoner's Dilemma," but his interest in doing so is to reveal the structure of the kinds of interests and trust that must occur in the process of social-psychological development if we are to expect a moral character to emerge from the education of man. The question is not directly attacked by him as to whether that kind of self-definition can be exhaustively expressed as a kind of technological education in the "ways of the world." But he does plainly have in mind the fact that some presuppositions concerning trust, the dependability of other individuals, and experience with their charitable and altruistic interests is primary if we are to expect moral character to be developed. Of all the papers in the series, this one and Bryce's come most directly to grips with the problem as to how moral character can be expected to be formed through such formal institutions as schools.

d) Pincoffs and Dietl, in their papers came most directly to grips with the relevance of the technical literature of moral theory to the rather special problems of moral education. Pincoffs especially discusses the relation between the cognitive elements in morality and the behavioral or habitual. But both he and Dietl raise severe questions about the capacity of contemporary moral theory to contribute significantly to understanding the problems of moral education in contemporary American schools.

Morality is not just right thinking, argues Pincoffs; it also involves right doing. Since morality has to do with practical reason which is related to action, it is a matter of will, disposition, and habit as well as reason.

It must be noted that morality is not mere habit. For as Peters points out, "Customary and obsessive behavior is not morality, for by 'moral' we mean at least the intelligent following of rules the point of which is understood."*

Nor is morality the acting on the basis of one's spontaneous inclinations or tastes. For a decision-act to be moral it must be done from duty, not merely in accord with duty; that is, it must be done because of a moral reason. Thus, "in assessing a man's moral character we must know that he is not merely acting as he has been told or trained to do, and that he gives the right kind of reasons for what he does. For example, it is quite conceivable that he should give merely prudential reasons for all of the actions that we would, not knowing why he did them, have supposed done for moral reasons."**

A theory of moral education, then, must focus on rational requirements plus behavior of results. Principles of moral reason-giving and matters of habit are not two independent programs of moral education, but are two aspects of the same program. However, "if, in the sequence of human development, the inculcation of good non-reasoned behavioral habits may have to precede or accompany the development of good reasoning habits this should not be cause for surprise."***

The second issue for discussion is the difference in moral theory between 'Good,' 'Right,' and 'Fitting.' As Green points out, this is the difference between value, duty, and skill:

> Throughout the history of western moral theory there have been three fundamental metaphors which have governed. There has been the idea of man the pilgrim, the searcher and creator of what is

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* Peters, R. S. as quoted by William K. Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," in Philosophy and Education, ed. by Israel Scheffler (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), p. 233.

** Pincoffs, Edmund L., "Some Prolegomena To A Theory of Moral Education," pp. 103-104.

*** Pincoffs, p. 104.

> good. The idea is central in classical thought and in the utilitarians of the nineteenth century. The central question was "What is the good for man?" The second image has been the vision of man the law-giver, the legislator to himself. The central moral question from this perspective was "What is right?" "What is lawful?" This is the fundamental question in the theory of duty. The third metaphor has to do with the image of man the artist. The central moral question becomes not what is right or what is good, but what is "fitting," what is appropriate. This is the central focus of the moral-sense school and is a strong element in the Greek conception of *hamartia* and of life as an art, a *techne*, or a skill.[*]

We shall see that one's theory as to which of these concepts is most important will make a difference in what he sees the marks of the moral man to be and in what is taught.

One's view regarding 'good,' 'right,' and 'fitting' will make a difference in his ethical position. He will adhere to virtue ethics, rule ethics, or moral competence as the model for ethics depending on his position regarding the above concepts.

Virtue ethics focuses on the kind of a person one should be. It is concerned with excellence of character, the good for man. Pincoffs defines 'virtue' as an "attributable dispositional characteristic of which the speaker (the user of the term) justifiably approves."[**] He is using justification simplistically, i.e., not simply referring to the speaker's or his group's beliefs concerning justification. To say that a person has a given dispositional characteristic is to say that under certain kinds of circumstances he is likely to behave in a certain way. To say that the disposition is attributable is to say that he would not have the disposition were it not for his own attitudes, beliefs, and effort.) Pincoffs suggests that the minimum set of (teachable) virtue for the moral man would include authenticity, sensitivity to suffering, dignity, tolerance and amenability to reason. This last virtue links virtue ethics with rule ethics; that is, the moral man is disposed to act in certain ways on *rational grounds*.

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[*] Green, Thomas F., "Some Aspects of Socialization Through Formal Schooling Relating Primarily to Civic and Moral Education," p. 9.

[**] Pincoffs, p. 17.

Rule ethics focuses on what one should do and on what grounds. The moral agent is seen in some kind of quandary and is concerned about what decision he should make. Rule ethical theory is concerned with the kind of reasons on which an agent may and may not act if he is to retain his status as a moral agent. It is also concerned with the justification of the reasons.

Pincoffs sees rule ethics as a post-Kantian development. Moralists before Kant were concerned with the excellence of character; whereas, since Kant and especially in recent meta-ethical theory, moralists have been concerned with reason giving.

Today we are undergoing another kind of shift in ethical theory. Traditionally a person's (moral) behavior has been viewed as if it influenced a rather small number of people. The focus has been on the right and/or the good with relatively little emphasis on what is effective, prudent, practically wise and technically efficient.

> In the modern, urban, technically oriented, highly organized world, the initial moral question may not be what is right or good, but "what is happening?" What is happening to me, to my neighbor, and how, by what techne, can I do something about it? The moral agent becomes much more the public agent, the political agent. He has need of some rather special skills. He becomes the man who is able in effect to "read the signs of the times," to discern the occasions for action as they present themselves, to accurately pick and choose where it is best to act, through what means, and with what expected temporary gains and losses. This is a much closer wedding of prudence, political sense, or what Aristotle called phronesis, practical wisdom, than anything we have understood as moral action before. The moral agent in this sense has need of techne, social skills.*

This difference can be seen by viewing different types of people who embody one or another of these ethical views. For a person's moral temperament is colored by his view of morality. Durkheim pictures for us the first two moral theories:

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* Green, p. 15.

> With some people, it is the sensitivity to the rule, a disposition for discipline that predominates. They do their duty as they see it, completely and without hesitation, simply because it is their duty and without any particular appeal to their hearts. These are the men of substantial intellect and strong will -- Kant is an ideal example -- but among whom the emotional faculties are much less developed than those of the intellect. As soon as reason speaks, they obey; but they hold their feelings at a distance. Thus, their bearing suggests firmness and resolution and at the same time conveys a sense of coldness, severity, rigidity. The power of self-control is characteristic of them. This is why they do not go beyond their rights, do not trample on those of others. But they also have little capacity for those spontaneous impulses in which the individual gives or joyfully sacrifices himself.
>
> Other people are characterized not be self-control and a tendency to withdraw but by a love of spending themselves, by an outward expansiveness. They love to attach, and devote themselves to others. These are the loving hearts, the ardent and generous souls. But their behavior, by contrast, is regulated only with difficulty. If they are capable of great deeds, they find it hard to tie themselves down to the performance of mundane obligations. Their moral conduct lacks, then, that consistent logic, that beautiful moral bearing of the former. One is less sure of these passionate men. For passions, even the most noble, blow successively hot and cold under the influence of chance circumstances and in the most erratic ways.*

Still other men can be characterized by their technical competence. They comprehend with a clear-sightedness the great public issues. Theirs is the language of reason and the world of abstraction. They are not the loving souls who comfort the suffering; rather they seek in an impersonal way to bring about the public welfare. They are involved in social action and are not disposed to spend time in acts of individual mercy. They are dispassionate, but have a political genius for discovering practical solutions to problems. They find their rich, deep human experiences in sharing corporate enterprises. And if the public welfare demands, they will give up their private interests for the public interest.

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* Durkheim, Emile, Moral Education, Trans. by E. K. Wilson and H. Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1961) pp. 99-100.

Dietl is even more forthright than Pincoffs in his rejection of contemporary "rule ethics" as providing basic and useful insights into the problems of schooling. He argues explicitly that the moral theorist too often views the moral agent only in the light of a "problem solver." They do not typically extend the preoccupation with ethics as rule-guided to observe the kinds of characteriological expression of morality in different types of character. Durkheim, and the kinds of observations he makes in the passage just quoted, are not ordinarily central to contemporary discussions in moral theory.

Perhaps the most interesting result of these last two papers was the beginning of an attempt to identify which issues in contemporary moral theory would be relevant to a theory of moral education and which ones would not. The following table is presented here as a fairly faithful representation of the types of issues touched upon in these two papers. Which issues in philosophical ethics are relevant to moral education and which are not? That is the question.

Makes a Difference	Does Not Make a Difference
1. How practical judgments are handled.	1. Whether value terms stand for properties or just have performative force.
2. Questions of will and response.	2. Freedom vs. determinism.
3. Uses of 'value.'	3. Whether values are objective or subjective.
4. Whether one sees morality in terms of good, right, or fitting.	4. Whether the principle of benevolence or the principle of justice is the most basic.
5. Whether one sees himself only as a member of a body politic or as a member/agent.	5. Whether an actual social contract was ever signed.
6. Moral vs. prudential reasons.	6. Whether or not "Why be moral?" is a confusion.

3. The Conclusion to which the participants arrived is perhaps not surprising, although it was unexpected by the participants themselves and cannot be adequately displayed in these papers. It was simply that out of a meeting of persons from such diverse fields as sociology, social-psychology and technical philosophy there should emerge as much agreement on the essential issues which their different disciplines should be facing if they are to come to grips with the problems of moral education in a technologically oriented society.

IV. B.

I: CRITIQUE

Roy Simon-Bryce

A WORD ON MORALITY

Morality is identified much more readily as a philosophic concept than a sociological one. Yet historically speaking, morality has been an explicit concern of those who sociologists hold in highest esteem and consider among the pioneers and prominent minds in their field: Durkheim, who often is viewed as the father of modern, empirical sociology, saw morality as a prime prerequisite of every social order and asserted that the persistence of specific social orders required the practice and sharing of specific kinds of morality by their human population. The role of the school was to socialize the populace according to that morality, inculcate such a morality in them, and then contribute to the persistence of the social order, as other institutions would do by exercising their perspective functional specializations. (1961, pp. 1-14)

The same social order--the division of labor--that Durkheim sought to defend and support was the same one that Marx (another scholar celebrated as a prominent sociologist) criticized and sought to destroy. While Durkheim was convinced that the division of labor was good; Marx was convinced that it was evil. Durkheim's preoccupation was anomie, the breakdown of the moral order and the threat to society. Marx's preoccupation was alienation, the deceitfulness and destructiveness of a particular moral order to the individual man. While both were concerned with establishing a compatible and congruent relation between man and society, Durkheim chose to strengthen society and socialize man to 'fit' it, while Marx chose to revolutionize society to 'fit' man. The effort to reconcile man-society relationships is a classical question; the answer, whatever it may be, is always a moral issue. Durkheim was a conservative restorer and protector of the old moral and social order; Marx was a radical proponent of a new moral-social order.

The root problem of the seminar is expressed in the Green proposal as follows:

> "How, if at all is it possible to educate for the formation of a technical conscience?" Put in another way the question is, how, if at all, is it possible to educate according to the view that moral behavior and civic action are to be conceived primarily as technical affairs?
>
> "A manipulative approach to inter-personal and communal affairs may appear to be immoral, or at best amoral. It is not true that what is good, right, or one's duty in a moral sense, will be technically effective or efficient. The idea of 'conscience' seems to be extrinsic to technology and intrinsic to morality. Education in technology is primarily a matter of cultivating competence and education in morality a matter of cultivating conscience. How then, can it make any sense to speak of forming a technical conscience?" (Thomas Green, 1966, p. 2)

If it makes sense is a question of logic. Then it is a legitimate concern of philosophy. However to be logical does not necessarily mean to be empirically real or morally good. Notwithstanding the basic role of logics in the process of sociological research and theory, it becomes at best a rather esoteric and usually latent subject matter of sociology, e.g., sociological understanding of the logics of a given situation, event, processes, or type--the sociology of knowledge. "Empirical reality" on the other hand is a legitimate subject matter of the sciences, social or sociological sciences included. Thus, sociologists are committed to "the propensity and consequences of being" rather than the "making of sense." But, Berger reminds us, that reality as understood by sociologists is by nature plural and relative and thus always written within tacit quotation marks, i.e. "realities". Moral goodness may be the subject matter of philosophers and religionists, but it ought to be the preoccupation of all fields. Thus, Gouldner reminds sociologists that value-judgment and interest orientation is part of their own "reality," and as such cannot be escaped and should not be denied or disowned. Thus, on the issue of morality both sociology and philosophy must be concerned, at least tacitly, with "the goodness of," but inasmuch as this exercise is to be considered sociological rather than philosophical, it must stress empirical issues over logical ones. Consequently, if we were to raise the question from our professional as well as moral point of view, we would say: It is not true that what is technically efficient is necessarily morally right. However, it is neither true that what is technically efficient must be morally wrong. If the stress is on morality then the question is: How can a moral technical competence be feasible and efficient? What must be done to make our actions both efficient and moral?

The specific purpose of the root question of the Green proposal is to stimulate discussion on the proper nature of education, moral education to be precise, and the role of the school in the promotion of that education. The rationale is that American society is a dynamic one which has undergone changes to the extent that what might have been considered proper as an end of education and the appropriate function of schooling at an earlier epoch are now obsolescent, if not obsolete. American society is now a highly technological, urban, corporate, and organized society, in which the end of education is certification and selection. Appropriate schooling is producing persons certified to assume certain roles expected or demanded by the present social order and to earn commensurate rewards for such fulfillments. Such a reorientation led to the emergence of new roles among professional educational personnel and lowering in the importance of traditional teaching in relation to these new roles, e.g., counseling and guidance. Such reorientation led to the redefinition of the behavioral requirements of students--graduation is now an obligation rather than an option, teaching and studying is now working, making, producing rather than fun; and proper conduct is now a matter of outward conformity, deceptive role plays, calculating con ways, rather than self-expression. Even though such con ways represent alienation--purposeful disparaging of the relation between behavior and self--they are social skills that are important, or rather indispensable, to success in the present society. Thus even though con ways are taught inadvertently by the school their teaching represents a latent function inasmuch as it prepares or promotes among students an area of technical competence which is a requisite for success in present day American living.

At present though, the prevailing Puritanistic morality or conscience of American society frowns upon con ways. To the extent that the school is representative and vulnerable to such a morality it too may officially frown upon whatever is perceived of as con ways and could not purposefully and overtly teach them once they are so defined. Consequently the school faces a dilemma: the competence "it develops in practice, it repudiates in theory" and that competence which is so claimed to be so indispensable to success in modern American society is found reprehensible by that very society. Nevertheless, inasmuch as such technical competence is inherently consequential of modern schooling procedures it is transmitted and rewarded. The danger is said to be not that it is transmitted but that such a technical competence is not accompanied by a corresponding technical conscience. Such questions were then raised: How can the human values of American and Western traditions be interpreted so that they can be formulated in technical terms? Is it possible for moral education to be conducted as a matter of developing technical competence in the expression of certain values?

In our opinion to pursue a direct course in answering such questions is to run the risk of appearing to approve some of the basic issues which underlie the questions themselves, namely that the technical competence of con ways or con artistry is morally not bad; that it is essential or at least not unnecessary; and that it is effective or at least not dysfunctional. However, the fact is that such underlying issues or assumptions are debatable and should not be side stepped in any responsible and scholarly pursuit. Moreover, in terms of the professional exigencies of sociological research the debate cannot be restricted to logical-hypothetical argumentation when, in fact, the nature of the data or evidence is empirical nor can empirical treatment be avoided due to mere declaration of the argument as an amoral one. Furthermore, to those individuals who subscribe to the value-laden, interest-oriented, and relativistic conceptualization of human behavior, the claim of amorality cannot be accepted without some suspicion.

In our case we accept the phenomenon of morality as a universal feature. We also concede that specific societies and often specific human groupings within or across societies have specific moral structures which may or may not be similar or may or may not share some communalities or compatibilities with the moral structure of other societies or social groupings. Even then, the idea that a position can be seen as moral-immoral only from within the system it belongs is begging the question; (Green, p. 86) it is playing with the absurd, running the risk of supporting some of the most hideous of human acts. Hitler and the atrocities of the SS were indeed immoral, but precisely from the view of outsiders and more so in the case of the Jewish victims rather than the Nazis. The killing of Martin Luther King and the enslavement, suppression and deceiving of his people is immoral from the viewpoint of the outisder, the black population, however, not from the white racists. Consequently, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for us to consider a given philosophical posture regarding human action, whether in terms of its intention or consequence, being amoral.

Inasmuch as the argumentation in the Green proposals is directed specifically to the United States, comments on its morality versus immorality is in order at least in terms of the morality of American society. America represents a complex society and there are, of course, different or varying moral structures. Inasmuch as reference is made in the proposals, however, to more than one of these groupings, i.e. privileged and the disadvantaged, the moral assessment of the proposal, at least from the vantage point of one such grouping as an out-group, is quite in order. Moreover, morality, when seen in terms of the welfare of man (or men), transcends specific social groupings and special interests.

Professionally and personally we take seriously the advice of Bendix:

> "...each social scientist should be personally conscious of the link between his research and the social and political and moral forces of his society. Such consciousness can only enhance the intellectual quality of his work. It should enter into his selection of research problems. This is usually interpreted as the need to make one's values explicit as they are involved in the specific problems under discussion. We should, however, recognize...it is more our major underlying assumptions that call for our explicit acknowledgement: our beliefs concerning the relation of knowledge and human power, the role of science in society, the position of the intellectual in the community...these are among the problems we must clarify for ourselves." (Bendix, 1951)

OUR OBJECTION TO A POINT OF VIEWING

Given this ideological position, other constraints of our own intellectual-professional orientation, we object and feel responsible to point out what seems to characterize the position taken in the proposals, if we understand that position correctly. Even if we accept that this position represents a point of viewing rather than a point of view, the question of its meaning is to be pursued in terms of not what is merely being said but also why it is being said.

> "It would be important to study the school culture for the way it rewards the skills of the con-artist. This may have much to do with the differential response of students to the school who come from different social and cultural backgrounds. Some children come with such skills already developed.
>
> But what are the skills implicit in the con-game? In the first place, the con-artist tries to get what he wants by acting so as to reinforce the self-image of his victim. This frequently requires the adoption of a rather calculated mode of behavior. One must contrive to act the way one's victim wishes one to act. It is helpful sometimes in the con-game, for the artist to appear fumbling, inept, and in need of sage advice. In the school, the same process often requires one to appear quiescent, agreeable, and well disciplined, but in both cases what one learns is to play a certain role in a calculated fashion. In the second place, the con-game stresses the capacity not to take the overtly

defined situation seriously. That is, the con-artist must act inept without being so; he must be able to elicit advice, appear to take it seriously and yet not do so. His activity, in short, is an interesting miniature of what we often call alienation. It involves a kind of detachment, a presentation of the self without that presentation actually being the definition of the self. This represents a high social skill, and it may be precisely this set of social skills which are peculiarly rewarded when the school's primary function is certification and selection. The development of these skills may be more important to academic success than many other factors of socio-economic status and mental ability.

"Urban man is more profoundly public in his actions, and by the same token he can become more profoundly personal in the smaller sphere of his privacy. Under these conditions a premium is placed upon the efficiency of the actor and his capacity for a certain detachment, a healthy alienation from his activities. He must learn not to take them too seriously. In short, I wish to suggest that the high social skills of the con-artist may be indispensable in the urban setting of life. It may be precisely these skills which it is essential to develop in young people for life in modern American society. The school whose primary function is certification and selection is well adapted to serve this purpose, and for that reason such a school is in a strong position in American society." (Green, 1966, pp. 7-9)

"The trouble with the high social skills of the con-artist is neither that they are bad nor that they are inappropriate for American society. They are essential skills to develop in the process of socialization. However, one can and must possess these skills without being a thief. Having the one does not imply being the other. The difficulty is rather that they are simply skills. The ideas of effectiveness and efficiency of action are not moral concepts at all. They are technical concepts. The danger is that we shall develop technical competence without developing a technical conscience. The skills of the con-artist are indispensible for urban America. The schools, partly because of their overwhelming function of selection and sorting are successful in producing these skills. Yet it is precisely this technical social skill which the school develops in practice and repudiates in theory. This places a hopeless burden on teachers and young people, and it is fraught with danger for American life. No society, to the best of my knowledge, has long survived with a technical ethic. The best example is Homeric society in which it could be said, 'The qualities of a man are best displayed in ambush.' This is the ultimate in the ethics of success. It is a view, as Arthur Adkins has observed, most suitable to a society which cherishes the arts of war.

"This then is the more profound sense in which there is a revolution in American education. It is a revolution in the very conception of the moral agent and of membership in society. The problem is not simply the universal contrast between the real and the ideal. That contrast must always exist in every society. The problem is not to overcome that distinction, but rather to make it intelligible. The problem is the formation of a technical conscience. It is to interpret the human values of the American and Western tradition so that they can be formulated in technical terms. It is possible for moral education to be conducted as a matter of developing technical competence in the expression of certain values? This then is the problem." (Ibid., pp. 10-11)

In summary, con ways are constituted of two major aspects, calculated deception of others and calculated detachment of self. They represent skills which are essential to academic as well as to social success, not because they are 'good' (for, in fact, as skills they are 'amoral') but because they are prudent, practical and effective. The danger is not the possession and practice of these skills but the absence of a conscience, as we understand it, an ideology or cognitive moral consonance to support and regulate their possession and practice and to allow their overt transmission by the official and legitimate institutions of the society, inasmuch as such skills are necessary for success in those institutions and in society and to the extent that they are translatable into technical expressions of American values.

If our understanding is correct we repeat the position is conservative, accommodating and incomplete, despite the obvious well meaning and intellectual energies which it represents. It is so because it reflects a desire not to change society but to adjust to the status quo, and shows no inclination to consider the change of status quo as possible, practical or desirous. Thus, it implies that con ways are so necessary and effective that they should be legitimized. Although it reflects an awareness of calculated deceit and calculated detachment as alienation, it proceeds to encourage their adoption not merely as ad hoc modus vivendi, but as an institutionalized and legitimate mode of living and further seeks to make it more legitimate, palatable, diffused and permanent by way of an ideology or conscience. It would seem that to strive to facilitate adjustment in a society which demands alienation, deception and detachment is in itself an alienating, adjustive-accomodative posture, even if they were representative of or compatible with the traditional values of the society.

We are quite aware that separated from its objective or consequences a skill becomes amoral, e.g., to know how to cause death is an amoral skill, and becomes immoral only when used against the defenseless, the innocent, etc. So, American western movies have not yet ceased to impress us that Indians were the villains--offensive and guilty. Thus, when a supporting ideology is developed and integrated into the underlying rational-calculated nature of the bureaucratic structure of modern (American) society, the consciously executed social skills which follow or are favored by it cannot be seen as amoral, non-instrumental and without objective or consequence. To say that a given conscience and competence would make more possible success in the present society is not sufficient to claim their morality. Such claims cannot be made without asking the nature of the present society and the probable consequence of their legitimization and general transmission of such skills on Man and his later ability to reject or accept that society. How much must one pay to make it? What was it worth making it once you have paid the price? Is there not another way to make it? Can there not be another way to make it?

It has been cited that, "No society has long survived on a technical ethic," (Green, Thomas F., Section III, The Proposal Essay) and by ethic we understand that there is mutual understanding and agreement. However, no complex human society can long endure on con ways. The propensity of survival and development of a large, complex society based on institutionalized and legitimated con ways--as a technical conscience--is limited. Sociologically speaking con ways are in themselves indices of self or group assertion against a hostile, rigid, encroaching system and as such are healthy. But, they are nevertheless modes of adjusting, manipulating, taking advantage of rather than controlling, molding or changing society. Inasmuch as they are often illegitimate and thus covert there is limitation as to the complexity and duration of any social relations which are based upon them. Note, for example, the frailty of primary groups and leadership roles and the absence of large complicated self-interest oriented organizations among inmates and slaves. (Goffman, 1961; Bryce, 1968) In part the limitations may be a reflection of the subordinate or captive nature of the practicing populations. However, even cases where the population is relatively free, powerful and dominant con ways limit the development and endurance of social structure. Rebels, pirates, gangsters, gamblers and racketeers may in fact represent power relative to the population they prey upon. Their modes of exploitation and living may represent con ways to the outsiders, and can gain no legitimacy nor moral sanction from such outsiders. These conditions are of little importance to the solidarity of the group. It may be observed that to the extent that the con ways constitute an internal ethic, that the propensity of complex, endurable relations diminish. The simple facts that everyone knows how to do them (competence in conning), everyone does them, and everyone feels it not wrong to do them, are not sufficient for the perpetuation and progress of social order. Moreover, such conditions may be detrimental to the further development and endurance of a complex society.

While consensus, shared expectations, and mutual understanding are necessary for complex society, they are not sufficient. For, when consensus and legitimization are supportive of the notion that "one does not take seriously what he is doing," then the complement or consequence can only be that "one must not be taken seriously in what he's doing." To be ruled by such an understanding is to threaten or deny the myth feeling of shared or mutual trust which is necessary for endurable, complex social structure and for the development of a feeling of safety, security and stability by the individual. The norm of truth telling as John Wilson calls it is a basic prerequisite for the endurance and development of complex human society. (1967, p. 103) It may be noticed that in cases in which such subversive or marginal groupings as rebels, pirates, slaves, gangsters, racketeers, etc., have succeeded to become large-scale, enduring organizations, that their growth has been accompanied by the development of a code of ethics which tend to prohibit the use of "con ways" internally or which prescribe the extent and form in which they may be used among colleagues. Violations of this code often lead to severe punishment, expulsion or death in some cases, for such violations often are equated with treason or the sacrilegious breaking of vows or oaths, e.g., the Mafia is reported to execute members who prey on other members. Violence is appropriate and heroic against the North Vietnamese but inappropriate and criminal against white Americans. Non-violence is appropriate against white Americans but inappropriate and treasonable against the North Vietnamese. (Martin Luther King, 1967)

Therefore, to suggest that persons should learn to steal (and should steal) without becoming thieves and to use the metaphor of stealing in a baseball game as analogous of the process of learning the art of conning in school and society is to underestimate the detrimental potentiality of a competence and conscience based on detachment, deceit, and distrust. To begin with, human life and complex society are not "games"; the stakes are too high. In the real world, outside of those for whom baseball is work, livelihood or investment, stealing or not stealing a base or not allowing one to be stolen are not generally regarded as matters of serious consequence. Whenever they are, then baseball is not a game.

In other words, to be able to steal and not be a thief is a matter of more than conscience. It also involves the issues of social definition of act and situation, and legitimization of action and role. To be able to steal and not be considered a thief is to ask that stealing be legitimized and that individuals internalize not only the skill but the new identity, value, sanction and morality of stealing as positive (at least not negative). Even though under such a situation stealing may not cause a problem of conscience, it still may not be morally good for the individual, nor functionally good for the society. In fact, to permit and teach to steal is to provide a basis for undercutting the mutual trust or myth of mutual trust which gives individuals the feeling of security in a social order. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is necessary to steal or to learn to steal in order to learn not to steal or to prevent one from being stolen. The moral duty is to teach what stealing is, that people steal, that people are stolen, and, of course, the relevant how's and why's. The moral duty is to teach not to steal, how not to be stolen, and how and why to build a system in which stealing is minimized or becomes unnecessary.

ON AMERICAN VALUES

If there is one thing that we are to learn from the problems--internal and external--that American Western society has been facing in the last decades it is that a morality and moral education based on pragmatism, competition and competence (even if necessary) are not sufficient to assure orderly growth and maximum contentment in a complex society. In fact, at some point they may become inimical to such interests. There is little doubt that the Protestant Ethic, Social Darwinism, and the concept of rugged individualism played responsible roles in the development of the United States to the most industrialized, capitalistic, and powerful country in the world. There is little doubt, however, that such a moral-ethical orientation has brought the country to a dangerous point of division between the successful versus the unsuccessful; the powerful-privileged sectors versus the powerless-underprivileged sectors; and a coalition of the elite and employed classes versus the masses of the poor, unemployed and under-employed. In addition, the visible minorities, though not necessarily the most recent immigrants, tend to concentrate in the lower categories of these dichotomies. We do not think that such distributions are accidental or mechanistic. However, rather than be preoccupied with explaining the cause of nature of the phenomenon, we are going to accept it as fact and dedicate our efforts to its correction.

The Green proposals belong to a genre of educational reform which is popular also among many intellectuals involved in pursuing the war on poverty and "cultural" deprivation. I choose to call it a pragmatic-liberal strategy and contend that it is conservative-accommodating on moral grounds and inaccurate and insufficient on empirical grounds. Basically this strategy is to make available and train the deprived minorities to use recognized effective means for attaining success (which presumably they do not know, do not practice, or cannot do) in the society-as-is. In the language of the Green documents this can be referred to as the open transmission of technical competence. However the Green position goes one step further and asks for the legitimization of the technical competence by way of a technical conscience, which would facilitate both the transmission and open practice of the technical competence by all segments of the society. In this sense it represents a more realistic view than the now common effort to be unselective in equipping the "deprived or disadvantaged"; it implies an awareness of the unlikelihood of such re-equipping efforts being successful without a moral commitment, guideline and framework. The position proposes that the major processes for effecting this legitimization are: (1) a retranslation of American values to 'fit' the presumed technical or behavioral demands of the present society and (2) the re-socialization of society so that it would not experience any difficulty or dissonance in practicing or transmitting such competence. Inasmuch as such competence includes con ways and that no condemnation or exception is made to them bothers us these latter skills may lose their illegitimate feature inasmuch as they will be shared and practiced openly by all, but certainly they will continue to be immoral and inimical to Man!

A review of American history would seem to support the opinion that individual success has always been of the highest value in the American way of life. The constitution of success has varied in form and proportions, but largely it has been a matter of gaining prestige, power or privilege, having an image of personal achievement and maintaining all of these features. Emphasis, scrutiny and control tend to be directed more to the end of success than to the means utilized (or available) for attaining it. This fluid attitude toward means of attainment of success permits a variety of means, ranging from legitimate through illegitimate, for attaining success. Among these are a plethora of con ways--many on the twilight zone of immorality--which are practiced subtly or covertly. The tendency to be subtle or covert when engaging in con ways is due in part to the fear of being recognized or openly identified as a practitioner of what, in fact, one is already practicing and having to pay social and other penalties meted out by the larger society (some of which could directly or indirectly threaten the image and base of success). The tendency to be covert and subtle is also accountable in terms of self-interest, individualism and success-competition orientation of the society, in which case it is rational to keep the exploited or potential rival or foe uninformed regarding the offensive-defensive tactics which are being used against him.

The fact is all conscious, overt human behavior is subjected to at least one moral frame of reference and that frame as well as the social context of control tend to counter any tendency to be wanton in the use of con ways. Moreover, such a moral frame of reference, inasmuch as it is internalized by individuals, tends to create conflict not only in terms of how or how much a specific con way is practiced but rather every time such a con way is practiced consciously. To be able to practice con ways without a feeling of guilt requires some amount of disenchantment with or detachment or immunization from the usual social-moral constraints. In other words, the absence of a supportive ideology constitutes a socio-psychological or internal control against wanton, blatant use of con ways. Given the limiting and alienating nature of con ways such control function is good and, in fact, serves as a code of ethics. What is bad morally, psychologically and socially is that a society demands and permits so much use of con ways.

Sociologically speaking, however, the thing to do is not to emote about these social facts but to attend to them and their solutions as social or sociological problems of American society. This society is directed not by pragmatism or prudence alone, nor by purity alone, but a polemical confrontation of these two value systems--Protestant ethics and Puritanism. Cleaver and others merely speak of the schizophrenic or sick nature of American society. Others speak merely of the double-standards which underlie or pervade the American way of life. The counterplay between these values makes it difficult to be successful without con ways of a sort, difficult to be overt in all strivings for success and difficult to practice con ways or to have succeeded by way of conning without developing a feeling of guilt. The irreconcilability of the (1) pleasures of having attained success and (2) the guilt or shame regarding how that success was attained constitute a basis for dissonance. Such dissonance becomes difficult to uphold or ignore for various reasons such as (1) the increasingly obvious disparity between those who enjoy success and those who do not and (2) the threat posed by those who are unsuccessful toward the continued or increased enjoyment of success by the successful.

The position in the Green documents and which is tacit in other liberal-pragmatic strategies seems to be a concern with removing the dissonance. Perhaps, the more precise concern is one of removing dissonance among the successful and disparity between them and their less successful victims. In various senses we may view the bothersome way in which this is proposed to be done as one of attempting merely to "Catholicize" the Protestant ethics: (1) It represents a position of forgiving the fallen and giving them another chance at salvation; (2) it advocates the routinization or ritualization of forgiveness and thus facilitates the repetition or continuation of sin, in much the sense that confession serves for many Catholics; (3) it allows for the practice of penance in the form of charity to the needy which serves not to liberate the latter from dependence but merely alleviate them from total misery and at the same time give credit to the chances of salvation to the donor in the form of grace or indulgences; and (4) it seeks to distinguish between venial and mortal con behavior, so that the former becomes tolerable, inasmuch as it is efficient and indispensable, even though basically it is still against the law of God. If this is in fact what the proposal is intended to do, then it is indeed conservative-accommodating. If it hopes to accomplish even this without strong opposition, it is unrealistic. The essence of the Protestant ethics is in fact the stress on hard work and success as a means to and indices of salvation, and individualism and competition are essential inasmuch as few will be saved. Moreover, on ideological as well as practical grounds there is no reason to believe that the faithful and the successful will fully acquiesce to suggestions of reopening the arena of competition unless they are coerced, converted or consternated by some overpowering external forces. Finally, if the proposal is offered with an anticipation of opposition, then it is insufficient or incomplete, inasmuch as even selective, sophisticated socialization falls short of the requirement for solving the problems of disparity faced by American society. To begin with, the socialization processes which would be required in this case would necessarily have to be of an intensive nature and must at least operate on two complementary levels--intensive secondary socialization of the unsuccessful-disenchanted and intensive re-socialization of the successful-faithful. Both of these are different from primary socialization inasmuch as they do not start with a clean slate or _tabula rosa_, (Berger) but rather are diverted to persons already socialized to the American way of life.

We may take the black population of the United States as a prime example of the unsuccessful-disenchanted sector. The black population of the United States has long understood and accepted the American Dream and the Protestant ethics. Their history has been one of being deprived, first from the means of realizing the Dream and later, even after obtaining the means, from being prevented from attaining the ends of the Dream. That population can largely be said to be characterized by a plethora of con ways or technical competence on at least two levels. The lower segment is characterized by con ways and a conscience or apologia oriented toward survival rather than success as a consequence of frustration and deprivation. The middle and upper segments are increasingly sharing the same competence (and lack of conscience) of the middle and upper socio-economic sectors of the larger society. Given the disparity and frustration they have had in attempting to capitalize on their competence as others have done, it is likely that they would be doubtful or suspicious about any conscience which would attempt to make more palatable a non-effective competence. Perhaps the only segment of the Negro population which in fact would welcome such a conscience or ideology would be the professional or dedicated con-men, hustlers, etc., who may have already devised their own, and thus even now conceive of themselves as _avant-garde_ and _on top of the game_. On the other hand, the black population sees these con-men as well as the larger white population succeeding by way of legitimate as well as devious means. Thus there is maybe a lingering faith in the American Dream among this larger black population as many may still be susceptible to the idea that their failure or frustrations are still due to personal incompetence, based on their observation of success by others. In general they will continue to look forward to an occasion in which they will in fact be properly trained and socialized for success and the dominant (white) segment will be socialized and trained to impart and reward such competence openly and without discrimination. Thus, we repeat the form of socialization to be carried out among the black population is one of secondary socialization or reinforcement, inasmuch as it is their disenchantment which must be overcome.

It must be emphasized, though, that, in our opinion, the problem is not one of simple deprivation of competence on either the lower or middle-upper strata of the black population. This is the fallacy committed by those who subscribe to the idea of cultural deprivation of Negro and lower class people. (Clark) They both have no less competence than their non-black peers, even though we would concede that a redistribution so that more of them will enjoy the competence level of middle-upper stratum would be desirable within the present social order. The competence as well as the correlated conscience or lack of conscience which they have are relatively consonant with another form of deprivation which has less to do with competence and more to do with power and opportunity in the society-as-is. Hence, more than reinforcing and upgrading socialization is required to resolve the problem.

While the white segment is certainly not all representative of the successful and faithful element of the population, statistically it is probably that a large proportion of that segment has been successful and is faithful to the Dream. Some are conscious and convinced of the effectiveness of con ways as competence and are blatant in their use and approval of them. Others are less inclined to admit to moral marginality or personal practice even though they engage in or subscribe to their use. Others do not see acts of attaining success in terms of conning, even though in fact such acts may correspond to the definition used in this text, but relegate such a behavior to the lower, less fortunate segment of the society. Regardless, there is likely to be opposition to the complete sharing of competence with the less fortunate inasmuch as it is against their own self interest. Even when the new conscience would make it psychologically easier for them to continue to exploit the disadvantaged, they would resist its spreading downward on practical grounds inasmuch as it represents rivalry and successful defense from the bottom.

The kind of re-socialization which would be required among them would be much in the order of conversion and consciousness. While on one hand it would make them more aware of the deviousness of their competence it would also legitimize this now-considered-devious means of attaining success, so that they would be able to executive these means in the open and feel compelled to teach and permit others to utilize such means openly in order to "share in success." However, given their group consciousness, self-interest and power, rather than capitulate it is likely that the successful-faithful segment will perhaps compromise if they must concede ground. That is to say that they will engage in charity or penance--another but more sophisticated level of conning--one so subtle that it escapes easy identification and so marginal that it does not elicit clear-cut resistance or punishment.

A shared definition of act and role expectation is important to the proper coordination and complementation of roles of the two sectors. In both, the effectiveness of socialization, however, is dependent on corresponding structural changes of the society itself. In that respect to merely call for socialization without structural change is insufficient or conservative. Moreover, to stress socialization without structural change is to merely postpone and inadvertently precipitate a "spontaneous" structural change in the long-run. Anomie and anarchy often is the result of alienation and distrust. Above all, there is a moral as well as an organic incompatibility between a society explicitly committed toward equally shared success and satisfaction for all and a conscience or ideology which attempts to regulate or rationalize the fact that America is unwilling or unable to guarantee or provide this equal sharing of success. All should have equal opportunity to attain this success and all those who can and do utilize the institutionalized means of attaining success should be rewarded with the appropriate ends of success, commensurate to the degree or nature of the means utilized without any other distinction. The primary task, therefore, is to explore the re-structuring of American society and economy so that it may make possible its claims of equality and opportunity without the need to engage in deception and detachment or to suffer the 'fears' or 'hang-ups' of such engagements. If America cannot make good these claims,then the values, traditional orientation and mythical claims should be discontinued and declared defunct. Moral education should not merely be an attempt to explain or explain away the discrepancy between real and ideal, but rather to contribute to the honorable approaching of the ideal if it is in fact accessible. If it is not accessible, then the proper role of moral education is to expose the fraud and work towards a more honorably attainable ideal.

The wide-scale advertisement and the sale of cigarettes should have been challenged from the days when children's textbooks were saying that tobacco consumption stunted growth and learning. Today we find strong evidence suggesting and a preoccupied audience inclining to believe that cigarette smoking relates positively to fatal diseases. Yet they are sold and advertised with little restriction. When the con game began is hard to tell. Perhaps it continues to persist. It is hard to tell. To translate the American values--Protestant ethics in particular--to explain away or legitimize the continued sale and advertising of cigarettes is a matter of rationalization. Whether the rationalization is logical or for that matter true is of little importance to the victims and vendors of tobacco. Our concern though is for the victims and the traditionally victimized. The answer for those who are always being victimized cannot be rationalization. The issue cannot be whether the rationalization can be proven logical. The morally sound and sanest position they can subscribe to entails pragmatism only to the extent that immorality is effectively stopped. This position can only be to stop the immorality--the con-game playing--at once and at any cost. If cigarette smoking is bad (or is not good and believed to be bad) then the sale and advertisement of cigarettes should be stopped. That profit-making, profiteers, and an economic structure will be threatened should not matter, particularly since the same competences and structures can be directed to an activity that is good: the society must "fit" man. The question is not one of technical conscience but one of moral technical competence--that is, a technology or competence directed and determined within a moral, Man-oriented framework.

C. FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT EDUCATION IN VALUES

by James E. McClellan, Jr.

Part I

A Philosophical Fable

Once upon a time there was a civilization called, by accident, The Occident. The Occident possessed a rich spiritual heritage drawn from all regions of the planet but nourished most by its taproot in classical Mediterranean cultures. Three fundamental (i.e., intrinsic, for themselves) values were pursued in The Occident--Truth, Beauty, and Moral Goodness. The religions of the Occident, like all great religions, were strange vessels which accumulated, drop by drop, the golden flow of spiritual insight, always diluted and often poisoned by ancient superstitions or inverted reasoning. From time to time, contaminated elements would precipitate and the mixture clear. Then it could be seen that the religions of the Occident did indeed articulate its major values: God, Creator of all beauty, was praised when man created works of art. God, author of Nature's law, was honored when man discovered and proved the Truth. God gave to Occidental man both a moral law and the freedom to disobey it; thus God gave man a power which He did not possess until He became man, subject to temptation and sin and the object of his own free will. Gradually the parochialism was purified: just before the final collapse of the Occident and the death of God, men finally came to recognize the ecumenical character of its values and its religion.

Philosophers of the Occident, like philosophers elsewhere if there really be such, were obsessed with the struggle for unity. If beauty is good, and truth good, and moral righteousness good, then surely, a philosopher might say, there is The Good--of which each of these goods is a species; The Good of which man may receive a Vision, even if not a precise concept. Or perhaps each of these goods is not equally good; perhaps moral goodness is the only true good; beauty without moral goodness only appearance; and truth only a vanity. Or truth the only genuine value, or even beauty.

Or it might be, so other arguments went, that man's soul is basically tripartite, each of the values he pursues being appropriate to a certain part of his soul. Truth is thus the good of man's cognitive faculties, moral goodness the value of his will or conative faculty, beauty the good of his sensibility or emotive faculty. This philosophical move had the advantage of avoiding the question of the nature of the Supreme Good, the Summum Bonum. Its disadvantage lay in its patent falsity: man's soul is not tripartite but singular. Theologians and psychoanalysts of the Occident may have argued for or assumed a triune image of the human psyche, but not even in the Occident (where many strange and wondersul beliefs were held) was any ordinary man nor serious philosopher ever convinced that he was three psychic entities miraculously united in one soul.

Just as unrestrained militarism and rapacious materialism were destroying Occidental civilization, its philosophers began to understand more clearly than ever before the nature of the problem they were facing. (Thus confirming a teaching of a Late Occidental Philosopher: The owl of Minerva flies at sunset.) The central question was seen to be not that of establishing a value hierarchy as it would sound if worded: Which is the supreme good: Truth, or Beauty, or Moral Goodness? Nor a psychological question, as it would seem as: How do men, in fact, order and arrange these different values? Nor is it basically a theological or sociological question. It turns out, instead, to be *primarily* (You may say "fundamentally," "finally," "really"--these are all adverbs which Occidental philosophers used as euphemisms for "as we prefer to treat it.") a question of how certain predicates are ordered. Such philosophical discoveries do not save a civilization from self-destruction; they may assist a new civilization to rise from the ashes of the old. As the Occident declined, its language corrupted and its values betrayed, its philosophy became a consciously created vestige to be followed by the next civilization to arise on the sands of time. As education in values also becomes infected by "nostalgia for the future," it seeks to enlarge the range of potentiality rather than maximize any particular actuality, and such was the mood as the Occident disappeared.

Part II

Some Remarks on Value Predication

Consider certain typical predicates by which we indicate that we're saying something about values:

TRUTH	BEAUTY	RIGHTEOUSNESS
true-false	beautiful-ugly	right-wrong
(likely-un...) (probable-im...)	engaging-boring	obligatory-not ...
warranted-un...	well-formed - ill-...	(permitted-- (allowed-- not ...
assured-not ...	harmonious-dissonant	just-un...
certain-not ...	unified-not ...	noble-ig...
valid-in...	intelligible-un...	well-intentioned--ill-...
consistent-in...	in scale-out of ...	other serving--self-...

TRUTH	BEAUTY	RIGHTEOUSNESS
	appropriately	
(etc., etc.)		(etc., etc.)
	(drawn, orchestrated, narrated, etc.)...	
	inappropriately...	
	(etc., etc.)	

Now, for each class of predicates, let us ask for a use which meets two criteria: (i) The use must be clearly evaluative; i.e. it must be intended to rank or grade or classify something along some value dimension; and (ii) the use must be as literal; i.e. non-metaphorical, as we can find. Let us call such use, the P use of the predicate (for Philosophically Primary or Paradigmatic, if you will.) Then the P use of Truth predicates occurs in judgments on assertions; i.e. someone's saying that such-and-such is (was, will be) the case. Thus we may employ a non-P use of, say, "probable" to speak of a probable or improbable *event*, but that use can be explained by the P use; i.e. by the conditional that *if* someone had said that the designated event would occur, then his *assertion* ("such-and-such will occur") would have been (at that time, on the evidence available, etc.) probable or improbable. The P use of Beauty-predicates is in their application to works of art (given certain possibly contradictory theological doctrines, also to objects and events in nature). The P use of Righteousness predicates is in their application to human actions.

The *simple* fact that the P uses of these predicates are different poses no philosophical problem, just as the *simple* fact that color predicates apply to physical objects and not to auditory sensations poses no particular philosophical problem. About value-predicates, however, no *simple* statement is adequate. These predicates may be separated by P uses, but they won't stay apart very long: when philosophers or plain men move from talking about assertions, objects, or actions to talk about *persons*, these neatly divided classes of predicates begin to merge and blend. When we describe a person as truthful, we don't mean that, statistically speaking, his assertions are true in a proportion greater than the average man's; rather, we mean to praise him for having a certain *moral* virtue. Or when we intend to commend the Righteousness of a person by saying that he deals justly with his fellow man, we usually mean that he has a fine sensitivity for the appropriateness of actions, thus overlapping a predicate the P use of which is in the category of Beauty. Typically when we praise a man for his Righteousness, we mean more than a comment on the morality of his actions; we mean also and equally that the assertions he makes about his own and others' actions are true, consistent, and relevant. Likewise, to commend a person's sensitivity to Beauty is, not wholly but certainly in part, to comment on the Truth-values of his assertions about works of art or natural objects.

While any of the predicates listed in the tri-partite classification scheme above *might* be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to a person, there are other value predicates which take their most literal, paradigmatic use in talking about persons. Thus an assertion is true, but a person is truthful or honest. (We may say: "That's an honest answer," but we mean the kind of answer an honest man would give; it is simple enough to imagine the scene where the honest answer is, in fact, false.) A musical composition may have freshness and diversity, but a person, perhaps a composer, is spontaneous and free. A man might perform a just action by accident or by divine inspiration. But we praise the just man for the seriousness, the sincerity, the high moral purpose which suffuse not just one action but rather an integrated, unified life-as-a-whole. In precisely the same way, an artist may achieve a brilliant effect in his medium by luck or divine grace; but it is the dedicated person whose life represents a constant effort to rise above vulgarity whom we honor as the serious artist.

Now the realm of value talk generally admits of the division indicated among T(ruth) predicates, B predicates, and R predicates. (It's analytic that if q is a T predicate then q has a P use and the P use of q is in judgments on assertions; similarly for B and R predicates.) But European languages also contain predicates that apply most literally to persons or selves. (Let us call those S predicates.); i.e., predicates the P use of which is to assert something about the value-quality of a person. Thus the stage is set for the first level dialectical tension in the philosophy of values, more specifically the philosophy of value education: So long as neither T, B, or R predicates can be defined completely without some reference to (partially independent) definitions of S predicates, then the relationships among these categories of predicates can be analyzed, explored, refined--*with a consequent or accompanying refinement of the values themselves*. Aristotle (the name of an early Occidental philosopher) saw that the expression "practice of virtue" could not be defined without referring to the practices of virtuous men. He also sensed, perhaps less clearly, that "virtuous man" could not be defined without going beyond the localized moral codes of his time and place. Thus our concepts of "virtuous man" and "practice of virtue" are enriched and refined by the dialectical tension between the two.

The conditions for this dialectic are fairly clear: there must be a beginning definition of T, B, and R predicates which is independent of S predicates. Such a beginning definition is ordinarily found in a code of naive realism. A statement is True if it is an accurate picture of reality; a work of art is Beautiful on the same criterion, and action is Right if it accords with the revealed Will of God or Natural Law or other "reality" of the world. Such a code is always both too restrictive and too lenient when it's applied to a person. Take the case of Beauty: it's easy to see (at least in retrospect) that a person be entitled to the designation "serious artist," even though his productions are not beautiful under the standards of the code, and another may be rightly denied that mark of high praise even though he accurately mirrored reality throughout a long lifetime. Then the

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philosopher of art must do one of two things: either refine and clarify the criteria for applying B predicates, or else maintain that the serious artist has nothing to do with Beauty. The dialectic is fruitful and productive only so long as philosophers pursue the first option. (Precisely the same appraisal can be made of T and R predicates.)

(It should be pointed out that no codes governing T, B, and R predicates can provide full definitions for S predicates. The deficiency is not in naive realism, as such, but in the logic of S predicates: they do not entail, nor are they entailed by T, B, and R predicates. Thus the dialectic doesn't stop after naive realism has been transcended; it goes on so long as there are definitions of T, B, and R predicates at least partially independent of S predicates.)

It is easy enough to see how this tension provides a promising ground for educational thought. Any society sets out to implant in its new members those codes which define its T, B, and R values. But a society's more acute and far-sighted educators realize that codes are not implanted in persons in the same sense (much less the same way) that corn is planted in earth. The codes are of no value whatever, except they become regulating principles in the lives of persons; hence S values, always in tension with codes, are also inherently educational goals. Yet these S values cannot be achieved except as educators succeed in making T, B, and R values live in persons. So codes are also important, though the educator can never be content merely to transmit the positive codes of his time and place.

The next level of fruitful dialectic takes us within these codes themselves. So far we've ignored the possibility of conflict among T, B, and R values; but, of course, that possibility in the context of human life becomes the common experience of mankind. An act is not necessarily right because it procures a beautiful object or a truthful assertion, though promotion of beauty and truth is a right-making characteristic; i.e. to the extent that a possible action has that characteristic, it deserves consideration as a right act. Imagine agents of the CIA torturing a Vietnamese: the action produces, let us say, certain true assertions which would not have been forthcoming otherwise. Let us also imagine that a very skilled cameraman records the event and later transforms it into a powerful, tragic film. That it produced truth and beauty counts for it, as it were; but any act of torture is still a monstrous crime. The action is less insane, but not less monstrous (perhaps it's more monstrous) than torturing someone just for the fun of it.

The reconciliation of T, B, and R values, in principle, is the task of philosophy and theology. It is a task which must ultimately prove fruitless, for there simply is no principle by which these values may be rationally ordered or collapsed into one another. Though the womb ultimately prove fruitless, the attempt to engender life in it may be worthwhile on other grounds, witness "Ode to a Grecian Urn."

The reconciliation of values, in practice, is the function of a political order. And with that thickening of the plot, two new and quite distinct dialectical tensions appear. The first of these is between the instrumental values of the political order and the intrinsic values (the T, B, and R values) which it is supposed to serve. There is nothing more that need be said about the disaster which seems to accompany the final victory of political values over all others. If we don't all get killed in the disintegration of this particular political system, there is hope for next time: the human spirit is a marvelously resilient non-substance, and the same material forces that brought us into being are still flowing in us as well as around us.

But it is the second new tension which a political system inaugurates that deserves our attention here. Let a certain nagging suspicion be brought into the open: surely, you probably want to say, there is a fundamental difference between T values on one hand and B-and-R values on the other. Yes, you admit, T values are values; i.e. one can acknowledge that a man (e.g., Bertrand Russell) can devote his life to eliminating falsehoods from his thought and speech. Still and all, you may continue, the truth or probability of an assertion doesn't depend on its being a value to human beings; the assertion that there is a prime number greater than $7^7$is true (or false) whether anybody cares one way or another. But B values and R values, you believe, cannot even be considered or thought about apart from someone's actively valuing the beauty of some object or the rightness of some action. We can imagine, you say, a beautiful object which no one has ever seen, but we cannot explain what "beautiful" might mean in that assertion without invoking the conditional that if some suitably educated and equipped observer should see that object, he would value its beauty, etc.

Now: at that level, the distinction is clear enough, it is also of practical importance in education. For example, one can teach a child how to establish the truth of the proposition "There is a prime number greater that 7^7." in the full sense of "establish the truth of," whether the child has any regard whatever for prime number or even Truth itself. But one cannot teach a child to apprehend the Beauty of an object or the Rightness of an action without enlisting or arousing that child's care and concern. (If this last sentence does not seem analytically true to you, the deficiency lies in the verb "apprehend." In that case, please do substitute something stronger; e.g. "become fully cognizant." "Apprehend" is strong enough for me.)

But now the tension: care and concern lie closer to the seat of conduct than does belief. (This, again, is analytic: when I assert my belief that this country is headed directly toward war and Fascism, I am challenged to present reasons or evidence in the sense of recognizably true statements describing relevant political and military events. When I claim that I care or that I am concerned about that eventuality, I am challenged to show that I've done or am doing something to prevent it.) Thus the pedagogical decision (even when made on Madison Avenue) to arouse care and concern in children is inherently a political decision. Thus the tension: at a given time and place aesthetic education and moral education are the means, perhaps necessary means, for arousing the kind and degree of care and concern essential to the preservation of that particular political order. But from a larger perspective, the only justification for any political order is that it promote a balanced, harmonious social participation in intrinsic values which must include B values and R values. Thus value education is an end as well as a means. No educational theory can be regarded as even reasonably complete unless it contains an explicit account of the unique and intrinsic values to be achieved through value education. Equally incomplete would be a theory of education inattentive to the power of aesthetic education and moral education as instruments for arousing in children and youth care and concern for other things. The conduct of education will be affected in quite concrete ways by how the line is drawn between the instrumental and the intrinsic uses of value education.

Again, this tension is of positive quality only so long as the integrity of both sides can be respected; i.e. so long as the political process (here used as a very general term to mean rule-directed way of resolving conflicts among genuine, existential values) insures that the rational claims of both sides will be heard and that decisions reached at one time will remain open for re-evaluation in light of new evidence and changing preferences.

To recapitulate for a moment: we have noticed two continuing dialectical tensions in both the theory and practice of education for values. The first is between T, B, and R values on one hand and S values on the other. The second dialectical tension is between the instrumental and intrinsic values in education itself. The outwardly directed care and concern which can be awakened by literature and painting (perhaps by music, dancing, and other arts as well) are surely necessary personal attributes for anyone who would experience the value of truth, moral rightness, political due process or anything else. One can see immediately that these two tensions are related, but even more relevant for the purpose of this essay is to note that these tensions are fruitful and productive only if two existential, environmental conditions are satisfied. The first has already been mentioned: the codes which regulate the P use of T, B, and R predicates must have a generally accepted, albeit limited authority. Only when both general acceptance and limitation obtain can these codes come into fruitful tension with the P use of S predicates. The second is easily seen: the political order in which are reconciled the instrumental and intrinsic claims of education (here, especially, value education) must be itself subordinate to the values it purports to serve. Let it be acknowledged that a political order can legitimately use the instrumental power of education (especially aesthetic education) for the maintenance and enhancement of that political order itself; but any legitimate claim of a political order derives ultimately from something else; namely, the role of the political order in promoting harmonious development of T, B, R, and S values.

Now, I will state quite simply and unabashedly that I believe both these conditions to be unsatisfied at the present time. It would be simple but fruitless to amass citations in support of this appraisal. I should prefer, instead, to address two questions directly to you, the reader, hoping that your answers will themselves incline you to share my belief:

1. Think about the routine critical judgments you hear made about persons: "He is a genuine human being." Or "He is a beautiful person."

"She is a sensitive and perceptive critic
performer
listener
reader
laboratory assistant
historian
mother
ad infinitum."

"I don't think they've established a meaningful relationship through their sexual attachment." Etc., etc. (You, the reader of this essay, would never use expressions like "beautiful person" or "meaningful relationship," but others, alas, do.) Now the question: When you and your friends are talking seriously and evaluatively about persons (yourself included), do you find that the value terms you use require explanation by reference to generally accepted (and limited) codes of conduct? I suggest that the answer is no, and that this negative answer is a rather recent historical phenomenon. The distinction is a subtle one: at no time could S predicates be defined completely by reference to scientific, moral, or aesthetic codes; that would contradict what I mean by S predicates. But what is unique to the present scene is that the codes have come to have utterly _no_ relevance to the serious (i.e. evaluative) use of S predicates. Oh, one does encounter purely descriptive uses of S predicates which have implicit references to codes: "He is an expert portraitist." But this comes to be a predication of values only when all reference to codes is abandoned. To say that a man is a serious, or dedicated, or important artist is not to say that he has transcended the codes governing artistic production--it is to say something about him which is utterly independent of any aesthetic codes whatever. Does the same hold when we speak of the moral quality of a person? Well, what is "situation ethics"?

2. Think now about the institutional setting within which education occurs. Consider two suggestions: (i) Does the political order in which we live constitute a free, open, and rational agency to promote the harmonious achievement of all the different sorts of values discussed above? Or (ii) has our political order become, in principle and for all, what it has long been in practice for the masses--a system in which the stability and extension of the system itself justifies the elimination of all internally disruptive values? While the second suggestion is _not_ a patently obvious description of present political reality, the obvious falsity of (i) makes the second the only plausible likelihood for the future. Among the manifold contingencies of daily life, of course, the exclusive and exhaustive disjunction between the first and second suggestions is seldom apparent. But if it makes any sense at all to speak of the intellectual or theoretical basis of a political order, then surely practice must be guided by (i) or (ii), and not both. For the present argument, of course, all that's required is a recognition and agreement that (i) is false,

for only when it's true does the political condition for fruitful pursuit of distinctively aesthetic values obtain.

It's scarcely newsworthy to announce that the cultural and historical environment is not exactly ideal for promoting value education. I only hope that this analysis may have established some distinctions which can help us to describe the malaise more accurately. For example, why is it that the inherited criteria by which we judge works of art have become totally irrelevant to the application of S-predicates to artists? Is it possible that there is an unnoticed and dangerous displacement here? Could it be that when the proponents of artistic freedom, creativity, and spontaneity have declared their independence from aesthetic codes, their attacks should have been directed instead against the perversion of all values (including also T, S, and R types) for ulterior political and economic purposes? These are, it seems to me, examples of questions which ought to disturb those engaged in moral education.

III

A Case for the Primacy of Aesthetics

But I should like to close with a few remarks on what might be done here and now in aesthetic education, recognizing and accepting the cultural situation for just what it is. (Allow me to acknowledge forthwith that whatever interest there may be in these remarks arises from the fact that they occasionally contradict what has been said by men who know a great deal more about these matters than I do.) Point 1. Aesthetic education is required by its own logic to be a model or paradigm of philosophical teaching. In this context the expression "aesthetic education" means, among other things, a deliberate effort to teach young people the P use of B predicates and what may be called the B use of S predicates; i.e. the use in which S predicates are applied to human beings engaged in making or contemplating works of art. (Let "works of art" be taken very broadly.)

The expression "philosophical teaching" means teaching in such manner that the reasons for a belief are revealed in the very act which is designed to induce a belief in the learner. (Have we all outgrown the notion that teaching necessarily aims at changing behavior? Sometimes we intend that our students know, understand, believe, etc., things they might not have known, understood, believed, etc., if we hadn't taught them.) Characteristically, B predicates (and S predicates used for distinctively aesthetic purposes) appear in judgments that are prefaced by "I believe...," "I think...," "I feel...," "It seems to me...," etc. I hesitate to say that such judgments are modal in any precise logical sense of the term. But even when the explicit personal qualifiers are absent, aesthetic judgments require personal defense in a way that scientific judgments clearly do not, and moral judgments do not so obviously. For example, suppose a person, Mr. A, says: (i) that Truman Capote's In Cold Blood recounted a particularly brutal and shocking murder, (ii) that the murderers were executed in accordance with the laws of the state of Kansas, and (iii) that Capote's account of it all totters precariously between sentimentality and callousness. If Mr. A is challenged on: (i) by "What makes you say that? I didn't think it so brutal; it didn't shock me," Mr. A can answer by appeal to what "brutal," "shocking," and "murder" mean in ordinary English; he need not affirm any particular personal affront to justify his original statement. If Mr. A is challenged on (ii) by "What makes you say so? I thought the sentence was commuted," Mr. A can answer by appeal to what he was told or what he remembers reading, but again he is not obligated by the logic of the question to affirm any distinctively personal reason for his assertion. But challenged on (iii) by "What makes you say so?" he can appeal neither to the meaning of the central terms nor to external evidence. (If Mr. A were to answer "I read it in the New York Times Book Review", he would be making a poor joke.) No, Mr. A would have to show the reasons for his believing Capote's work as he described it. In the other cases, it was sufficient to provide reasons; here he must also convince his questioner that the reasons given are related in a distinctive way to his own judgment on the work. If he hasn't learned that his assertion is subject to that kind of challenge, then he hasn't learned to use "sentimentality" or "callousness" as aesthetic predicates.

If the cultural situation is what it seems to be, then philosophical teaching is more necessary than ever, also more difficult. Perhaps the distinctive logical character of aesthetic predicates could be used to set an example for the whole curriculum; perhaps the policy of teaching only that which a teacher is willing to accept as representing or embodying personal judgment can spread from aesthetic education to moral education. Or perhaps it would not be allowed. Perhaps it's too late. Point 2. If the analysis above is correct, it follows that the "passion for pupil freedom" cannot be treated merely as "a symptom of insecurity about one's own preferences." (Harry Broudy) On the contrary, a "passion" for pupil freedom is a strictly logical implication of the idea of aesthetic education. In the most fundamental sense, a pupil's preferences are free because they are simply not under the control of the teacher; indeed they're not under the control of the pupil either. A person (for the moment let's ignore the usual practice of schools and consider a pupil a person) prefers what he prefers, not what he wills to prefer. A teacher, by threat or promise, may control what a pupil says he prefers and what he does with the objects and ideas around him. Since preferences are only partly innate, control over his experiences and his statements may eventually bring the pupil to the preferences the teacher prefers he have. But if the teacher has effectively taught him the habit of lying about his preferences, may it not happen that when he has acquired the new (teacher-preferred) preferences, he will lie about them also?

Remember that so far the term "preference" is used in its most fundamental sense; i.e. that sense in which a person may announce his preference--say, for neutral colors in automobiles over black or vivid colors--by saying: "I just like them better, that's all!" A pupil may announce his preference the same way: "I just dig 'The Doors,' They've got the coolest sound." (He doesn't have to worry about freedom to have such preferences, though in school rooms he would ordinarily lack the freedom to express them.) But before one ever reaches down to that most fundamental sense of "prefer," one passes through regions where one's statements of preference are, like all other statements, subject to explanation or justification or a combination of the two. One says "I just like them better, that's all!" as a rejection of, not an answer to, "Why do you prefer them?" There are many reasons for rejecting questions as well as questioners: one has reached the most fundamental sense of "prefer" when he (i) rejects the "Why?" question and (ii) does so on the grounds that he can find no further rational explanation for liking one thing more than another.

Between an initial expression of preference and the most fundamental sense of the term lie all the humanly interesting aspects of the life of criticism; it is in this intermediate stage that aesthetic education can be distinguished from idle chatter about art. And in that intermediate stage, Point 1 above implies pupil freedom: A teacher has the obligation to teach pupils the bases of aesthetic judgment, but those culturally sanctioned reasons for preferring A to B can become the pupil's reasons only if he does, in fact, prefer A to B. The point is, again, strictly logical and not a romantic identification with youth. The point, I believe, could be developed to distinguish aesthetic reasoning from reasoning about matters of Truth and Rightness. For arguments about Truth and Rightness can typically be expressed in conditionals: If I had deduced statement S from theory θ, and an experiment designed also from θ had yielded a result compatible with S, then (given certain other conditions) I could call the experiment a partial confirmation of θ, etc. Or in moral reasoning: If an agent A in a certain situation in which to do X would be to keep his promise and would not cause any foreseeable harm to himself or others, then A ought to do X, etc. But aesthetic reasoning has to relate to the actual responses of persons to objects and events around them, for to say "If object O had quality Q, then I should prefer it to O without Q" is simply to make a prediction falsifiable in experience, not, as in the cases of scientific and ethical reasoning, to provide an explication of the concept. This is not nearly enough to say to clarify fully this logical distinction; it is enough to make the point that's really relevant here: "pupil freedom" is logically a necessary condition for aesthetic education. If "freedom" is advocated by the wrong people for the wrong reasons, that's a lesser evil than having the wrong thing advocated by the right people for what might sound like but could not be right reasons.

Point 3. After the breakdown of the Occident, after the betrayal of Truth and Rightness to the totally malevolent Leviathan of political order--only the honesty and freedom of individual aesthetic responses offer hope for a post-Occidental civilization. Which may be a very slightly exaggerated way of leading into the question of how aesthetic education is to deal with contemporaneity in art. The truly contemporary always has freshness, vigor, and relevance to youth; in our Augustan Age, contemporary arts are marked by despair, nihilism, and lament for the chance at life we just let slip through our fingers. It's scarcely a service to infect them with our cultural malaise even before they have been protected by the vaccine of disillusion. Nor is it a service to fail to gain for them access to any art form that can speak to and for them ("That sound is cool. It sounds the way I feel.") If there is such a sound for any youngster, he ought to have a chance to hear it. And he (more poignantly, she) ought to have a chance to raise those feelings to the level of articulate consciousness. Here, again, aesthetic education is the paradigm for all value education.

It isn't so difficult to envision an ideal solution to the problem of the contemporary arts: The young man or young woman objectifies internal despair and powerlessness by finding these feelings spoken through one or more of the contemporary arts. But an art object can be criticized, clarified, and extended in time; thus the young person's feelings can become integrated into an expanded consciousness of self-related-to-world.

But it is difficult to see how this ideal solves the immediate problem of what to do with the destructive and the banal as they penetrate our students' lives. The Rousseauan-Romantic myth that students will attend only to what benefits them is obviously absurd. Equally absurd is the Platonic-Classicist myth that wise adults can edit an entire culture to protect youth from the deleterious effects of arts. These myths are psychologically and sociologically false; to adopt a course of action which hedges between the two is not to protect oneself from failure but to doubly guarantee it.

Perhaps the basic distinction of Part II above will help to think, if not necessarily to act, sensibly on the problem. Note that B-type predicates can be rightly applied to disgusting as easily as to pleasing objects. It is simply a fact, let us say, that some people find The Story of O erotically exciting while others find it soporific and some find it now one now the other. This fact takes on aesthetic significance only when related to certain formal properties of the book; e.g. the flat externality of the prose, the ambiguous perspective of the narrator, etc. One probably can move more effectively in teaching young people to talk meaningfully about art objects by attending to The Story of O than by dealing with Pride and Prejudice or Madame Bovary, for the feelings O appeals to are simpler and the relationship between formal and emotively arousing qualities is more easily identified. But we would hesitate to make that first little masterpiece required reading for all tenth graders because we feel it might have deleterious effects on the personalities of our students. To generalize: there is no assurance that pedagogical techniques successful in teaching the meaningful use of T, B, and R predicates will also promote S values. Neither is the connection the other way a necessary one: the advancement of S values does not require instruction in the effective use of value predicates, though it may be helped thereby.

If we cannot censor without being absurd; if we cannot make pedagogical use of the power of contemporaneity in art without exposing young people to more destructive emotions and ideas than they can handle: what do we do? I should advise, again, perfect freedom, but this time freedom for the teacher to represent in his teaching those contemporary arts which speak to and for his experience. The teacher cannot protect students from banal and exploitative art forms. (Nor should he: What if banality and exploitation are indeed dominant qualities in the world experienced by students?) The teacher cannot presume that it is his duty to find for the student that poetry, music, painting, or dance which will articulate and objectify the student's outer and inner world. In fact, the art presented by the teacher will be to the student "their" art, not "ours," for the otherness of the teacher (and parent and all adults) is one of the essential qualities which the student's art must articulate for him. That is to say: what is truly contemporary for the teacher eo ipso is antiquated for the student.

But the teacher can present his art seriously and authentically. He can show (which is a different thing than logically demonstrate or prove) how B predicates can be used to make true and meaningful statements about art to which one responds fully and positively. To the extent that he has them, he can show S values interacting with B values and T values. He can show these things; he can invite students to share them. There's nothing else he can do.

Now, finally, aesthetic education becomes the paradigm for all curriculum theory. A genuine curriculum can exist only where students and teachers meet in freedom; i.e. where Points 1, 2, and 3 are respected. This is almost a logical truism in aesthetic education; but it is a moral and pedagogical prerequisite for any serious education whatever. Perhaps it is incumbent on teachers of the arts to show the way to a new institutional arrangement in which freedom can obtain. Perhaps that new institutional form is the embryo of a post-Occidental civilization.

D. THE FAILURE OF IDEOLOGY: AN INTERGENERATIONAL DISTURBANCE

(George G. Stern, Syracuse University)

We experience the world through the labels we have for it. In childhood we learn to distinguish between rats and rabbits without necessarily experiencing either animal directly. In adolescence we learn in a similar way to differentiate liberty from slavery, without really having known either. The conceptual schema of the adolescent are more elaborate than they were in childhood, involving larger, more abstract, and more complex organizations of potential experience than before. The adolescent's schema are also more definitive and binding than in later adulthood -- more compelling, rigorous and absolute because they have not yet been tested or modified by experience. Relativism and moderation are yet to be learned, through the testing of categories against reality. Hence the young adult is more of a purist, more of a romantic, more of an idealist than most of his elders. The potential for intergenerational conflict lies here, to be exacerbated in a time of value change.

To take his place in society, man must acquire an intelligible theory of the process of life, a religion or an ideology, that permits him to make use of his energies in the pursuit of a creative sexual and/or vocational identity. As Erickson (1968, p. 187) points out, ideology is a system of ideals which (1) simplifies our time perspective of the future, (2) relates our inner world to external social reality, (3) provides opportunities for collective social behavior which help to overcome residual feelings of personal guilt or inadequacy from childhood, (5) provides a geographical-historical framework for youthful identity, (6) provides a rationale for a sexual way of life, and (7) provides for submission in the appropriate context to superhuman leaders who are above the ambivalence of parent-child relationships.

In a stable society shared ideology provides a conceptual bridge across which the passage of the generations is continuous. The failure of ideology constitutes the generation gap. In times of change or of transition, construct systems match up badly with reality. Adults are more bound by words that have become empty because they have accommodated themselves for so long to the exceptions. They are only dimly aware of the failure. The formulas learned in youth survived the test of their adolescence, and the subsequent inappropriateness of these schema has been minimized or ignored. For the elders in such a period the absence of ideology leads to defensive paralysis, a falling back on cliches too hollow to persuade even themselves to convincing action, too lacking in substance to bridge the gap to the younger generation.

Lack of certainty for the young is far more devastating. For those who are only just beginning to formulate a youthful identity and a sexual way of life, a failure in ideology is a failure in socialization, the precursor of personal psychopathology and of social upheaval. In the words of a very extraordinary young man of our time, "Each social structure projects onto the screen of possibility the images of the highest type of male and female sexual identities realizable within the limits of that society. The people within that society are motivated and driven, by the perennial quest for Apocalyptic Fusion, to achieve this highest identity, or as close as they can come to the perfection of the Unitary Sexual Image. All impediments to realization of this image become sources of alienation, obstacles in the way of the Self seeking to realize its ultimate identity." (Cleaver, 1968, p. 178.)

The problem lies not with the absence of ideology, but with the incompatability of surviving elements from the past with derivatives that are unrealizable in the present. Contemporary youth are like marginal men, perceiving this world from the outside, unable to reconcile its contradictions or to communicate the urgency of their sense of dissonance to their elders.

Black Alienation

The parallel to being a black man in America is striking:

> It is difficult to let others see the full psychological meaning of caste segregation. It is as though one, looking out from a dark cave on the side of an impending mountain, sees the world passing and speaks to it; speaks courteously and persuasively, showing them how these entombed souls are hindered in their natural movement, expression, and development; and how their loosening from prison would be a matter not simply of courtesy, sympathy, and help to them, but aid to all the world. One talks on evenly and logically in this way but notices that the passing throng does not even turn its head, or if it does, glances curiously and walks on. It gradually penetrates the minds of the prisoners that the people passing do not hear; that some thick sheet of invisible but horrible tangible plate glass is between them and the world. They get excited; they talk louder; they gesticulate; some of the passing world stop in curiosity; these gesticulations seem so pointless; they laugh and pass on; they still

> either do not hear at all, or hear but dimly, and even what they hear, they do not understand. Then the people within may become hysterical. They may scream and hurl themselves against the barriers, hardly realizing in their bewilderment that they are screaming in a vacuum unheard and that their antics may actually seem funny to those outside looking in. They may, even, here and there, break through in blood and disfigurement, and find themselves faced by a horrified, implacable, and quite overwhelming mob of people frightened for their very own existence. (Du Bois, 1940, 130-131.)

This is a remarkable parable. Du Bois emphasizes the invisibility of the Negro as a person in a caste society. He lives, breathes, laughs, bleeds -- but not in the conscious experience of the whites who surround him. Du Bois perceived that his sufferings were outside the awareness of white America because he himself scarcely existed as a tangible human being in the white mind.

Like a child who has grown up in front of a distorted mirror, the black man's efforts to validate himself, to somehow establish a unique identity even from within the shadows of societal indifference, has had a profound influence in the shaping of his ego. Other Negro writers have drawn on the same metaphor: The Invisible Man (Ralph Ellison); The Fire Next Time (James Baldwin); Soul on Ice (Eldridge Cleaver). They have each emphasized this inability to establish communication, to elicit a response from those they strive to reach, and the resulting sense of internal coldness and isolation, the numbness of feeling within that corresponds to the impermeability of the wall around them.

The Intellectuals

We are reminded in these autobiographies of Kafka's strange and tortured hero, K., who struggles vainly to make contact with The Castle, a center of power and significance which he wishes most passionately to reach but which remains mute and inaccessible on its distant hill, indifferent to his desperate efforts to establish communication. In The Trial, K. tries hopelessly to defend himself against unspecified charges brought by unidentified authorities who have had him thrown into jail. His life is spent in a nightmare of guilt, confusion, impotence and despair. Gregor, the salesman in Metamorphosis, who awakens one morning to find himself transformed into a gigantic insect, is an even more vivid elaboration of self-hatred in an ego that has become cramped and deformed within the imprisoning shell of a self it finds repulsive.

This same note of despair has occupied an increasingly central place in Western thought. When man freed himself from his own bogey-man, dismissing God as a child's invention and elevating Reason in his place, he came also to experience an anguish unlike any known before. The anguish stems from the loss of meaning in existence. With God in heaven and man His creation, there was a purposefulness to the universe. Even when His acts were inscrutable, as in the death of innocent children, it was comforting to know that He nevertheless had a plan.

The need to establish conceptual order is a powerful psychic force, underlying all of man's creative activities. God supplied not only love, and therefore a confirmation of the reality of one's existence as the beloved, but even more importantly an explanation -- an assurance that life was at bottom meaningful and therefore worthwhile. The consolation of religion for a life that is otherwise painful and senseless is implicit. Jesus could cry out, "Why hast Thou forsaken me?", yet be confident that His Father heard him and in His silence still further confirm the redeeming virtue of His death. For Camus's Meursault there is nothing but void; life is pointless; there is no reason to live, or not to live.

So man goes on, discovering absurdity in the absolute inexplicability of the universe and his equally undeniable need to find it understandable in human terms. "Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards," said Kierkegaard. To which Sartre added that it made no sense either way. The Age of Enlightenment has led directly to the Absurd; freedom from God leaves man in terror at the brink of a vast, relentless, indifferent world.

For over a century Western man has played with this new thought. If Copernicus and Newton had not been enough, Darwin demonstrated in the 1850's that the biblical Genesis was not nature's way. At the turn of the century the Hammurabic source of Mosaic law was discovered. God's revelations had been copied from a pagan social code. Moral law did not rest on divine authority. Where then is the basis for morality? If man is solely responsible for his own actions, in which actions should he engage, and why? We are free to begin anywhere, but how shall we choose, and how should we establish the virtue of that choice? If the world has no meaning other than the one we give it, then we are free to give it any meaning, or none at all.

Beckett writes of the frustration that comes from such freedom:

> ....Enough of acting the infant who has been told so often how he was found under a cabbage that in the end

> he remembers the exact spot in the garden and the kind of life he lead there before joining the family circle. There will be no more for me about bodies and trajectories, sky and earth, I don't know what it all is. They have told me, explained to me, described to me, what it all is, what it looks like, what it's all for, one after the other, thousands of times, in thousands of connections, until I must have begun to look as if I understood. Who would ever think, to hear me, that I've never seen anything, never heard anything but their voices? And man, the lectures they gave me on men, before they even began trying to assimilate me to him! What I speak of, what I speak with, all comes from them. It's all the same to me, but it's no good, there's no end to it. It's of me now I must speak, even if I have to do it with their language, it will be a start, a step towards silence and the end of madness, the madness of having to speak and not being able to, except of things that don't concern me, that don't count, that I don't believe, that they have crammed me full of to prevent me from saying who I am, where I am, and from doing what I have to do in the only way that can put an end to it, from doing what I have to do. How they must hate me! (Beckett, 1958, p. 324.)

Beckett's characters are a cripple on a bicycle travelling on an endless journey, a worm-like man (or man-like worm) measuring his length across an infinite expanse, a disembodied head in an urn. They are determined to prove that they exist, or to prove that they do not exist, that the voices around them are real and the message they convey significant, or that they are meaningless and trivial and a delusion. They are driven by the need to find a proof of their identity and purpose that does not depend on an acceptance of the validity of the mirages around them.

We have reached a confluence then of estrangement shared by intellectuals, black activists, and youth. Few adolescents have read Sammuel Beckett or heard of Kierkegaard. Even Kerouac is likely to be unknown to them, a name that belongs one generation back in today's time span, to the pre-hippy beatnik progenitors of the now miniboppers. Nevertheless, the existential crisis has expanded itself into the consciousness of our time. Listen to these verses from a record by the Jefferson Airplane:

> You and me we keep walking around and we see
> All the bullshit around us.
> You try and keep your mind on what's going down,
> Can't help but see the rhinoceros around us,
> And you wonder what you can do.

And you do what you can
To get balled and high.
And you know I'm still going to need you around,
And you know I'm still going to need you around.

You say it's healing but nobody's feeling it.
Somebody's dealing--somebody's stealing it.
You say you don't see and you don't.
You say you won't know and you won't let it come.

Everything someday will be gone except silence.
Earth will be quiet again.
Seas from clouds will wash off the ashes of violence
Left as the memory of men.
There will be no survivor, my friend.
Suddenly everyone will look surprised.
Stars spinning wheels in the skies,
Sun is scrambled in their eyes,
While the moon circles like a vulture.

Someone stood at a window and cried
"One tear; I thought that should stop a war,
But someone is killing me."
And that's the last hour to think anymore.
Jelly and juice and bubbles--bubbles on the floor.

Castles on cliffs vanish.
Cliffs like heaps of rubbish
Seen from the stars hour by hour
As splintered scraps and black powder.

From here to heaven is a scar
Dead center--deep as death.
All the idiots have left.   (Balin and Kantner, 1968)

"Ah," I feel you think, "why this estrangement? Why these Hamlet-like antics, this self-dramatization? Life is good. Breathe deeply. The world is bright and big. Stretch your legs, kid; jump. Get out of that muck." This is how the frogs must sound to the tadpole! And it gasps and wonders why it cannot, what's wrong with it that it cannot, that it should be a failure?

Why should this metaphor have any power to move us. All youth go through their larval stages. What is the plight of the nymph that we should feel sorry for it? Youth is no nautilus imprisoned in a shell. Youth is freedom, to be envied and prized...not regretted. "After 30," goes the old English proverb, "a man is either a fool or a physician" --

either a healer or beyond help. Before then he still has hope, freedom to seek out the frontiers unchecked by hostages of heart or hearth. Why then the morbidity, the melancholy introspection, the self-conscious rebellion, the self-destruction, the paralysis of will, the distrust?

So what if some youth choose to play Hamlet, feigning madness "less than mad and more than feigned." Purge them. There is nothing here that a cleaning out wouldn't cure -- a haircut, a bath. But we are not sure. They gather in large numbers and we worry. They threaten the universities and we grow indignant. The police break their heads, in rage and frustration, yet we fret still and feel neither self-righteous nor fulfilled. Why should we be uncertain, anxious, enraged, personally called upon to defend society and ourselves from this unprovoked and outrageous attack? We are agitated by attacks where we are vulnerable, not where we are strong. Where are our defenses so weak?

There is a strong tendency in each of us to see the world as a stage "with all the people players on't," and ourselves in a major role. Since we think our own actions to be deliberate, and atribute the same self-determination to others, the events around us often seem to occur for our own personal benefit or distress. This tendency towards self-reference often blinds us to major social trends. Like Rosenkrantz and Gildenstern, we imagine that the eyes of Denmark are upon us and our delicate mission, only dimly aware of the complex struggle going on all around. With detachment, however, new dimensions may be opened. The short-tempered cab driver who takes us crosstown in New York is not reacting specifically and deliberately to us, is not in fact unique in his astringency or cynicism, but has been nicked and ground on the same wheel as countless others in the city until he takes on the edginess that is endemic to those who live there.

What seems so obvious here is more difficult to see when it involves others who occupy a meaningful role in our lives: parents, husbands, wives and children. Unresolved tensions from such relationships often extend to people who are surrogates for these same figures: administrators and students, police and demonstrators, the middle-aged and the young. Differences in outlook between ourselves and such others seem quite personal and specific, and we are often unaware or attach little significance to the fact that the same conflicts are experienced by many others, besides ourselves.

Karl Marx has said somewhere that the contradictions of a society are felt most sharply by its marginal classes. Another Marx, Groucho, observed that any man who claimed he could see through a woman was bound to have missed a lot. Let us take our chances nevertheless as societal voyeurs, and look to a few of the contradictions of our marginal participants -- Black Americans, youth, and intellectuals.

Love and Marriage

Urban man appears to expect more from private relationships than ever before, perhaps because his public ones are so rapid, fragmented, impersonal, and superficial. A marriage of convenience, unaccompanied by romantic love, has come almost to seem obscene. Yet marriage based on physical attraction would seem scarcely able to sustain demands for continued perfection and emotional absoprtion for a period of time that now runs to 50 years or more. Why marry so early, then? Time enough for a family later. The earth is too crowded anyway. Sensible, responsible people plan their families; don't add to the population explosion. Why not explore short-term relationships in depth? Learn to love and to be loved, freely and fully, without fear of being bound forever. Why be committed blindly to a relationship that may turn out to have been wrong? We are both consenting adults. There are no children to be hurt, nor even the risk of pregnancy. How then does the old morality apply? Who should say that it is wrong to love another unless it be forever? How do you know the relationship is going to work if you haven't tried it yet? Why try to keep it going if it clearly isn't successful?

Land of Opportunity

Democracy is dedicated to the proposition that all people have dignity. Not some people, not men only, not just people over 30, not everybody except Negroes, Jews, and a few others that don't count, but all people. Why the does democracy mean everybody but me?

Civil Rights and Wrongs

In a democratic community everyone has the right to be heard, but the inflexibility of bureaucratic structures and the complexity of formal processes make it difficult for some people to get through. The borderline between protecting one's own rights by speaking up and transgressing on others by refusing to be silent is not clear. The necessity under our judicial procedures to establish test cases by deliberately violating laws presumed to be unjust confuses things still further. There is no savior who will appear in response to mute suffering. The victims of injustice have only themselves to blame if resignation brings neither reward nor relief. Mustn't we then speak out in loud protest when our cause is just and in defense of fundamental American values: equality of opportunity, joint participation in decision-making on matters of mutual concern, compassion for those who have less or who are different?

Productivity

How produce in a world that is already characterized by overproduction? The schools teach how to think, not how to earn a living. Yet when I think that I will make as much on welfare, maybe more, than I would by going to work, I am called lazy. If I think to preserve something of myself by being my own man rather than someone else's hired hand, they tell me I don't have the right idea. Is it irresponsible, shiftless, not to work for work's sake, if I can bring home more by not being there? My woman and children get more from ADC than I can earn at the best job I can get. What would you do?

Creativity

"If a man has a talent and cannot use it," said Thomas Wolfe, "he has failed." Talent is a virtue, more important by far than a humdrum workaday existence. In a country rich as ours relatively few go to school to learn a trade, to waste their precious essence in some routine task that should be done by a machine. Machines work, men think. Men think about the mysteries of the world around them and tell it to others. Men think of the subtleties of the world within, the last of our unexplored frontiers. Our body makes a secret music all its own that cannot be heard when awake, that cannot be seen when looked at directly. Shouldn't we listen to its strange sounds, its private rhythms, its changing moods and colors? Is there something wrong with the key that unlocks the doors to this rich interior? Is it really dangerous, or merely immoral?

PRODUCTIVITY AND AFFLUENCE

These are only a sample of the deep contradictions in contemporary life. There are many more, no less provoking or critical, including pollution, poverty, and peace. The solutions are far from clear. Is there any one of us who is prepared to act decisively, any one of us who is not lacking in certainty? Where is a new synthesis to come from? Can there be another broadly shared, intelligible theory of the processes of life again? Can there be an ideology implicit in the very anti-ideology with which this discussion began?

In historical retrospect changes are sharp and clear. The differences between day and night, between high tide and low, are distinct and unambiguous. During life, however, the patterns shift slowly and one phase merges almost imperceptibly into another. Time passes slowest of all for those whose senses are quickest: a whole life-cycle passes without hurry in a single tidal pool; to a child summer itself at the shore seems endless (and waiting for change can be unendurable); yet a decade can pass for the elderly almost without notice, and leave little to compare with the vivid remembrances of youth.

In our own time some still seek a way by old means, while others struggle to break out of the confines of the passing order. A technology that has not yet reached the ultimate of its perfection may yet co-exist with primitive elements of a new one to come, foreshadowing new relationships of man to the universe.

One such contemporary development of potentially great significance is the developing use of leisure as a time for re-creation rather than recuperation. Leisure activities are becoming synonymous with the discovery and development of new personal resources and style, the realization of self in everyday life.

In 1965 there were some 1400 symphony orchestras in the United States, more than twice as many as in 1939, and all but 54 of them predominantly amateur. Theatrical enterprises numbered about 40,000, 15 percent more than in 1955, but only 200 of these were commercial -- compared with 590 in 1927 (Carter, 1965).

There is surely no accident in the return of simple melodies and rhythmic forms to popular music. From Dixieland to progressive jazz involved a time span of nearly half a century. In its final form a level of technical sophistication and virtuosity was needed that took jazz outside the range of self-expression for all but the most extraordinary young talent. Rock has restored music as a popular participatory art form again.

There is, furthermore, a new synthesis of arts and meaning. Contemporary art forms have made it possible for every youngster to be a poet, a minstrel, painter, sculptor, photographer, or moviemaker. The aims, furthermore, are neither to entertain nor to profit primarily, but to perfect the expression of an inner need.

This is the personality of a consumer rather than of a producer, oriented inwardly to the discovery of needs and outwardly towards the means for their fulfillment.

The functional relevance of such a lifestyle in an affluent society is obvious. Unemployment is not a problem for a leisure class, but the necessity to perfect a meaningful identity remains. The same is true for those whose leisure is forced rather than by choice, sustained on negative taxation rather than inherited wealth. Creative expression provides a nucleus for the formation of an acceptable non-vocational identity. Nor is there a scarcity of relevant talent. Shulberg found an abundance of it in Watts when he and others started a writer's clinic there after the riots. The Balinese have developed an entire culture around decorative crafts enjoyed by the entire community. The real problem lies with the conflict between our Puritanical past and this Epicurean future. Motivation for work, drive, the need for achievement are no longer urgent. The tightly wound springs that made Sammy run are easing, causing great anguish in those who were shaped for an earlier time.

Religion provides a metaphorical equivalent for coping with the conditions of life. A scarcity economy is bolstered by a religious outlook conciling fatalism, resignation, the inevitability of suffering and the necessity of its acceptance. In primitive societies, given the chance-like succession of surplus and famine, war and peace, pestilence and pleasure, the gods themselves seem whimsical and arbitrary -- to be approached with care, bribed and placated. With the advent of small but regular accumulation of surplus a caste of priests could be maintained as intervening shamans, specialists in interpreting the gods and propitiating them. From the free enterprise and anarchy of pantheism to the monopolistic monotheism of the church seems more an exercise in organizational sophistication than in social process. However, the alliance of church and crown was not favorable to the emergence of an industrial society. Protestantism provided a rationale for the pursuit of self-aggrandizement even at the expense of others, since salvation was assured to none and only those who worked incessantly to fulfill God's will could hope to be among the elect. It is by no historical accident that the lower classes nevertheless continue to support the earlier religion of resignation.

The interdependence of religion and the social order is revealed interestingly enough in current attempts to maintain the status quo through artificial scarcity.

1. The productive capacity of farmland is wasted rather than distributed. People starve, but food surpluses are stockpiled or burned and idle land is legitimated by putting it in a soil "bank" as if it were being saved. Even more ironically, soil bank payments and farm parities support large corporate landholders, not small families in need. This avoids the dilemma of subsidizing the poorest in society, thus bringing them without effort to the same level as those just above them in the socio-economic hierarchy. The fear is rooted deep in the Protestant ethic: none should be helped who do not help themselves. It is not only morally debilitating for the poor but sets a bad example for others, and would ultimately bankrupt the community after first exhausting the reserves of those who have virtuously managed to accumulate by their own hard efforts some protection against poverty.

2. The draft keeps millions of Americans between the ages of 18 and 26 (including girls) uncertain of the future and unable to make commitments, therefore unaware of the limitations of our society to absorb them functionally if they were to attempt to become fully involved in productive careers on graduation from high school.

3. The professions and trades practice restrictive exclusion, and maintain artificial work codes that protect their membership.

The point behind these scarcity anachronisms is that fewer people are needed to maintain our productive capacity. There is no real work for hard-core unemployables, nor is their contribution as producers wanted. Self-denial and a dedication to hard work is of ideological rather than of practical necessity. Indeed, as both Marcuse and Galbraith imply, a new ideology must emerge which will celebrate consumption as a virtue. Life must be enjoyed. We are driven by affluence to the verge of a society in which everyone can be a member of the leisure class.

What is a "productive" role in such a society? Can everyone really participate, or are we likely to be confronted with new social expendables of surfeit rather than of deprivation? Will those who have leisure forced on them feel inadequate, developing psychic deformities of the psychologically deprived comparable in their way to the physical deformities -- tuberculosis, rickets, etc. -- of the materially underprivileged?

Three broad classes of activity can be found in contemporary society:

(1) private consummatory leisure activities, pursued alone or with others, for the sake of their intrinsic rewards. Some avocational pursuits are an escape from life while others may offer an alternative pursuit of it but, as can be seen from the list in Table 1, none offer any immediate opportunity for extrinsic gain. Let us call these activities play for convenience, although not all of them are so benign.

(2) private consequential activities pursued for either intrinsic or extrinsic rewards. Any activity may become consequential insofar as it contributes to the edification of others. Art, scholarship, science, esthetics -- and social, economic or political enterprise in general -- are areas of human activity that are expected to be (and are) supported by society because their products may be of interest to others or lead to an improvement in the human condition. These activities shall be referred to collectively as vocations.

(3) public instrumental activities, involving an exchange of labor for pay.

Some forms of supportive activity are essential to the practice of practically all private pursuits, whether consummatory or consequential. Indeed, society itself depends on many such activities and could not exist without them. They must be fulfilled by someone, even though they are not intrinsically rewarding in themselves. Who would work in a mine or haul garbage for the pleasure in it? Such essential public services have been coerced in the past from people who were either physically or economically enslaved. Despite advances in technology and robotization, it seems unlikely that all such activities could ever be wholly eliminated. On the contrary it would seem that some forms of both laboring and vocational activities would always be required.

Class (1) avocational activities as listed in Table 1 may now be seen as largely play-oriented preparation for (or simulation of) the preferred gainful forms of class (2) private consequential employment. The exceptions on the list such as drugs or crime are deliberate movements away from the vocations, escapes from society that are either self-destructive or anti-social. The nature of our present society is to offer extrinsic (money, power) and intrinsic (self-fulfillment, self-enhancement) rewards as inducements to prepare through avocations (1) for vocations (2), at the price of labor (3) for failure.

TABLE I

PRIVATE CONSUMMATORY ACTIVITIES

Form of Participation	Male		Female		Neuter	
	Active	Passive	Active	Passive	Active	Passive
Self-sufficient*	fishing hunting				gardening swimming sun bathing horseback riding walking, hiking climbing, exploring solo musical instrument, including voice dancing sexual self-stimulation	reverie sleep auto-hypnosis cognitive dysfunction suicide
Individual	boating flying driving model building: planes, trains, boats, cars collecting: stamps, coins, insects, rocks burglary arson		sewing needle-work knitting flower arranging collecting: dolls, jewelry prostitution		skiing sailing cooking painting photography sculpture leather craft jewelry making model building: puppets, merionettes collecting: books, paintings, records, flowers, leaves dancing sex shoplifting, theft, larceny	watching: movies, TV plays parades, celebrations sports reading travel drinking drugs

PRIVATE CONSUMMATORY ACTIVITIES - continued

Form of Participation	Male		Female		Neuter	
	Active	Passive	Active	Passive	Active	Passive
Communal	baseball basketball hardball volleyball squash jogging soccer lacrosse organized crime				motorcycling ensemble music ensemble dances sex golf tennis bowling school study groups fraternal organizations church groups visiting friends, relatives	

* No activities are completely self-sufficient -- except for those which can be done with hand-made implements or with one's own body -- but the degree of dependency on the services and the participation of others increases down the table. All activities, even at the lowest levels of involvement with others, can nevertheless be engaged in alongside of other people in mutual isolation, or be done with them, or -- at higher levels of skills -- performed for the edification of others.

Those who are achievement-oriented from families with backgrounds in class (2) and have rejected such activities because they have experienced failure in their class (1) preparatory forms are likely to choose self-destructive escape activities in preference to labor. Those who are achievement-oriented from backgrounds in class (3) and see no access to the vocations because of systematic exclusion, or who have experienced failure in class (1) preparatory forms, are likely to choose anti-social escape activities in preference to labor. Both are likely to be victims of neurotic anxiety, however, since achievement-orientation involves socialization for competence at an unspecified vocation, with failure meaning the loss of opportunities for both extrinsic reward and self-esteem. As Auden puts it:

> Why leave out the worst
> Pang of youth? The princes of fiction,
> Who ride through risks to rescue their loves,
> Know their business, are not really
> As young as they look. To be young means
> To be all on edge, to be held waiting in
> A packed lounge for a Personal Call
> From Long Distance, for the low voice that
> Defines one's future. The fears we know
> Are of not knowing. Will nightfall bring us
> Some awful order--Keep a hardware store
> In a small town...Teach science for life to
> Progressive girls--? It is getting late.
> Shall we ever be asked for? Are we simply
> not wanted at all?
>
> Auden, 1946, p. 42

Since labor is the sentence for incompetence and is also intrinsically undesirable, it is likely to be rejected in favor of self-destructive or anti-social escape forms. The present dilemma constitutes a formidable deterrent to an orderly transition to a leisure society. Furthermore, this alienation of middle-class youth and of black Americans is not likely to be resolved by repressive measures since it is symptomatic of a much deeper disturbance. However, labor can be made acceptable if it can be regarded as a way of obtaining the means to enjoy alternative forms of class (1) activities, and provided that those who labor are:

a. accorded dignity, i.e., given the opportunity to approximate vocational status, as paraprofessionals for example,

b. provided compensation adequate to sustain class (1) avocations of their choice.

c. protected from the debilitating consequences of labor, i.e., by maximizing mine safety, and by providing higher pay and a shortened working area to compensate for physical hazards, and

d. are potentially free to move at any time through class (1) to class (2) activities.

Within these limits a functional leisure society would appear to be possible.

EDUCATION IN THE LEISURE SOCIETY

The open leisure society presupposes an elite based on creative talent. Since individual differences are the source of such valued performances, and are further necessary to the recruitment of labor in class (3) activities, such a society can only stay open at the expense of the downward mobility of the offspring of vocational families who cannot themselves make it out of (1)-(3) preparatory play-labor oscillation into their own vocation. However, the potential envy of the less talented can be minimized if labor is neither denigrated nor debilitating, if everyone goes through the (1)-(3) cycle in early life, and if the residue in (3) contains a high proportion of contented "appreciators" who also share public opportunities for creative participation at low skill levels as in Balinese ceremonials or American sports now.

The schools are the locus for formal preparatory activities. The curriculum is designed to transmit basic cultural skills and values and guard the channels that provide access to a differentiated social structure. In a functional social order the schools not only fit man for society but the society will appear to be fit for man. When the social order is dysfunctional, however, education embodies all its contradictions, including the forces (arguments and techniques) for change as well as those to maintain the status quo.

American schools once served as a ladder for social mobility. Immigrant children were acculturated, given a common historical identity, and provided with minimal preparation for a place in industrial society. The schools are no longer called upon to serve this purpose, and are in fact clearly unable to in the case of the American

Negro. In central cities Negro median income is only 75 percent that of whites at all levels of completed schooling, and the disparity is slightly greater for Negroes with four or more years of college than for those with less education. Male Negro high school graduates have a median income about the same as that of white males who only attended elementary school; Negro college graduates are no better off than white males with a high school education. The gap between black and white Americans is even greater outside the central cities. There has been no significant change in these differences in income since 1959 (US Bureau of the Census, 1969, p. 26).

Encouraged by the needs of an advanced technological consumption-oriented society to keep people off the labor market, schooling also tends to become prolonged. The function of the school as gate keeper and source of certification becomes paramount. The diploma is needed for the job, even if the actual job skills are learned later while working. The growing dysfunction between school task and social role leaves both the child and the teacher frustrated, impatient, and engaged in hostile interaction. The pupil is infantilized, and may come to feel his inability to understand the dysfunction as a sign of personal inadequacy rather than of a societal malfunction.

To protect its own integrity, the schools will encourage such distorted self-devaluation. The student becomes alientated, developing ways of protecting his own integrity against the absurdity of the apparently consensual system. The more successful learn to be con men, converting their tormentors into victims by giving only the appearance of conformity while in fact rejecting the overtly defined situation. Others are betrayed into taking the contradictions seriously, attempting to resolve them as if they were susceptible to rational correction. The school cannot tolerate disinterested analysis but must confront and destroy such students or be destroyed by them. The school thus becomes the accreditor of socialization, confirming only the docile and eliminating the others as unfit. The school dropout is a social reject.

"The school endorses and supports the values and patterns of behavior of certain segments of the population, providing their members with the credentials and shibboleths needed for the next stages of their journey, while instilling in others a sense of inferiority and warning the rest of society against them as troublesome and untrustworthy. In this way, the school contributes simultaneously to social mobility and social stratification." (Friedenberg, 1963, p. 49.)

"The real threat to the hegemony of the school comes from youngsters who have independent access to a cultural tradition that still commands a measure of respect, and who therefore retain both a standard against which to judge the pattern of values the school conveys and a source of self-esteem beyond its control. But these, I have already argued, would also constitute a threat to the mass society if they were allowed to mature. The function of the school, in socializing them, then, is to deprive them of access to that source of self-esteem and to shake their confidence in the standard from which it is derived." (Friedenberg, 1963, p. 182).

Older generations side with the schools in this repudiation of the deviate since he calls into question their own commitment. Insecure members of the middle-class, and marginal lower-middles like the police in particular, are especially embittered by the mockery of their aspirations by those who reflect the very success which they so passionately pursue.

The universities are in an even more troubled state than the grade schools. Dedicated to reason and self-examination like no other institution in our society, they cannot turn away from the critique of their own articulate students. Beset by student unrest that has stopped many of them from functioning for days and weeks at a time, the universities are nevertheless close to the height of their power, having become self-validating institutions using society to reproduce themselves. The graduate faculties are an extremely select group of people, even among the already select body of faculty PhD's. They have been recruited for the past 20 years on the basis of their potential for research, publication, and program building. Having been screened even earlier for such qualities by their own graduate instructors, they are unquestionably the most aggressive, ambitious, energetic, counteractive, pragmatic, and intellectually independent of all graduate school products, and committed both vocationally and by personal conviction to the development of others like themselves. It is in this sense that the graduate disciplines in the arts and sciences have come to be the determining force in education, reaching down through the colleges and high schools to the elementary grades to channel the brightest and the best motivated into the tracks that lead on specifically to the graduate schools. The second-best fall out to other careers. The best are encouraged to work towards PhD's, and the very best to join in training others like themselves. The school system has become academia's way of reproducing itself.[1]

The graduate schools are thus a source of people, both students and faculty, who are: (1) independent of life outside the university community, and therefore more detached in their view of that world, (2) articulate and analytical, and therefore more likely to formulate a critical position on social issues, (3) engaged in a struggle paralleling that of the surgeons earlier in this century, for control of the institution that has become more and more specifically adapted (like the hospitals) to meet their particular professional needs, and are (4) contributing inadvertently to a growing reservoir of frustration and ill-will among the enormously large numbers of students, graduate and undergraduate, who have neither the inclination or the capacity to be included among the select few destined for the graduate faculty but who are nevertheless forced by circumstance to stay in school and required by regulation to pursue the same curriculum. Beyond criticism, it is not only the best curriculum, since it was designed to prepare people for participation as graduate faculty, but also the only one.

Despite all this, there is evidence of a growing sense of alienation even among the faculty. The growth of research literature has reached fantastic proportions, creating problems on the one hand of facilitating the rapid conversion of the ever-increasing output of material into print, and of retrieval systems on the other capable of sorting through this burgeoning mass of material in order to pick out relevant bits for the specialized student or researcher. There is general agreement that much that is published is worthless, but also considerable doubt as to whether any attempt to screen this output in accordance with current cannons of value or quality wouldn't create problems even more serious than the ones that exist already. Senior men in all fields share some uncertainty about the relevance of the issues currently at the forefront in their fields, the criteria by which new knowledge is being evaluated, the standards by which younger faculty are judged, and the relevance of instruction at both the graduate and undergraduate levels in their field.

The growing reliance upon game theory and simulation is suggestive of the recrudescence of a peculiarly virulent form of scholasticism. Intended as a model, this form of reasoning by analogy gets us into trouble when we forget that it was a product of our own intellect and begin to treat it as if it represented the real world rather than an attempted and oversimplified approximation of it. It is at this point that the nightmare of the post-atomic world really begins. Military strategies are based upon minimaxed assumptions regarding an enemy who must in turn operate on the basis of the same "practical" calculus. Our own technology forces upon us the art of deliberately creating a surplus of dud-ballistic missiles, knowing that our enemy must respond to every one as if it were real, and then calculating in turn the optimal basis on which to attempt the interception of enemy war-heads on the assumption that he, too, will have randomized the production of true explosives, of which we can expect to be able to intercept only a limited number.

The reduction of complex moral issues like those represented in the Prisoners' Dilemma -- issues of basic trust in one's fellow man -- to the simple payoff matrices of experimental social psychology is a similar though less striking case in point. Here, too, the technology has become dominant, even to the point of displacing interest from the original problem for which the model was appropriate as metaphor. For those who are wrapped up in such mutual fantasies, the game does indeed become reality. It is precisely to the extent that an academic discipline comes to the point of overcommitment to its own abstractions that it stands revealed as dysfunctional in its relationships to society.

It is possible for a society to impose an absurd education on its youth, an education without relevance to their lives. In such cases the ways of the culture must be learned outside of the educational establishment. Eventually, however, such irrationality must come to an end. The problem for our time is to understand the emerging forms well enough to create an education relevant to them.

A CURRICULUM FOR MAN

Early Greek civilization was controlled by an aristocracy of warriors. Education for them was mainly military, emphasizing physical prowess, skill in combat, and a soldier's character formation (devotion to duty, love of one's comrades, heroism, chivalry, oratory, and knighthood, i.e., how to give good counsel and to perform great deeds). Rhetoric arose later in Sicily, according to Aristotle, after the expulsion of the tyrants. The resulting annulment of their confiscations of property and goods encouraged eloquence in law and politics.

In time, however, a liberal education for the sons of free Greeks of leisure came to embody almost entirely theoretical concerns. Geometry was not studied for its applications in surveying, the study of numbers had no bearing on the learning of simple arithmetic, the study of music did not help one to play an instrument or compose a tune. The Greek aristocrat was taught to be conversant with form in art, music, literature and sports, but neither to venerate the artist nor to simulate him. What he learned primarily was a common mode of speech, dress, thought and behavior that provided invidious signs of class distinction.

If the elaborations of Hellenic education strike us now as the narrowest forms of pedantic "scholarship," they were nevertheless taken most seriously by its practitioners. Pupils competed publicly for prizes, scholars debated, eminent academicians founded new schools.

Thus, obsessive dialectics became art, and art became life. The Greek aristocrat eschewed homely learning associated with earning a living and replaced it with non-functional arts -- what Veblen would call a display of conspicuous consumption. To set themselves apart from the barbarians and the low born, they invented abstract pursuits, then pursued them with an obsessive devotion as real as that of any slave desperate to escape his lot by becoming a champion athlete or musician.

Is all education like this -- determined by the view of the leisure class of itself and its needs at an historical instant? Philosophers and theologians have sought to construct ideal communities for man based on their assumptions regarding his underlying nature -- presuppositions of his moral disposition and character. Psychologists and politicians have looked to systems they thought were likely to be acceptable or tolerated when imposed upon human capacities. The utopian communities of the former have often proved uninhabitable, of the latter unendurable.

The philosopher's problem is that the virtues of man are neither finite nor inevitable. The myths that guide man are like the pole star -- the light they throw is dim, and we can go for long periods (some of us, indeed, forever) without ever raising our vision that high. Utopias fail because they expect too much.

The psychologist on the other hand demeans man. Human learning does have a mechanical paradigm as an analogue and human behavior has its robot-like qualities. But man is more than that. Machine-like motion is within his repertoire, but it does not satisfy or fulfill him.

Education has followed both courses. It presupposes what is good in man's nature, and attempts to extract it, encouraging its emergence by the reading of ennobling works and exhortations to emulate their example. It also seeks to impart socially useful skills by devices intended to capitalize on human capacities to imitate, to store, and to reproduce. There is no guarantee, however, that either input will speak to man's essential nature. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that the ultimate elaboration of the Hellenic academies, the medieval universities, and of contemporary higher education simply reflects the final triumph of the subject matter, culminating in the denial through an excess of scholastic zeal of some crucial aspect of humanity.

If we were to ritualize diet during the first year of life and exclude all proteins, we would be institutionalizing a cortical deficiency -- limiting by cultural artifact a potential for growth that was a biologically inherent given. The nature of man in a characterological sense may be broadly plastic, and thus resistant to unique proscriptions of a moral ideal, but man's biological nature is not nearly so invariant. Organismic propensities that are among the invariant qualities of humankind are the source for what might appropriately, if inelegantly, be called an organic curriculum. (This should be understood to refer to its biological specificity for the human species, perhaps even to its nutrient value, but not as a commentary on the source of its richness.)

What are some of the elements to be considered in a curriculum designed for man rather than for the material being transmitted to him:

1. Early childhood is marked by digital gratification. The infant grasps, sucks, incorporates and manipulates. He discovers erogenous zones, is driven to gross kinesthetic movements. All of these activities suggest that manual dexterity and physical motion are important early stages in human development, sources both of gratification as well as of subsequent elaboration in more complex pursuits.

2. While still in infancy the child demonstrates a high degree of interest in other humans. Faces and face-like masks attract him, elicit pleasurable responses, and are sought after for repeated stimulation. The need for affection and for emotional gratification through human interaction comes early, but so, too, does an interest in the characteristics of people and their different ways. Physical anthropology and cultural geography are likely to be of considerable interest to the young child, leading in time to other aspects of the social sciences, history, and ultimately interpersonal relations.

3. The love of beauty and order, the response to esthetic experience, is peculiarly human. We share body mechanics and intraspecies dependence with other primates, but only the most rudimentary responses to rhythm among them are akin to the capacity of humans to enjoy music. Much of this appreciation is intellectual, a predisposition to order experience in symmetrical patterns. It is perhaps no accident that talent for music and for mathematics both appear early in life, and tend to be found together in the same individuals.

4. The last of the specifically human propensities to appear is the capacity to play word games. Language, logic and intellectual abstraction are interrelated, as we noted at the outset of this paper, and serve in turn as the basis from which poetry, rhetoric and philosophy emerge.

If the student were taken as the integrating center of a curriculum composed of successively more complex forms of these four elements, permitting his own inductive capacities to lead him on from one level to the next, a form of education would emerge which might be said to be uniquely human. What is envisaged here is the spontaneous generation of activities facilitating the ultimate growth of which man is capable, rather than the continued fitting of humans to the limited categories of their predecessors.

> Though trees turn bare and girls turn wives
> We shall afford our costly seasons;
> There is a gentleness survives
> That will outspeak and has its reasons.
> There is a loveliness exists,
> Preserves us, not for specialists.
> (Snodgrass, 1966, p. 39)

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E. SOME PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION

by Edmund L. Pincoffs

A PROLEGOMENON TO THE PROLEGOMENA

There is something uncomfortable about the very notion of moral education. Plato felt and evinced this discomfort in the Meno and Protagoras. Part of this discomfort comes from the fact that we feel that in the very broaching of the idea of a program of moral education we crack a door through which all sorts of charlatans and sophists can slip, decked out in false and all-too-easily obtained credentials, ready to do business, and with prospects of public support. Another part comes from the sense that we don't really know what we are talking about, that the chief difficulty is to clear our thoughts. We don't know what kind of logical object moral education is. Questions that make perfectly good sense in other realms of education concerning credit, course titles, qualifications of instructors, and the basis for the awarding of grades sound strained and even embarrassing or nonsensical with respect to moral education. We are obviously extending the common notions we have of education, but it is not clear how and how far. It is not even clear whether moral education is a self-consistent notion: whether it makes sense at all. The trick in what follows is not to be scared off by the strangeness or odd humor of these questions which seem to set limits on education--limits which we are straining against, but to acknowledge to ourselves that we are extending the bounds of public education, and to be clear how we are doing so, while we keep tally of the merits and demerits of the extensions we propose. In the process we must somehow keep the charlatans in our field of view and keep the back doors latched.

This is a cowardly kind of paper in which a great many preliminaries are attended to without ever coming very near the formidable substantive issues. My only excuse is that the preliminaries must be given their due, or we are not sure what the issues are; or if we are we shouldn't be. The substantive issues have to do with moral education as a public enterprise, and should leave moot for the time being the question of the role of the schools. What we want to know, ultimately, is what kind and content of public moral education, if any, is justifiable and what kind is not. But before we can get to so large a question we must know whether there is a logically coherent notion of moral education, whether moral judgments are only apparently cognitively justifiable, how the requirements of moral autonomy may be reconciled with those of moral education, whether education is to be understood as primarily rule-oriented or virtue-oriented; and we must know other things as well.

STUMBLING-BLOCKS IN THE WAY OF THEORY

THE IRRELEVANCE OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY

It is a curious fact that contemporary moral theory is of very little use to the person who wants to know what he should teach his children, or how moral education might be introduced into the schools. Those of my readers who are close to the field will know that moral philosophers tend to be more exercised over questions of meta-ethics than over normative questions; and that even when they turn to normative ethics they rarely deal with questions of moral education. It may be useful to sketch the history of the belief (or superstition) that meta-ethics is normatively irrelevant yet at the same time logically prior to normative ethics; and to indicate the reasons why normative ethics as it is presently discussed is less than useful to the moral educator.

A. The Irrelevance of Meta-Ethics

Meta-ethic's subject-matter is supposed to be normative ethics. The distinction is usually couched in linguistic terms: in normative ethics there are first-order statements about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness of actions, policies, persons, rules, and courses of action; the (second-order) statements of meta-ethics are about normative ethical statements. The main business of meta-ethics, as it is usually conceived, is with the definitions of the terms used in normative ethics, and with the assessment of the arguments used there.

The emphasis on the definition of ethical terms as the central subject-matter of ethics began with G. E. Moore. The question "how 'good' is to be defined" is, for him, "the most fundamental question in all Ethics. That which is meant by 'good' is, in fact, except its converse 'bad' the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics."[1] If we ignore the assumptions that there must be some one central term in normative ethics, and that that term is "good," then Moore is simply returning to a very respectable position in moral philosophy: the one expressed by Socrates when he demands to know of Euthyphro how he, Euthyphro, can report his own father for a misdeed "because piety requires it" unless he knows what is the meaning of "piety". First questions must come first. "It is impossible," says Moore "that, till the answer to this question (how 'good' is to be defined) be known, any one should know what is the evidence for any ethical judgment whatsoever. But the main object of Ethics, as a systematic science, is to give correct reasons for thinking that this or that is 'good,' and unless this question is answered, such reasons cannot be given."[2]

I want to mark off for discussion in my next sub-section the conception of normative ethics expressed in the sentence just above. It is evident from this quotation, and from the over-all plan of Principia Ethica, that Moore thinks of the definitional question as of merely instrumental value; if we don't know whether or not "good" can be defined, and, if so, what it's definition is; then we don't know what we are talking about when we call anything good. As it happens, Moore thinks that goodness cannot be defined, that it is an indefinable because the term refers to a simple and unique property of things which is as primitive as "yellow"; but he does think that we can intuit the presence of this property if we take the right preliminary steps to ensure correct intuition. For Moore, there was never any question of restricting ethical inquiry to the definition of "good," even though that definition is the only simple object of thought peculiar to Ethics. This is the first question, but is certainly not the last one too.

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[1] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903, p. 5.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

It is logically the first. This explains the pull of meta-ethics on philosophers from Socrates forward. You cannot evaluate the truth of a statement until the meanings of the terms in it are clear. If we do not know the meanings of the terms, we do not know the meaning of the statement; and we do not know what counts as showing that a statement is true until we know it's meaning. This pull has been so strong, that, in Anglo-American philosophy, questions concerning the definition of moral terms and the structure of moral argument have dominated the scene. Pennants flying, and swords drawn, philosophers galloped into the logical fray. One squadron fought for the thesis that "right" and all other "moral terms" should be defined by reference to "good"; another flew the flag of "right," contending that this, not "good," was the primitive term. So exhilarating did the battle become, that philosophers did not think it strange to say that moral judgments did not belong in Ethics at all, and that the field should be restricted to "propositions relating to the definition of ethical terms."[3] Even this was not enough. Ethics proper, or Meta-ethics, had to be cut free of the hampering bonds of normative ethics. William Frankena cut the last strings when he said, in a paper read before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in the same year, that "the differences between intuitionists, naturalists, and non-cognitivists are differences in meta-ethics--in particular, they are differences about the nature of normative utterances--and do not necessarily entail any disagreement in normative ethics." He went on to say that "all metaethical objections to a belief in universal human rights are simply irrelevant.... Meta-ethical relativism does not entail normative relativism."[4] (R. M. Hare, in a book published in 1952, referred to Ethics as "a special branch of Logic".[5])

Surely there was no small amount of intrinsic interest in these discussions. Moore's theory of language, evidenced in his notion that either "good" referred to something or it had no meaning, had come under attack. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, philosophers came forward to protest against such a constricting view of language-functions. "Non-cognitivists" held that moral utterances were statements in form only; really they were expressions of emotion, or imperatives, or prescriptions. But, if we are to hold to the Socratic tradition, exemplified by Moore, it is just as sure that these discussions should not be regarded as having merely intrinsic interest. They should not be cut off from normative ethics. As he and Socrates conceived the definitional quest, there was certainly no reason why they should be. (It might well be argued that they were wrong in supposing that we cannot know what is the grounds for our judgments unless we can define the terms we use in them. I cannot define "time" satisfactorily, but I can make a great many true statements using the word; and I know what counts as showing that they are true. Nevertheless, right or wrong, Meta-ethics was for them a handmaiden to Ethics.)

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[3] A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, London, 1936, p. 103.

[4] The Language of Morals, Oxford, 1952, p. 172.

[5] Science, Language, and Human Rights, Amer. Phil. Association, Eastern Division, Vol. I, Philadelphia, 1952, p. 190.

In fairness to Frankena, and to Stevenson, whose work may have inspired his remark, there is something to be said for the view that it is normatively irrelevant whether we conceive of moral utterances as "cognitive" or "non-cognitive". It is at least arguable, and has been argued, that even if I think of moral utterances as fundamentally expressions of emotion I may at the same time acknowledge that I have emotions concerning morality, and I may see no inconsistency in attempting to bring you to share these emotions of mine. The point is not that they are wrong, but that if they are right, and restrict Ethics by intent or by practice to Meta-Ethics; then normative Ethics has been abandoned as a field of inquiry worthy of philosophers; and the moral educationist would do well to look elsewhere.

But suppose that they _are_ wrong, at least so far as the definitional quest of Socrates and Moore is concerned. Suppose that we _cannot_ know what is the evidence for any moral proposition unless we know the definition of certain terms? (My own reservations turn on a distinction between knowing the meaning and knowing the definition. I _can_, I would hold, know the meaning of "time" or "good" even if I am unable to give a definition of the term.) Moore said, as quoted above, that Ethics is mainly concerned to "give correct _reasons_ for thinking that this or that is good". Ethics does not on his view descend to particular cases, practices, or policies (that is Casuistry), but it helps us to do so by elucidating the grounds on which we may support that judgment that this or that _kind_ of thing is good or bad. What Moore had chiefly in mind (if we may judge by the trend of his later chapters) by "this or that" is things like knowledge, beauty, and friendship. When he thought of ethical judgments he thought of such judgments as whether these things would be good if they existed quite alone; and if a course of action would lead to their realization and could thereby be judged to be instrumentally good. His successors in the Anglo-American tradition have been by and large less stringently teleological in their analysis of the grounds for moral judgment. In consequence, they have focused less on judgments of the intrinsic value of ends and more on judgments concerning action taken by themselves. In fact, as we shall now see, judgments concerning action have come (mostly unconsciously, I think) to be characterized in one particular way.

B. The Irrelevance of Normative Ethics

It is a fundamental and almost universal presupposition of Normative Ethics as it is practiced today that the business of Ethics is with "problems"; i.e., problematic situations in which it is difficult to know what to do. This is true not only of the ethics written in the journals of the Anglo-American scholarly world, but also of much of the popular and semi-popular writing in the field, and in a certain way of the existential movement in ethics. "Ethics," Toulmin tells us, "is everybody's concern....Everyone...is faced with moral problems--problems about which, after more or less reflection, a decision must be reached."[6]

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[6] S. E. Toulmin, _An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics_. Cambridge, 1950, p. 1.

According to Hare, "...in a world in which the problems of conduct become every day more complex and tormenting, there is a great need for an understanding of the language in which these problems are posed and answered."[7] "My ultimate aim," Singer informs us, "is to determine...how moral judgments can rationally be supported, how moral perplexities can rationally be resolved, and how moral disputes can rationally be settled."[8] Grice takes it that the central purpose of his work is to set up the grounds of "different kinds of moral judgment: judgments of obligation, rights, justice and good and evil."[9] Fletcher thinks of himself as setting out a method for " 'situational' or 'contextual' decision-making."[10] Rand understands Ethics as a "code of values to guide man's choices and actions."[11] In Sartre's "ethics of freedom," if we may so refer to the general ethical tendency of a writer who has yet to produce a work specifically directed to the problems of philosophical ethics, the central problem is choice; even though Sartre would reject the emphasis of all of the above writers on justification.[12]

Without argument, and as a matter of course, philosophers assume that the ultimate addressee of their normative writings is that miserable creature, the "moral agent" who is in some kind of quandary and is concerned with what decision he should make. The question whether meta-ethics can be relevant to normative ethics is understood without further analysis as the question whether meta-ethics can be relevant to the determination of the standards to which the quandary-bound agent can appeal. The certainty that the focus of normative ethics is on quandary-resolving and perplexity-patching is a certainty born of scholarly convention. Moral theorists have become so accustomed to thinking of themselves as peering over the bank at men floundering in problems that they couldn't recognize a man practicing swimming or just floating lazily on his back; and it does not occur to them that they might be better occupied in building fences and posting warning notices; in concentrating, to drop the metaphor, on moral education.

The aim of moral education might be in part just to help an individual toward a life in which he is not continually bogged down in moral quandaries. To be so is ennervating and not necessarily a sign of character. The moral individual must surely be sensitive to the sometimes conflicting claims that are made upon him; but he should know when and when not to become involved, when he should avoid the occasion of perplexity. Men can have moral problems because they are sensitive and conscientious people; because they do not have the sense to avoid them; or because they are continually looking for them or pathologically concerned about them. Moral education should encourage the having problems for the first of these reasons, discourage it for the second, and attempt to avert the fixation of the third.

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[7] op. cit., p. 2.

[8] M. G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics, N. Y., 1961, p. 6.

[9] Russell Grice, The Grounds of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, 1967, p. 2.

[10] Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics, London, 1966, p. 11.

[11] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, N. Y., 1961, p. 15.

[12] N. Greene, Jean-Paul Sartre: The Existentialist Ethics. Ann Arbor, 1963, pp. 56-57.

The tendency to concentrate on difficult decisions first began to seem queer to me when I taught the history of ethics. I read Plato, Aristotle, the Sophists, the Epicureans, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, Hume and Shaftesbury for their "theories"; and by "theory" I meant the grounds they offered for justifying moral decisions. But I began to suspect, what I should have known, that in presenting these philosophers as having theories of this sort I was distorting their teachings. The fixation on decision is, in fact, a phenomenon of relatively recent origin in the long history of the subject. The philosophers I have mentioned were mostly concerned with matters much more directly related to the problems of moral education: with excellence of character and with the good for man. The watershed between an ethics which emphasizes virtue and one which emphasizes decision may well be the work of Immanuel Kant. In the first lines of the _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_ we find him starting out in the usual way by locating moral goodness in the good will. The traditional moral philosopher on reading this would settle back in anticipation of an analysis of the moral excellences which would demonstrate that good will is the foremost among them. But this is not what happens. Kant finds, by recursive analysis, that what is essential to the concept of the good will is the concept of acting not merely in accordance with, but from, duty. And to act from duty is to act, so he finds, as the Categorical Imperative demands. But the Categorical Imperative is an imperative which concerns the kind of _reasons_ on which I may and may not act if I am to retain my status as a moral agent. So the center of moral gravity shifts, in Kant, from what kind of person one should be to what one should do, and from there to how (on what grounds) one should make decisions.

I do not want to be misunderstood. My interest here is in moral education. Quandary ethics is, in a world in which there are too many quandaries, obviously relevant to the needs of man. But to concentrate on it, to the exclusion of virtue ethics, is to give short shrift to the problems of moral education: short shrift, not no shrift. It would be absurd to deny that we must somehow convey to the young what it is to reason well about difficult moral problems. But it would be much more absurd to deny that this is but a _part_ of moral education.

THE NON-COGNITIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

In passing I mentioned above that Moore was attacked for an oversimple theory of language in which a word was supposed to get its meaning merely by referring to some object, and that the consequences of this attack have been a new start in Ethics. I should now like to spell out a little more how this new development constitutes a new stumbling block for a theory of moral education.

Let me begin at the end. An adequate theory of moral education, we might reasonably suppose, should identify the criteria by which we may distinguish what should from what should not be conveyed from generation to generation. We might quite naturally put this in terms of warranted content. That is, we will convey what we can be reasonably sure is true, but we may not convey what we suspect may be false. The criteria which distinguish what should and should not be conveyed are, then, criteria by appeal to which moral propositions may be warranted as true, or rejected as false.

This seemingly straightforward account, however, will not do. It is presently a matter of debate whether there are any moral truths and hence any criteria of moral truth. This is not the skeptical doubt which is founded on some form of relativism. On any form of relativism, some moral propositions must be taken as true. On the thesis of subjective relativism, for example, what is morally true for me may not be so for you. But on the non-cognitive view, there are no moral propositions, if a proposition is understood as an instantiated language-form having a truth value. On the non-cognitivist view, moral utterances (to use a neutral term), even though they may be couched in deceivingly declarative form, may have a function different from that we ordinarily take declarative sentences to have: the stating of facts. The point of the utterances, in the region of language which is their natural home, may be quite different. It will not do either to say that they state values. This is to suppose that there are "value-facts" which are the objects of such statements, but the question is whether moral utterances are statements at all. The alternatives are that they serve some other function in language, as e.g. commanding expressing attitudes of emotion, or prescribing.

I should say at once that the non-cognitive theory seems to me to be merely a stumbling-block, and not an impassable barrier. This is because I believe that it is quite possible for there to be rationally defensible commands or prescriptions (perhaps emotions, too). So that, if this be accepted, and the theoretical task of analyzing it be bracketed for the time being, one may convey to the young a rationally warranted content, even if, strictly speaking, one must avoid cognitive terms in elucidating that content. There seems to me to be no more difficulty in principle in the notion that a teacher may be justified in prescribing a given kind of conduct than in the notion that a doctor may be justified in prescribing a given medicine. The philosophical superstition that "cognitive assertions" are a form of language to which all other self-respecting forms of language can be reduced is rapidly disappearing. And progress is being made toward an appropriate analysis of the logic of imperatives and prescriptions.[13] Some philosophers, no longer intimidated by the name, have returned to normative tasks even though they accept the non-cognitivist label.[14]

THE AUTONOMY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

I have, when I have been on guard, used the neutral term "content" to refer to what in the way of moral education is passed on from one generation to the next. This is because I do not want to take a position at this stage whether moral education, if intelligible at all, is best understood as teaching that certain beliefs are true, teaching how to act or behave under a variety of circumstances, teaching what sort of person to be, or something else. The problem of autonomy is usually raised by reference to the principles which are inculcated in young people; although in principle it could be generalized to cover any of the above understandings of "content". And, although it is usually raised in the cognitive mode of moral talk, it could be raised in terms of justified imperatives or prescriptions or attitudes.

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[13] Cf. Hare, op. cit., and Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1963.

[14] e.g., Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, Ithaca, 1958 and Kai Nielsen, "Good Reasons in Ethics," Theoria, 1958.

Aiken has raised the difficulty I want to discuss better than any writer I have read.[15] "Our unahppy situation," he says, "is this: we wish to honor, indeed, we cannot escape, the obligation to be objective in our moral decisions, yet we seem unable to do so without at the same time committing ourselves to a conception of morality which, if taken seriously destroys our autonomy as moral agents and critics. On the other hand, we find ourselves committed to a principle of moral freedom which apparently dooms us to acquiesce in a radical ethical subjectivism that renders meaningless the very effort to search for objective moral judgments." (137)

The problem is that it seems to be a prerequisite of moral education that there should be principles which can be held to be objectively valid, and which are binding upon any moral agent who once understands them; but, on the other hand, it is held that true moral agents must be self-legislative or, as Kant says, autonomous. The paradox of moral education, then, is that at the same time we must inculcate in the young the principles definitive of morality; and we must so educate them that they are not willing to rest on principles supplied to them by another person but will themselves generate the principles appropriate to their life-circumstances. Otherwise they do not possess the freedom that characterizes genuinely moral agents.

Suppose that the principle in question is the Golden Rule; and suppose we accept this as one of the principles, if not the only principle, definitive of morality, so that no person could properly be called moral who did not accept and practice it. How are we then to teach this principle to our children? We want them to judge for themselves, and not by appeal to any authority; but at the same time we present the Golden Rule to them authoritatively, telling them that if they do not accept it and live by it they are not really moral persons. Insofar as a person is an autonomous moral agent he has a right to reject any and every principle presented to him as binding. He must bind himself, not be bound by another. It might seem as if the way out of the dilemma is simply not to present the principle in question authoritatively, but to show the child that there are good reasons for accepting it; reasons which when understood will persuade him that the principle should be a part of his self-legislation. But while this carries us a certain distance, it is easily seen to fail when we move beyond principles which can be justified by reference to higher principles. How are these higher principles to be justified? How, in fact, justify the Golden Rule to someone who is not ready to accept it? Is it not, in fact, simply presented as something that must guide our thought and action? And how is this to be squared with moral autonomy?

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[15] Cf. Henry David Aiken, "The Concept of Moral Objectivity" in his Reason and Conduct, N. Y., 1962.

Again, although there are depths to this problem which I have not begun to prove, it does not seem to me to be anything more than a potential stumbling-block. What needs to be acknowledged is not that our freedom is shown to be unexpectedly limited by the argument, but that the proponents of the argument do not take freedom seriously enough. For most of us at one time reached a stage in our development when we realized that it was open to us not to be moral: to reject any and all principles which are (or are claimed to be) definitive of morality, including the Golden Rule. Shades of Thrasymachus! So we do not necessarily accept the Golden Rule because we are told that we must; but we may accept it freely, having freely decided that we will be moral, and that this Rule is indeed definitive of morality.[16]

PRELIMINARIES TO THEORY

In this section of my paper I want to raise some of the many questions that must be answered if an adequate understanding and justification of public moral education is to be developed.

IS MORAL EDUCATION POSSIBLE?

The question has two branches: Is moral education conceptually possible and is it empirically possible? The first asks whether the very notion of moral education is in some way self-contradictory, the second whether, supposing it is conceptually coherent, moral education sets a task beyond our powers. I shall confine myself here to the first.

The argument that moral education is conceptually impossible could take two forms: (1) that moral knowledge is conceptually impossible, that moral education consists in conveying moral knowledge, and that moral education is, hence, impossible; (2) that education requires teaching, and that teaching morality is conceptually impossible, since we can know *a priori* that morality cannot be taught.

The first of these arguments raises two questions, one of which the practical educator should avoid, and the other of which he should confront. He should avoid the question whether moral knowledge is possible. To answer it he would have to settle the age-old and perennial skeptical doubts centered around individual and cultural relativism, and the modern doubts concerning the cognitivity of moral assertions. This he is not likely to do. He should confront the question whether moral education necessarily consists in conveying moral knowledge. Here there is much in contemporary Anglo-American and continental European ethical theory that will be of use to him. If he can eschew the temptation to insist that, by some kind of special power, he can divine the elements of Moral Truth, and from these deduce the Proper Rules for everyday life; it is still open to him to consider the merits of alternative commitments and prescriptions. The question whether there is moral knowledge can be by-passed, in short, if the educator does not claim to convey moral knowledge, but only that he is justified in recommending beliefs and inculcating habits which can themselves be justified on moral ground. The notion that this cannot be done without ultimately claiming some form of ultimate moral knowledge is but a superstition of some philosophers. Since Hume, we should all have been painfully aware that committment can be grounded only on committment; and that even if there were impeccably warranted Moral Truths, no committments, and hence no prescriptions, could be derived from them.

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[16] Cf. E. L. Pincoffs, "Objectivity of Henry Aiken," *J. of Philosophy*, March 12, 1964.

The second argument turns around the concept of teaching, raising the possibility that teaching morality may be seen, when we understand what sense of "teaching" is in question, to require a kind of teaching which is conceptually impossible. This raises, in turn, the questions whether moral education need be conceived in terms of _teaching_ anything, or only in terms of some less direct preparation of the environment for learning; and what kind of teaching, if any, _is_ conceptually impossible. The first of these questions cannot profitably be discussed until there is some conception of the subject-matter of moral education; in any case, teaching may be broadly enough conceived to include preparing the ground for the seed. What is at issue in the doubts concerning teaching, is, first, a distinction familiar to educational philosophers between success and non-success senses of "teach". In the success sense, to claim to have taught _A_ something is to claim that _A_ has now learned what has been taught; in the non-success sense, the claim to have taught _A_ would be true if _A_ had been given lessons. Thus, in the success sense, I may not have taught Olson geometry if he cannot pass any examinations; but in the non-success sense, I have: he took lessons from me. It can be argued[17] that, in the success sense, there are some things that, conceptually speaking, cannot be taught, since, because they are accomplishments which require the unlikely or dubious cooperation of the world or of other people, they cannot be learned. It is, thus, only in a pickwickian sense that we can say that Johnson _taught_ Diggs to shoot holes-in-one, even though _what_ Johnson taught Diggs may make it more likely that Diggs will shoot a hole-in-one. It is, in fact, on this sort of ground that Plato had intense reservations about the activities of the Sophists. They claimed too much, because they, or some of them, claimed to teach a kind of _areté_ which, if mastered, would guarantee success. Does moral education, by the very meaning of the term, claim to achieve what, in principle, it cannot achieve?

What kinds of success-claims are entailed by the claim that moral education is conceptually possible? The answer is, of course, that we can limit our claims as we see fit, depending on what we mean by "education" and by "morality". If we claim something that would be on all fours with claiming to teach how to shoot holes-in-one, then we claim too much; but there are more modest claims we may make. Let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that to educate is, at least, to teach, even though the reverse entailment would not work; and let us understand "teach" broadly enough to include everything from rote drill to arranging the environment in such a way as to make learning likely. Then our question turns on the nature of that which, so it is claimed, we can teach. What, in short, is meant here by "morality?"

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[17] Cf. Pincoffs, "What Can be Taught?" , _The Monist_.

In claiming to teach "morality," we could be claiming to teach a number of different things: moral beliefs, principles, rules, maxims; justified beliefs, etc.; beliefs, etc., which would be justified anytime anywhere; moral behavior; moral ideals; moral decision-procedures; moral virtue; moral homilies, poems, songs; codes of behavior; universal solvents for moral difficulties; Natural Law; the deliverances of Reason; God's Commandments; the Human Situation; or what not. I suggested above that no cognitive claims need be made that we are teaching something (Natural Law, e.g.) which can be known to be true. But even if the emphasis is on the conative rather than the cognitive, the content of moral teaching is not affected. Natural Law, for example, can be presented as a set of prescriptions worthy of acceptance, rather than as ribs of the universe. A part of what we teach, then, might be prescriptions for behavior which we believe can be justified, and which we believe we are justified in teaching. (The new traditional distinction between "teaching that" and "teaching how" seems less than useful here. It could lead us to think of teaching principles in a cognitive way; and to relegating prescription to a twilight zone between the two.) What we claim for these prescriptions will determine the extent to which we remain within the bounds of acceptability or verge on sophistry.

The prescriptions we offer can be of two sorts: those concerning how to make and justify moral decisions; and those concerning the sort of character it is morally necessary or desirable to have. For reasons which I have given above, I think that moral theory has recently slighted the latter topic, or even ignored it completely, in favor of the former. I should like now to take up more explicitly the relations which can be made out between rule-oriented and virtue-oriented moral education.

CHARACTER-EXCELLENCE "VS." DECISION-ADEPTNESS

As I see it, the moral educationist must look mainly to an older tradition in ethical theory, virtue ethics, and can expect little help from contemporary ethics, which is too narrowly focused on the resolution of moral quandaries. I do not want this conviction of mine to be misunderstood. It does not mean that I think that reasons and reasoning have no place in moral education. Quite the contrary. They have a central place. This is so because a good many of the virtues, or excellences of character, with which, on my view, the moral educationist should be concerned are what might be called the virtues of reason; for example, principled consistency, awareness of the legitimate claims of others, and fidelity to the facts of the case. It is also so because, generally speaking, virtue ethics is concerned not merely with behavior patterns (which could be described by an observer who knew nothing of the rationale of the behavior), but with dispositions to act in certain ways on rational grounds which could be supplied on demand. Virtue ethics is, in short, a noramtive ethics which has a place for reasons and reasoning. The distinction between virtue and quandary ethics is not that one does not, and the other does, have a place for reasons and reasoning. It is that one, quandary ethics, emphasizes moral reasoning to the exclusion of moral character. But it is quite conceivable that an individual well-schooled in a normative system, say rule utilitarianism, might still be an immoral or amoral man; whereas it is not conceivable that a man of good moral character should know nothing of the reasons he should give for his actions. This is an analytic statement. He would not be a man of good moral character if he merely behaved appropriately on the appropriate occasions; that is, we would not have a right to conclude on that evidence alone that he was. In assessing a man's moral character we must know that he is not merely acting as he has been told or trained to do, and that he gives the right kind of reasons for what he does. For example, it is quite conceivable that he should give merely prudential reasons for all of the actions that we would, not knowing why he did them, have supposed done for moral reasons.[18]

But we do not want to move too fast here. It is a common (if unconscious) tendency in moral philosophy to depreciate training as somehow essentially mindless. This it surely need not be. The difficulty, if it is one, lies in taking into account that moral education is of developing creatures: creatures who are developing from less to more rational, and in whom the early development of good habits is of crucial importance. If, in the sequence of human development, the inculcation of good non-reasoned behavioral habits may have to precede or accompany the development of good reasoning habits this should not be cause for surprise. But here again we must move slowly. Good reasoning habits cannot be regarded, if we are to avoid a merely external, observational perspective, as habits merely. Good reasoning is reasoning that can survive criticism: is consistent, faithful to facts, relevant, economical, and founded on defensible principles. These are terms that agents, not observers, use in criticism and assessment; they are the language of insiders, participants, community-members-- not anthropologists, psychologists, or sociologists.

VIRTUE: SOME DISTINCTIONS

Ever since Plato broached the question in his discussion of philosopher-kings, academicians have been faced with the problem with which we are faced at this conference: how to retain our status as expert outsiders--observers and analysts--while entering the community and participating as insiders and agents. But there is not only the difficulty of entering the community in a defensible way, but of being clear when we are not entering it.

This latter difficulty may be illustrated as we proceed to a preliminary analysis of "virtue". In spite of somewhat unsuitable antique connotations, the term is of some use in the theory of moral education. It is quite natural, and I think correct, to define the task of moral education as the cultivation [illegible] of virtue.[19] As I shall use the term, "virtue" will refer to certain attributable dispositional characteristics. Before taking up "attributable" and "dispositional," I want to add something to my definition. I do not _just_ refer, I refer approvingly. This is not the same thing as to say that I refer to what is, or has been approved, but that by the use of the term I express my own approval. To say that virtues are approved characteristics of a certain sort is to take no position oneself; and to fail to speak as an insider. It is to leave the question open whether I, the speaker, approve of what is generally approved. But I do not want to leave it at that, either. I do not want to define virtue in such a way that _any_ attributable disposition could count as a virtue, so long as I approve of it. I must add some reference to an at least quasi-procedural method for deciding whether I am _right_ in approving of the disposition in question. This I will do by saying that I am _justified_ in referring approvingly to the disposition in question. My definition as a whole, then, is that a virtue is an attributable dispositional characteristic of which the speaker (the user of the term) justifiably approves. And (to maintain my foothold as an insider), "justifiably" in this definition is not to be understood in some such observer's terms as "justifiable according to him" or "in the light of the community's beliefs," but justifiable _simpliciter_. That is, I would not be willing to call a disposition a virtue unless I thought that I justifiably approved of it; but my _justifiably_ approving of it does not refer back merely to _my_ or my groups _beliefs_ concerning justification; otherwise I might just as well have left justification out and settled for approval.

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[18] Kant can be seen, in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, to be moving along these lines: from acting virtuously from the standpoint of conation (the goodness of the will) to the analysis of such action in terms of the reasoning that informs it (acting from, not merely in accordance with duty).

To say that an individual has a given dispositional characteristic is to say that under certain kinds of circumstances he is likely to behave in a certain way. To say that the disposition is attributable is to say that he would not have the disposition were it not for his own attitudes, beliefs, and efforts: that the disposition would be a result, we might say, of his enculturation, and is common to all persons of his sub-culture, or is innate in the members of his family. "Attributability" is obviously a relative term. I am not sure that it makes sense to speak of enculturation without any effort on the part of the culture-bearer as anything more than a limiting case. But to the extent that there is no effort of the individual, the disposition is less attributable, and hence less amenable to being counted as a virtue.

Part of the age-old problem concerning the teachability of virtue arises from understanding the claim to be able to teach virtue to include a subordinate cognitive claim. This claim is to the effect that we know "the nature" of the virtues and can convey this knowledge to our pupils; and knowing means, in this context, being able to give a rationally defensible account (in Plato's dialogues, one which can survive the Socratic elenchus). But, as we know, all kinds of doubts can arise over whether there is any such knowledge to impart. On the approach to virtue which I have outlined, these difficulties are at least cashed for a series of smaller and more intelligible ones. The question now becomes, what are the grounds on which a given disposition is held to be a virtue? When, to put it otherwise, are we justified in regarding a disposition as a virtue?

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[19] I shall have to allow my previous discussion of quandary-ethics and virtue ethics to serve as a warrant for this assumption: even though I would explicitly argue the point in a longer paper. Frankena, in the Introduction to his _Philosophy of Education_ (N. Y., 1965); and in Ch. I of his _Three Historical Philosophies of Education_ (Chicago, etc., 1965), rightly I believe, holds that the business of moral education is with excellences of character.

But this is of course only the beginning of the normative task. We must then ask whether this and that sort of virtue can be taught (logically, empirically); and whether, supposing it can, we would be justified in including it in a public education program. (I do not mean to imply that there is nothing more to a possible public moral education than the inculcation of virtues. I believe that moral education must include the inculcation in early years of a minimal code of behavior as well. The topics are closely interconnected: failure to abide by the minimal code would count as virtue-failure of some sort too. The minimum code required by our precarious common life can be formulated just as the minimum code for drivers can be formulated. This is in fact done in the criminal law. But more than a minimum code is surely necessary for the commonweal. Codes of virtues (consider the Boy Scout's promise to be Loyal, Trustworthy, Obedient, etc.) are open-ended in a way that minimal codes are not. The minimal code specifies, typically, what we may not do. The code of virtues sets certain not-very-well-defined ideals toward which we may strive.) There are, I think, some virtues which it is logically impossible to teach. The claim to teach them would be like the claim to teach shooting holes-in-one. Wisdom, I suspect, is one of these. The more people learn, we might say, the wiser they become. But we can't teach wisdom (as we might prudence) because it depends too much on a gift of the gods. Not everyone can be wise. To a lesser extent, the same seems to me to be true of justice. Some men are simply not so constituted that they are able to be just. They are sometimes, to our loss, elected or appointed to judgeships. Courage, again, is, I suspect, to a still smaller degree unteachable: some people are by nature cowards. The sociological and even genetic conditions which give rise to this failure could no doubt be changed, but this is a different topic.

I suspect that a minimum set of the virtues would include authenticity, amenability to reason, sensitivity to suffering, dignity, and tolerance. These I should call necessary virtues: virtues without which communities cannot exist. To these might be added all sorts of virtues of station, trade-virtues, special-group virtues, and social virtues. The real task, of determining the virtues which can and should be taught, I have not taken up.

F. THE IRRELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY TO MORAL EDUCATION

by Paul Dietl

It is tempting to hold that in order to decide whether or not morality can be taught, one must first decide what morality is. Nor do I think that an adequate characterization of the nature of morality would be an insignificant accomplishment. But that way of beginning, as old as the *Meno*, has, to say the least, had disappointing results. When one begins by treating the question "What *is* virtue?" as logically prior, one embarks in interminable controversy--either giving an "essence" which always has apparent counter-examples or else a mere list which might serve the authors of a Boy Scout manual well but is hardly philosophically satisfactory.

On the other hand it is not difficult to say what we want in our children and pupils besides academic excellence. What I (and the parents I observe) am interested in instilling seems to come down to two basic characteristics. I want my children to be sensitive to the wants and needs of other children and of adults. Secondly I'm constantly interested in their telling the truth--both about the past and their intentions concerning the future. I don't want to suggest that this is all we mean by "being moral" although I do suspect it is necessary and closer to sufficient than you might think. If an anthropologist came back from a newly discovered tribe and described the system of reward and punishment he observed as consisting in moral *praise* and blame, though neither of these two characteristics was involved, I believe we would fault him. Even more clearly, if a society has developed an appreciation of these two characteristics and goes on to encourage them appropriately, then we would be justified in concluding they had developed a sense of morality.

Now complications arise immediately which exercise moral philosophers. The first thing that strikes one is that so long as there are even two elements involved there is a possibility of clash. Sometimes truthfulness will clash with benevolence. Secondly, no one would hold that all the wants of others put us under moral obligation. Some account of what constitutes a legitimate want must be developed. And now we have enough problems to begin another dissertation in moral philosophy. I do not think we have to write that dissertation before we can deal with our present topic however. Notice that if a person who makes an honest mistake concerning the relative importance of the two principles in a particular context and acts on it, he is already moral and if a person is not already a moral person then problems that arise will have no practical import. So settling those issues may not be essential to answering the questions about what is involved in moral education. That we do sometimes succeed in bringing about some moral development in our children can hardly be disputed. Some people are moral sometimes--whether or not they learned morality in school. But can morality be learned in school? And how can we speak of it being taught if it is *not* in school? What do we mean by "taught?" And now we are off after another essence.

Part, at least, of the implication of saying that moral behavior is taught is that it does not always, consistently come "naturally." No one has to be taught to act so as to satisfy his own wants. Nor could there be principles of prudential maxims which served as the rational foundation. Reasons cannot be given for being rational. Morality is different just because what is required, often, is that one not do what he is spontaneously inclined to.* Now can a child be "taught" to act against his spontaneous inclinations?

To this question the answer is undeniably in the affirmative. And I mean "taught" in its most central uses. In fact acting in defiance of one's spontaneous inclinations is the essence of the work and study involved in formal education. Even in the most progressive experiment where, for example, the children learn about money by playing store, the environment is altered to bring about behavior in the child other than would have taken place. If the setting is so progressive that not even this takes place, then neither does formal education nor, probably, teaching (though learning obviously can). And usually we have neither the means nor the patience to be even that progressive. At some point the student of mathematics must learn the multiplication tables and the student of language some grammar. The student of history could just read so much history that all the chronology of events was always remembered, but memorizing some dates is bound to prove helpful. The closer one gets in school to learning language as the natives do, or living through the history studied, the better. Geography is probably best learned by travel. But there isn't time. That's why we have schools. Something comparable takes place in good classes in literature, music and art. Here, if one is not merely studying the history of the field, one is engaged in the expansion of esthetic horizons. We usually don't speak of educating one to the point of appreciating The Jefferson Airplane but it makes perfectly good sense to speak of educating to the point of appreciating Bach. Teaching can take place because what one ultimately comes to appreciate is different from what one spontaneously enjoyed.

What is involved in this teaching? Well, guiding, correcting explaining, proving, and justifying the exertion (motivating). This last is of special interest. Obviously the multiplication tables are learned because they will facilitate later calculations. The initially less enjoyable fugue is attended to rather than the operetta because doing so will lead to appreciation of another form of music. Now often the pupil is not interested enough in the future calculations to work on the present tables. Indeed if he were he might not have to come to school at all. If the future purposes motivated sufficiently he would undertake the present means.

Of course, I don't want to imply that pedagogical encouragement is the only reason for formal instruction. I've already said the teacher corrects, guides, explains, etc. But the encouragement is crucial. This is true through the "liberal education" of undergraduate college. Distribution requirements are just encouragements to study what one might not originally be interested in. And marks are an encouragement to work hard in even those areas. In graduate and professional school this pedagogical encouragement is less important because the student is specializing in something he enjoys and/or sees its obvious utility to his long term goals. But from elementary school through college the teacher is functioning, in part, as a bridge between the child's short and long range interests. Hopefully the bridge is psychological and never corporal and made up more of praise than of punishment but in some form it's existence can hardly be doubted.

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*Our anthropological thought-experiment would have even more point here. If the tribe he discovered never did anything to discourage fulfillment of the members' spontaneous inclinations they have not discovered morality.

Now something very like this bridge operation takes place in moral development. In the family and in the classroom the parent and teacher encourage praiseworthy behavior by praising it. Meanness, lies and broken promises are discouraged. We bridge the child's interests and others' interests by making it in his interest to take their interests into consideration. Both ends of the bridge must be real. If we were bringing up people to live in Hobbes' state of nature then this moral pedagogical bridge would be a sham. A life of kindness and integrity is usually a full and happy life. If we believed it always led to a short miserable life we would not want a moral life for our children. We might still legislate and punish. We might train and condition people to act in others' interest sometimes. Obviously it would be to our advantage and that of our society to do so. But it would be conceptually distinct from "moral education" as presently conceived.

But now the rub. The moral life involves genuine risk. The point is not just to take into account other peoples' happiness or to tell the truth when it is to one's long-range advantage to do so. That's mere prudence and no one ever doubted that could be taught. To look at things from the moral point of view involves not giving preferential treatment to yourself. How can that be taught? So an objection might go.

It will shortly become clear how much I agree with the view of morality behind the objection. But first notice that going beyond real long range self-interest is probably not necessary for the well-being of society. Very few people do it and very seldom, yet we muddle through. Two things are crucial. First it must be true that the long range reward for current inhibitions will be forthcoming (or at least that it is believed that it will). If your society has a group which is persecuted. If kindness and integrity on their part will not substantially enhance chances for a long and full life then moral education will be impossible.* Secondly, though every moderately critical person will realize that from time to time not being moral will be to his advantage, we can bridge the gap here with institutions providing efficient detection and deterrent.

It is unreasonable to assume that such a social system could not survive. And that may be a good argument for the view that any further moral heights to which man can aspire have no essential place in public instruction. But that most of us want more is obvious. Even if it has no place in public instruction it is what we are after in moral education wherever that education takes place. And I see no reason it couldn't be forthcoming from formal instruction. Indeed I think it is to some extent even now--though not, usually, in classes in "ethics."

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*As Silberman shows education in general will be--and for exactly the same reason. Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, p. .

The first thing is to realize and admit honestly that no bridge is possible. If morality involves genuine risk of real sacrifice then we will never be able to sincerely persuade people to be moral for its advantages alone. That would be a logical impossibility. To ask for a justification is to manifest conceptual confusion. Not surprisingly it is at this point so many have turned to philosophy. This hankering after what might be called a cosmic bridge takes many forms. I'll only characterize a few which, I think, are typical of the most widespread attempts. (A) Crude religion (B) Logical trickery (C) Psychological con-games (D) Moral Systemizing.

Christianity is a good example of the former. People who say moral education is impossible without religious training betray a belief that people won't be good unless they are rewarded or are punished if they are not. The advantage is that God sees all and so is more efficient than the police and courts. The disadvantage is that no new moral height has been reached. Prudence has not been transcended, we have only stacked the deck so earthly principle will be cosmically prudential. "Morality can't be taught without religion" means here "Morality can't be taught." One must hasten to add that Christianity, and I suspect all but the most primitive religions, do leave room for the believer who does what is right not out of fear of doing the wrong but just because it is right. And this is considered by all to be the position of greater moral worth.

Logical trickery takes many forms. Plato's was one of the first. He proved that justice leads to happiness by redefining happiness as the life of justice. Kurt Baier is probably the most recent. He argues that one should be moral because it is to the advantage of everyone if everyone is moral. Stipulative definitions and fallacies of composition are obviously too high a price to pay.

Michael Scriven tries what I call the psychological con-game. He argues that since the moral life is happier than even the most enlightened prudential life, it is rational to adopt the moral point of view (in spite of the fact that the moral life runs the risk of real sacrifice). Its clear advantages outweigh its risks. But Scriven sees being moral on an analogy with taking a pill. If it were, then, since we couldn't know in advance which would have to really pay and the chances of any one of us paying price are so small, it would be rational to take the pill. But alas moral temptation is always with us. In instance after instance prudence and principle clash. Scriven can reply that this just shows we are lacking in moral development. But that's just the state of man and what we are interested in, given this state, is to develop moral agents who do what is right even when really tempted in the opposite direction.

Finally we have the systemizers. Their work is most studied in current ethics courses. The main event is usually the clash between deontologists and utilitarians. Typically the former forbid some sorts of actions as inherently immoral and the latter call upon us to do all actions which have happy results. Any particular moral philosopher will have a mixed bag of these strictures since by now it seems obvious to all that neither position is adequate in itself. There is a utility factor which morally justifies breaking some promises but some promises should be kept even if there would accrue a small advantage to someone in its being broken. However, concerning the moral character we are trying to instill in our children these doctrines suffer from even more profound deficiencies. The negative duties are insufficient. One can avoid breaking promises by never undertaking any. On the other hand the positive ones are too strong. "Help the needy." or "Act so as to maximize happiness." either do not require any particular action at any particular time or they would never allow one to pursue his own interests or even to rest.* There is always something more one could be doing. More importantly even if one were able to systemize all morality into one or two maxims that would still leave open the original question. It would lead to a morally better life only on the part of those who were willing to do what was right if only someone would show him what is. Further, since the only test for the adequacy of the system has to be its accuracy in describing the behavior of morally well-developed people, the instances of such moral conversion will be necessarily rare.

But let's not lose sight of our goals. We want people sensitive to others but not people who completely neglect their own pursuits. We want people who act on principle but not continual martyrs. Only modern fascination with generalization in ethics could have led to doctrines with such silly consequences. For many current moral philosophers universalizability is the one feature of moral discourse which saves it from sheer emotivism or subjectivism. If I morally approve of an act then I must approve of all people doing that act, in morally relevant circumstances and that is what is supposed to distinguish moral approval from mere approval. The trouble is not just that all the interesting questions arise over what is and is not morally relevant--though they do! It's that a fully developed moral person is neither one who merely avoids moral situations nor one who always does whatever he can do to help others.

I think it is in reaction to that sort of specious dichotomy that our current students lose interest in rationalizing about their actions. One of them goes on a freedom ride. Another burns his draft card. The one does not condemn the other for not joining him. Each one is "doing his thing." And each for reasons which make it a morally worthy act. Nor will the old talk about obligatory acts and acts of supererogation appeal much. Or if it does it will be because it is realized that a morally responsible person has an obligation to do some (though not all conceivable) supererogatory acts. But that's too paradoxical to be helpful.

But if this is what we are after how can we teach it? First let me repeat three things. The first is that it is not necessary for society. The second is that if such actions, actions really done out of principle, is what you are after then don't pretend real sacrifice is not involved. Pretending all acts of principle are really prudential, or are prudential whenever they are rationally justified, will inhibit rather than help moral education. Since it is not socially necessary that the acts which would be principled (if they were not mythologized into prudence) be undertaken, we can afford to leave them alone and hope for the best. The third is that obviously no reasons or proofs or explanations will do. This rules out what I have referred to as pedagogical bridges. There can be training even where there is not education. The encouragement and discouragement of parents and teachers of the genuinely principled behavior of the children may result in lasting habits and dispositions for such behavior. (This, if effective, can take place without the cosmic mythology.) But since reasons cannot be given, education as so far dealt with cannot produce it.

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*It would only allow that rest which was necessary to carry off the next moral battle successfully.

We are not without some resources even here, however. Much moral education takes place by example. This is one of the most important functions of teaching history and literature. I am not proposing we select and slant history in a Platonic endeavor to delude the student into thinking virtue always pays and crime never. They're too smart for that anyhow. But, on the other hand, the moral life doesn't require heavy sacrifice from everyone all the time, though it does from most sometime or other, and it is possible that presented with many examples of kinds of life the student will pick one half way between merely avoiding the occasion of sin, on the one hand, and an endless search for positive duties on the other.

Let me close by just mentioning six things I have not argued for: (1) I have not argued for the unintelligibility of some actions. The actions I consider to be morally responsible are explainable. Asked why he turned in his draft card the student mentions the suffering and devastation of this war he is protesting. That is perfectly intelligible even though he might not know how to answer the question as to whether everyone should turn in his card just now. The freedom rider on the burning bus, in fact, might vehemently deny everybody should be on this or some relevantly similar bus. If asked why they do this in spite of the probable loss of personal happiness they would know they were faced with a philosopher. Knowing this they might answer that they considered it the moral thing to do. The only question they could not answer would be the next: "Why be moral?" But that, as Bradley and Prichard well know, is just because the question is a confusion. (2) I am not arguing that the most moral person is the person whose inclinations are the most immoral so he has the most challenges to overcome. The point of moral education is to instill a real sensitivity to the wants and needs of others. Instilling moral sensitivity is here like instilling or expanding esthetic sensitivity. We want the considerations of others to really weigh on the agent--and not just behaviorally. But that is not to deny that acting on these considerations will sometimes result in real sacrifices to the agent. The real goal may be to instill in moral agents as real an interest in the happiness of a Vietnamese peasant as he has in his immediate family. But even with one's own family from time to time real sacrifices are involved and there is nothing to be gained in saying there is not. (3) Nor, on the other hand am I arguing for a virtue ethic, at least as traditionally conceived. I think the Greek notion of wisdom is a bag of gas. In the end Socrates has to fall back on the possibility of a cosmic bridge in order to make real sacrifice rational. People just are not happy on the rack no matter to what extent their reason is in proper control over their passions.* (4) Nor am

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*In this regard see Henry Veatch's Rational Man. What is probably the best recent attempt to translate Greek insight into a more modern idiom becomes at bottom a tract on Christian prudence.

I against religious morality. As I said I do think morality and sophisticated religion are compatible. Indeed often the message of religion is genuine morality as personified in some of its heroes, and there is obviously much agreement in what I have said and the notions of moral debit and credit often found in religion. There is a danger here that may make history a better source of examples however. If the religious stories are not actually believed, or if the only unquestionably moral acts are done by men who are half divine, then such activity may come to be looked upon as a humanly unrealizable ideal.
(5) Any similarity between what I have said and what commonly goes under the label of Existentialism is purely coincidental. Sartre, for example, seems to be even more fascinated with generalization than Hare. If I choose to be a bachelor or a waiter I am deciding that everyone should. That seems absurd. Secondly, there is nothing here analogous to justifying an action solely on the ground that it provides the agent with a new experience. I may have no way of proving to a person that he shouldn't stab his wife eight times if all he cares about are prudential reasons and, *ex hypothesis*, there are none. But nothing I've said would give him any moral justification for so doing. There is one facet of existentialism concerning which I'm not sure what to say. They not only argue that one should sometimes act out of commitment when it is not prudent (though they tend to go on about the absurdity and *Angst* involved) but they sometimes hold that one should act even when the cause for which one is acting is not helped by the act. Not only should I join the revolution even though it may be imprudent but I should join it even if I believe it is doomed to failure. This leads to the ultimate. What if my very act is counter-productive? Some protests of the war are, it seems to me, in this category. But do I really have to decide here? If the reason he burned his card was in protest to the killing then he was acting morally--although the act may not have been an advisable one in those circumstances.
(6) Insofar as I have said anything positive about moral education I deny that it is culturally relative. What I have said about teachers and parents is true, it seems to me, in any society whatsoever--not just "Western" or "liberal" ones. If the society has a concept of morality at all and if any attempt is made to pass it on, I think it would have to be along paths I have outlined.

V

PARTICIPANTS

Thomas F. Green (Professor of Education, Syracuse University). The Position Paper: (1) The Proposal Essay: Education for the Formation of a Technical Conscience, and (2) A Note on Method.

Roy Simon-Bryce (Lecturer in Education and Sociology, Syracuse University. Presently on faculty at Hunter College, New York City). On the relation between the context of conscience and the formation of conscience. The viability of "The American Dream" as a source of social ideals in contemporary social structure.

James E. McClellan, Jr. (Professor of Education, Temple University). The viability of civic ideals and the appropriate symbols for their cultivation through formal schooling.

George Stern (Professor of Education and Psychology, Syracuse University). On the relation between the context of conscience and the process of learning as related to the formation of conscience. The prisoner's dilemma.

Edmund Pincoffs (Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas). On the limits of the formalist tradition in ethics to the educational problem of the formation of conscience.

Paul Dietl (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.). On the irrelevance of moral theory for the problems of moral education.

Art Grisham (Graduate Assistant, Philosophy of Education, Syracuse University). Assisted the principal investigator in drafting the position papers, arranging for seminar meetings, and in developing a summary of the discussion.